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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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PERESTROYKA'S IDEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL

Social Goals and Political Programs

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[Article by Aleksandr Razumov, *KOMMUNIST* section editor]

[Text] Social objectives are not dispassionate deadly indicators along the roads of life. They are not outside or ahead of history; they determine our steps not on the basis of a remote and as yet nonexistent future; they live within ourselves, in our history, in the real dynamics of society, side by side with which they exist and develop. Without them human history would stop being human history, remaining a simple monotonous change of generations and a series of random changes.

Closely interwoven with means, the ways set the trend of social development (that without which we would have no reason to discuss progress, regress, etc.); together with the trend, they also impart to social life a systematic and motivated nature, to a point of historical completeness. In our practical activities they apply to economics, politics, philosophy, religion and fiction. Whatever we may say about the objectives of society, we say it as people of our time, alongside the invisible presence of the rest of mankind.

Perhaps not all that distant from us are the final frontiers, the limits of historical civilization, and the completion of the gigantic evolutionary cycle, the beginning of which may be traced to the Egyptian pyramids, and the temples along the Fertile Crescent; this takes us to the Greco-Roman region of the Mediterranean and the banks of the Huanghe and the Ganges (where, from the middle of the first millennium B.C. its basic paradigms stand out among a nondifferentiated awareness), and further to the origins of history, lost in the indistinct period of illiteracy and the muteness of prehistory. Throughout the existence of man alienation has been created, taken shape, lost its shape and stuck to man. Initially there was alienation from nature, for at the time when awareness burst out within the dullness of an animal existence, the human individual fell out of the common order of things.

The simultaneous appearance of Personality and Morality creates a new spiral of alienation, this time

against society with its alienated labor, economic structures, standards of political behavior, base and superstructural cultural-ideological symbols. The primitive confrontation, the confrontation between man and nature, became built-in in the "genetic memory" of religion, philosophy and ideology. Naturally, not to an identical and equal extent but, essentially, it is only recently that the various forms of social awareness began timidly to separate themselves from the (ancient, Renaissance and latest) dualism of the heart and the body, matter and spirit, providing new interpretations to past beliefs. However, we are still as far from the ethical, the moral attitude toward nature as we are, let us say, to the superior synthesis of the religious and the secular, the clerical and the worldly, within the single moral awareness.

To this day, an advancing dialectics, according to which the level of production of material goods leads to quality and quantity of consumption, while consumption stimulates ever new production, may be found in the trends and the concentration of the processes of the shaping of man, cultures, civilizations, and societies. Production-consumption includes and fulfills Need. According to Marx, this is the "ideal motivation for production." The curve of development of historical systems shows an escalation of needs, while public projects present an image of abundance and dreams of the ever fuller satisfaction of growing needs, the major and the lion's share of which grew and matured on the nutritive grounds of the human Universe, harmed by alienation (economic domination and political power).

Time itself remembers that while we are enthusiastically performing (to many people ritual!) dances involving parties, factions and platforms, the last gasoline-fueled campfires of a technological civilization are burning out. We try not to note the obvious fact that the centuries of domination of the "measure of all things"—man—and the 300th's anniversary of Reason and Enlightenment (or folly?) led to the fact that, the moment we earmark the solution of the problem of the "origin of species," man must urgently deal with the problem of their disappearance. The saddest thing of all is the ripening of a decisive and mutual objection expressed by Nature outside man and within man's biological, animal body. It is a protest which, after the philosophers, has been a favorite of journalists; it is an "ontological," and "existentialist" process. Simply speaking, it is a question of the existence, of the life or death of humankind.

Religious hallucinations—the eternal cosmic struggle between Light and Darkness, Ormazd and Ahriman, and Christ and Antichrist, has finally acquired visible traits: the specter of absolute evil has become apparent and man turned out to be its creator, with his human love of power, greed, ambitions, arrogance, helplessness and fear and, above all, the thoughtless and poorly governed group governmental, racial, national, and other similar relations-clashes, into which man enters in the course of living together with other men.

While still very far from solving the global problems, the world community is already out of breath from energy oversaturation, yet energy remains in short supply. Catastrophically little time is left (according to some reliable estimates, no more than 40 years at the rate of the present energy consuming technological and demographic trends) to the point when it will begin to lose its breath also from the so-called greenhouse effect: the product of the decay of the "inorganic human body," the "second nature." It would be preferable, before that point is reached, to realize once and for all that neither strategic defense initiatives nor jet bombers, nor the excessive satedness of some or the poverty of other are a higher benefit, and nor are scientific and technical growth itself, which has been all too hastily described as "progress," and even the information industry with computerization, for they can be used with equal success for good or bad. It is only when social systems can provide them with a clear and an unequivocally humanitarian interpretation (which they are obligated to do!) that philosophy and morality would be able sincerely to congratulate technology, with a clear conscience.

At that point, if we are lucky or, more accurately, if we make purposeful political efforts rather than become entangled in social contradictions and antagonisms and not become the victims of a nuclear Armageddon or else poison ourselves with some kind of chemical or bacteriological rubbish, only then should we recall that it is precisely we who welcomed the dawn of the new era, who were at the origins of the new stage in the development of human thought, not fettered by the old alienations. This splendid objective is the base for unification, for universal consolidation; this would be a good occasion for mankind, having forgotten past and present ideological and political quarrels, tired of wars, genocide, crime, lies, doctrines and speeches, to start dealing with its own salvation, restructuring or repentance, whichever one may prefer.

As to our descendants, the possible inhabitants of a free, humane and nonalienated world, it is to be hoped that they will be no stupider than we are and will be able to choose their own path. Let us wish them success but let us not envy them. Whether or not their lives are more active or more contemplative, they will become no less complex and dramatic. Cloudless happiness is possible only above the clouds, where there is "neither sadness or sighing but eternal life." The mission of those who live on earth—today and forever—is not to resolve the problems of the future generations (something which, it seems to me, we have done a great deal), but deal with our own problems. The task now is not simply to survive, but to survive in such a way as to lay a straight path for those who will follow us.

Unfortunately, today there are few reasons for cheerful optimism. Let us look at our perestroika without which, as many people realize and which others will soon realize, no further global progress of civilization is possible. Too many ecological, technological and political tangles have developed in our human and governmental

space to be treated as an internal matter, unrelated to global events. For the time being, it is triggering more problems than it is able to resolve.

Yet the time allotted to us for renovation is by no means any greater than that allotted to the remaining global community. Actually, it is unlikely that we could straighten out our affairs in anything short of 30 or 40 years if we were to accept as the objective of renovation a new social system and different humane forms of social relations, different state and law, and a new type of man. Also if we take into consideration the fact that we are as yet to leave behind us a long array of errors and reformulate our ideological, scientific and political and artistic languages and values and meanings, i.e., the main culture "codes," and reshape our thinking. In a word, we must rethink the entire methodology of historical initiative, having realized, within the concepts of economic and political action, that the main problems of society are not behind but ahead of it.

Whether this is good or bad is not the question. On the social level, mankind is becoming aware of its objectives within the framework of ideological systems and making socially significant decisions through the mediation of political parties. The suns of ideologies and parties shine particularly brightly when major sets of group interests are activated. However, these suns can also blind supporters and create gravitational forces which distort the field of social awareness. They can provoke a sufficient number of conditions leading to possible social upheavals during periods of substitution of guidelines and objectives, and unclear prospects. Therefore, a cultured and civilized society, a state and a government and a political party in power should extensively consider, unless social change is placed under the strict control of morality, science and common sense, at least how to use them in providing the necessary support for the decisions they make. This is something, unfortunately, which we do not note so far: scientific recommendations are conflicting, the mechanisms for choosing them have been poorly developed, morality is violated by the effect of the shady economy and ethnic conflicts, and common sense is frequently dissolved in the euphoria of meetings and the pleasure of "interparty" debates.

Those among our fellow-citizens who excite the minds and warm the blood at meetings and in the course of innumerable formal and informal alliances, as they demand (of the state) maximal justice and immediate and decisive change for the better, do not notice that the state itself can barely make ends meet. To demand of the state anything is naive: one could obtain something only by depriving of it someone else. So, what is the solution? Is it private initiative, private enterprise, free competition and the market? It is true that the advice of those who consider the market as the only rescuer and who call for a profound reform of the state, is becoming increasingly persistent.

I am not against it. I am not an economist. I do not have my own economic program and I do not see any serious

economic arguments which could weaken the views held by the supporters of a market economy. The market is what it is. I am prepared to believe that it is a universal human possession and that it can function under different and support different (feudal, capitalist, socialist) social structures, and that we must immediately exonerate the market mechanism from accusations of inescapable and vicious influence on man and society. Nonetheless, I would prefer to enter a market economy as well with my eyes wide open. It would be even better if the socioeconomic and political systems enter into this economy with their minds clear and with sober considerations.

As a consumer and agent of social processes, as the "author and actor in the historical drama," I cannot fail to be concerned with the following circumstances. We read in the first volume of "*Das Kapital*," in the famous part which concludes the chapter on initial accumulation, the following significant lines: "Converting the splintered private ownership of individuals, based on their own labor, into capitalist ownership is, naturally, a much longer, more difficult and hard process than converting capitalist private ownership, which is actually already based on the public production process, into public ownership. In the first place it was a question of a few usurpers expropriating the possession of the people's mass; in the second case it is the people's mass that must expropriate a few usurpers" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 23, p 773). Naturally, Marx was discussing natural, normal historical-economic rhythms (the word combination "expropriation of usurpers" should not be interpreted in terms of personal coercion). Naturally, this natural process could, under specific circumstances, assume very abnormal deviant forms. All of this is true.

Here is what is worrisome: in Russia, where the process of initial accumulation had been poorly implemented, it was this "easy" attempt at converting from private to public ownership and the expropriation by many of a few that led to the Civil War, mass repressions, hunger and poverty without, as it were, achieving its cherished objective, which was "negating the negation," i.e., it did not lead to an economy based on individual ownership by the associated worker, an ownership existing "on the basis of cooperatives and the common ownership of the land and individually created means of production" (ibid.). It would be wrong to believe that no one aspired to achieve it. People did aspire! This even included outstanding minds and political leaders. However, history has the habit of providing its own interpretation to even the clearest possible texts and ascribing its own meaning to entirely well-wishing and sympathetic advice.

Unquestionably, society did not stand still. A "cultural revolution" was made, industry, power industry, highly developed space technology, precise technological systems, and so on, were created. In precisely the same way, however, there also developed things which are totally unwilling to disappear, such as a falling behind global

standards of economic development, arbitrariness, petty supervision, the neglectful attitude of the official bureaucracy, corruption, restriction of freedom of thought, a secrecy brought to the point of senselessness and, which is the inevitable companion of the selected form of socialization (nationalization), the deadening of economic and cultural historical memory. The latter, actually, was retained on the level of behavioral standards, which were characteristic "archtypes" of the "collective subconscious." These social vices are an almost identical copy of those which existed in the 19th century. In any case, they were expressed in similar terms by Marquis Astolf de Custine, a traveler in Russia beloved by Sovietologists, in 1839, in his book "*Letters From Russia*." He is also the author of the frequently quoted statement: "I am not saying that their political system has not created anything good. I am simply asserting that the price for such achievements was excessive." Anyone mistrustful of the marquis could turn to Saltykov-Shchedrin and historians such as Solovyev, Kostomarov or Klyuchevskiy.

So, if a conversion from markets to plan and to administrative command, from a more complex to a simpler economy, brought so much tragedy, could we assume that the opposite, a return to the market would be nothing but a holiday of immediate and high consumption, accompanied by the anthem of democracy and law and order? Neither our sad historical experience nor the study of the initial conditions or else the study of economic and political realities have given us reason for such superoptimistic prognosis.

Today we have become much more intelligent. Initially, however, it was precisely this psychological belief, the sociopsychological mood that led to the haste (not to mention fussiness) with which we undertook to apply in the country's economy systems of state inspection, innumerable defective models of national, regional and other cost accountings, cooperative projects, self-governing "democratic" state enterprises, farm leasing, (to nonexistent private farmers). To this day, as we hear appeals from some high deputy rostra immediately to distribute (sell) the land to the peasants, after which, allegedly, there will soon be total food abundance, repeating after the ironical (occasionally) Klyuchevskiy in quoting the prereform author Ya.I. Rostovtsev: "I look optimistically at the solution of the peasant problem: the peasants will be given full freedom; they will begin to get rich."...

Naturally, there is a great deal of healthy thinking in the idea of dismantling the authoritarian-bureaucratic economic management system (including cost accounting and cooperatives) and in adopting political management; furthermore, this concept alone could indicate a way out of the historical impasse. In this case, however, it was precisely that system which became operational. Bureaucracy buried the mind and noneconomic coercion applied by that same bureaucracy, with the help of force, once again failed, creating a variety of monsters, such as

personal and group mindless egotism, a growing inflationary wave and, as a consequence, new financial-currency protuberances and plunges into the shady economy.

According to Weber, even an ideal, functional, rational and efficient bureaucracy can act only within the range of the corporate, the departmental "values," systems and standards which created it. In our country it was and remains by no means ideal. Essentially, or even as a trend, it is incapable of engaging in any functional (aimed at achieving a narrow specific objective) substantive, as Mannheim said, rationality, i.e., it cannot undertake actions consistent with reason and thinking, capable of exceeding the limits of the initial task in a broader area of problems (which, naturally, does not exclude the existence within it of individual very sensible people). Hence distortions of departmental interests become understandable, and it is clear that when the state, as the supreme administrator, slackened its power pressure, the entire directive-based administrative pyramid began to shake and that the already unbalanced market system became further unbalanced. We quickly adopted all its faults without being able to acquire its virtues.

It is said that any system has a madness of its own. The madness in our system was that, while intending to introduce the market it began to operate with antimarket methods. Having decided to rely on economic management methods, our bureaucracy implemented its decisions through antieconomic actions. How could one quote a selective-mass wage increase if it is paralleled by an almost blanket drop in the living standard? Or if it is not supported by any economic realities? Let us add to this the nationalistic storms, the strike tornadoes, the natural and sociotechnological cataclysms which befell the country's economy, "leaving in their wake a desert" on the consumer market and generating the worst possible shortage: the shortage of hope.

What is bad is not the fact that we undertook to introduce the market but that we entered the contemporary system of the global economy on the basis of an obsolete economic ideology and practice. For example, to promise that everything will radically change in 1, 2 or 5 years is nothing but the old ideology and the impatient self-confidence of managers.

Could all of this have been avoided? Could it have been avoided in its entirety? I do not know, I am not sure. I am convinced, however, that the awareness of the people of forthcoming difficulties could and should have been prepared with an open and frank discussion. Now, when concern and mass justified dissatisfaction with the delayed expectation for change for the better are such as to wreck and block even any healthy initiative, this becomes all the more difficult. Nonetheless, it remains vitally necessary, for otherwise irritation may grow into hatred (with easily predictable consequences).

Clearly, it is not merely a question of debates. We have started discussing the depoliticizing of the economy and

deideologizing of politics. Having agreed to do so, we must think. Naturally, it is a question of repoliticizing and reideologizing, of new politics and new ideology. Ever since economics pulled itself away from the primitive tribe, a purely economic relationship—the satisfaction of biological (not social) needs on the basis of joint labor activities—stopped being such. After a political system was established, the economy could not fail to become the focal point of its attention.

In practice economic and political power (the distinction between Marx and Weber) becomes so closely interwoven that occasionally only the eye (the abstraction, the imagination) of the theoretician may be able occasionally to separate them. The basic market act—the purchase and sale of manpower—is also a political act to the extent to which it is supported by the legal system, governed by the power of the law which expresses the will of the political authorities. It is subject to the influence of the state, political parties, trade unions, etc. How to trade on the market and who can trade must be the prerogative of the economic power; what is being traded cannot be a matter of total indifference to the political authority (there is no market law whatsoever which prohibits profitable trade in nuclear warheads. However, we do not trade in them). Generally speaking, we must try to determine whether Marx was right (along with the political economy which preceded him) in placing the theory of value in the production and the trade area. When our state absorbed trade (together with producers and consumers) this was, to say the least, unwise. However, letting the elements operate uncontrolled would be no more intelligent. The political system would simply be unable to withstand the overload and would explode. An uncontrolled market is hardly better than the element of the plan. Under contemporary circumstances, actually, an effort to develop a market without legal and governmental coercions and restrictions and without political, ideological and cultural support would be a futile undertaking. Without their help we cannot develop the necessary stratum of entrepreneurs; there would be no "encounter" between this stratum and the objectives of society; an initiative-minded and, therefore, a man of substance will, as in the past, be considered suspicious by public opinion or, worse would engage in shady economic practices. Naturally, such a stratum will develop its own ideology and politics. What matters, however, is for it not to be antisocial.

As to politics, it would not exist without ideology to begin with and, in all likelihood, would not begin to exist, for it is 1,000 times "more pluralistic." As long as people have a variety of group interests which occasionally do not coincide, the power, the coercive regulation of their relations will remain necessary; until that time, they will support the authorities or oppose them, setting up their own group images-concepts concerning their own place in society and defending their own view on things as being the most reliable. It is unlikely for the authorities to drop the habit of substantiating their

actions by appealing to the common interest. Even if the authorities would state that "I Am the State," they would claim to act for the general good (France).

It is very regrettable that the world at large is still living in the prepluralist age (including both us and our overseas partners). It may be better to describe it as a protopluralist age, bearing in mind that a dialogue, albeit difficult, may nonetheless be noticed. Within our country, we are merely taking the initial steps toward a pluralistic awareness and pluralistic practices. We are marching toward a pluralism of political biases which can be formulated only by a highly developed civil society. At that point political trends will provide a sensible, a balanced democratic variety. They will be able, having eliminated the chaos of a loud discord, to become an efficient means of rational action; the variety of opinions will become the substratum which nurtures social creativity. It is only as such that it could become a prerequisite for the legitimacy of political regimes and generate alternatives and opportunities for possible options for social development and for coming out of the impasse.

Strictly speaking, pluralism is not the skeleton of political life, put together as a result of the good and humane will of an enlightened conscientious government. It cannot be structured with the help of appeals and decrees. It grows from inner needs, fulfilling the assignments of entrepreneurial initiative and of individual, specific and general ideological-political instructions and obeying the requirements of legal standards and, above all, the recommendations of common sense and moral imperatives. The leading spiritual maxim of a pluralistic awareness is the following: "I cannot say that he who claims this is right but..." offering both to reason and ethics to acknowledge that no mortal possesses the complete truth. However, all of us together can and must find our own ways to the truth. To begin with, we should perhaps find out when is it and why is it that we do not understand one another, as well as the fact that wherever making an error is forbidden usually no place is found for the truth either.

In short, pluralism remains the objective of a practical historical progress without being as yet its reality. Anyone who thinks otherwise should closely look, perhaps, at the growing excitement prevailing in our (and in our neighbor's) public meetings. Political and spiritual-ideological pluralism is least of all adapted to periods of forced radical restructuring of the social organism—to social revolutions. Such revolutions either totally lack any or have little space for doubting and for thoughtful self-analysis or unhurried reflections. What are most valued and, based on the cruel logic of events pertinent, are unscrupulous conviction and resolve and the especially concrete practical Action.

Both the greatness and the tragedy of revolutions, their attractiveness and their repelling manifestations are included in the sharp polarizing of aspirations, the demarcation between ideology and political programs

and the clash of interests. The greatness and attraction of revolutions are due to the fact that man, previously suppressed, the anonymous part of the "mass," is given the opportunity to take a deep breath, to participate in the making of history and of himself, to display heroism and his Will. The tragedy and the repelling features reside in the fact that in this case all usual behavioral standards are destroyed, the law is replaced by an "unlimited law" of dictatorship, moral foundations lose their mandatory nature and the will is manifested through suppression.... Then it suddenly turns out that the will does not mean freedom and that true historical creativity is postponed for an indefinite period of lengthy and painful economic and cultural restorations.

Even a relatively "soft" semirevolution, such as the February one, was a social convulsion, directly related to the fevers of the Civil War. Maksimilian Voloshin, who had sensitively felt the pulse beat of life, and who was a contemporary of the revolution, described the events of those days as follows: "The period of the Provisional Government was, psychologically, the most difficult period of the revolution. The February coup was in fact not a revolution but a soldiers' mutiny.... Russian society which, for many decades, had lived with the expectation of the revolution, accepted the external symptoms (the fall of the dynasty, abdication, proclamation of a republic) as the essence of the events and was pleased by the symptoms of gangrene, which it interpreted as harbingers of a cure. These months were a crying and tragic contradiction between universal enthusiasm and reality. All the praises in honor of freedom and democracy, all speeches at meetings and newspaper articles of that time were intolerable lies."

Historians may differ in their interpretation of this assessment. However, those who call for a "return to February" and see in this the prototype of democratic, multiparty and pluralistic freedoms, should pay attention to these words. Somehow it has been quickly forgotten that within a short period of time, from February to October, there were interparty and intraparty (factional) squabbles, governmental crises, the helplessness of the soviets, the failure of the offensive and the total breakdown of the front, the Kornilov mutiny, heavy-caliber machine-guns installed on house roofs, the firing at the July demonstration and the total breakdown of the state.

Naturally, revolutions release that part of popular energy which engages in the destruction of the historical dams. However, this is the energy of an explosion. A social blast cannot be closely and accurately controlled. So far, wherever such a blast has occurred, not only have road obstructions been cleared but landslides have appeared as well; the shock wave has deformed the objective of the movement itself. We know the "curse" of all revolutions: the winners are not those who started a revolution or fought for it. Weakened by their reciprocal destruction, the struggling classes open the way to power to third forces. The slave and the slave owner open the path to the feudal lord; the serf and the feudal lord opens the way

to the bourgeois. Our revolution, as we can now well see, also failed to bring about the victory of the proletariat and the peasantry. The bloodshedding Civil War and the even more cruel Stalinist ideological and political "evolutions" brought to the surface marginal-lumpen equalization moods; the authoritarian regime brought military-police forces and an omnipotent state not accountable to the Constitution and the law.

Part of this legacy continued to live in something which society is currently trying to reject: ideological, monistic orthodoxy and intolerance, monopoly power and illegality, a virtually comprehensive legal and economic incompetence and the naive conviction that the state can solve all of our material and spiritual problems. We are clearly short of responsibility, dignity and tolerance. Obviously, all too long the state (persuading, protecting, rewarding, punishing) decided for us, the "weak and sinful" citizens, how better to handle our own destinies.

Should anyone be interested in the view of this author, let me admit that I would prefer to live in a society which has, in general, learned how to manage itself without political parties, a society in which politics has been replaced by a natural, reasonable and moral self-regulation of social relations. Alas! For the time being this is only a fantasy. Despite the entire importance of the question of "what type of democracy would we like to have?" it is even more important to determine what type of democracy is possible in our country. Therefore, we go back to politics and political parties.

People introduce in politics part of their inner world, hopes, aspirations, interests and concepts of the meaning of life and happiness, trying to ascribe them, as we already noted, the nature of a universal obligation. Many of those who are in politics rise up to their potential more fully than in other areas of activity. Nonetheless, this is a specific area of restrictions: it involves occasionally forced and drastic decisions; it is a place where moral imperatives must be coordinated with rational and expedient actions, personal desires and biases and the dictate of circumstances. The politician must, all too frequently, settle with a peremptory "yes" or "no" any disorderly clash of wishes and opinions, paying no attention to shades of meaning and thus eliminating the artistic, the intellectual completeness and variety of life. The most important, the central task of a contemporary social renovation is to restore it to the maximally possible extent.

Long years of economic, political and ideological monopoly exercised by a centralized authority resulted in exceptionally narrowing the outlook of society, befogging the future with a narrowly aimed one-sided view and introducing, as much as possible, standards, routine and monotony within the private lives of citizens (the civil society). Having rejected the separation, combination and consideration of the range of conflicting interests of individual population groups, the party assumed the feature of a party for its own sake, a mass organized

force which supported its own upper echelon. Its objectives turned out to be so misshapen that, ignoring the people's good, the party was able to produce and, for many long years to support, even totally criminal or openly talentless leaders. It would be unfair to remove the party and the entire multi-million strong mass of party members from the building of socialism and our victories. However, we cannot fail to see (at least from 1929 to the initiation of perestroika) the negative impact on its experience.

It is neither socially nor psychologically possible to imagine that, having won a revolution, the Bolshevik Party would have undertaken to share the power with anyone and to promote parliamentarianism, while its leaders would engage in scientific debates with their former mortal enemy. However, having accepted the concept and practices of monopoly power of a state party and a one-party state, sooner or later a ruling party should have initiated a movement toward its self-destruction. It viewed its weakness as strength. A society, as though a procession borrowed from a canvas by Peter Breugel, marched for decades, poorly mapping its own road, losing its best fellow travelers in the black terrorist downfalls, skinning its elbows in arbitrary and unprepared reforms, sinking into swamps of stagnation, and paying no attention to ecological, social and moral traumas. Truthfully, today one could be amazed not at the fact that perestroika is running idle at but the pace at which it took place and at what is taking place in general. This circumstance, in itself, should not lead create in anyone a feeling of complacency.

Yes, in no more than 5 years a new "social contract"—a presidential form of government—was drafted. However, unknown to society as yet remain the final shape of the new Union, the new economic structures or the final forms of political organization.

Tired of projects, at this point society is ready to reject altogether the idea of social planning. Yet there is a difference separating plans, prophecies and forecasts. Some are the offspring of mythological imagination while others are necessary in order to be aware of prospects and of possible alternatives in making a sensible choice. Naturally, if we are guided by theories which contain extreme logical contradictions, such as "blossoming," "rapprochement" and "merger" among nations or the notorious "withering away of the state through its strengthening," we could expect nothing good.

Today problems of the renovation of society and the party are problems of national renovation. There are many amateur philosophers who ask: "Was the choice which was made in October 1917 the right one?" It is as though someone with a very swollen brain was intensely thinking, on behalf of the "people," of the path along which to move it. Neither the people nor any one of the then revolutionaries had even a concept of what will be the nature of real and not fictitious socialism. What

about now? Have we already determined without a question that we know everything about socialism?

Consider humanism. Not so long ago a respected people's deputy (truly respected!) insistently emphasized that he is an "abstract humanist." He was not alone, for this term has already found its way in the press, for one must choose ways of expressing oneself. Ask Zoroaster, the Gautama Buddha or the Biblical prophets, turn to the author of the "Sermon on the Mount" and to the stranger, the refugee fleeing from Mecca to Medina: Could and did those people want to be known as abstract humanists? Their humanism always had a very precise and specific direction: the human soul. "Know thyself" is the supreme moral and religious law of all highly developed forms of religious life. In the same way, the humanism of ancient Greece and the Renaissance was aimed at the perfection of man as a sensible natural being. It was a naturalistic and an anthropocentric humanism.

The sociological humanism of the proletarian revolutionaries (and not their alone) is turned to man and his social relations, to relations within which he becomes included by virtue of the social division of labor. Human life can be changed for the better only by changing that which is the essence of man: the real "nonhumanized" social relations. In that area, the humanists blame their opponents not in the least for turning to universal human values (all humanisms have turned to them) but for their helplessness, their inability to implement these concepts. That is precisely where they identify their abstract nature.

Not one of the three ideological trends we named has been able, so far, unconditionally to assert the higher meaning and value of individual human existence. The ways of each one of them were interwoven with violence, fanaticism, mass sacrifices, executions and deformations of initial objectives. We, who would like to protect mankind, are simply left with nothing other than to seek and find a synthesis where in the past we could see nothing but antinomies. I would not like to seem as though I know what specific cultural-ideological and political forms this synthesis may assume under the conditions of our own (and the world's) renovation. We could assume that one of the possible ways to it is that of socialism.

The critics ask the following: What kind of program is democratic socialism? Could there ever be any socialism other than democratic? Yes! Today there has even been talk of communofascism and sociocapitalism. The theory and practice of socialism know so many trends and shades that any whatsoever serious discussion of this topic requires the presentation of views and arguments which were brought forth more than a hundred years ago: Marx's and Engels' state socialism, which argued in

favor of the withering away of the state as an apparatus of coercion, and its presentation as an instrument of management; the nongovernmental socialism of Bakunin, Kropotkin and their contemporary supporters; the parliamentary and democratic socialism of the socialists and social democrats; the socialism of the dictatorship of the proletariat of V.I. Lenin and the Comintern; our own authoritarian socialism; the socialism of people's self-government (Yugoslavia, after its break with the Cominform); Trotsky's socialism of the Fourth International, etc. There have been planned and market socialism, multiparty and single party, democratic and dictatorial, Asian and Latin American, and many other.

This partial list indicates that to this day the socialist theorists cannot provide ready answers to all cases of life. Such will hardly be the case in the immediate future as well. Some of these models we can reject as anti-democratic. Others we are as yet to study.

What is important, however, is to earmark a general perspective. It is important to realize that in the 19th and 20th centuries socialism was only acquiring its ideological shape. Its sources are considerably deeper, going through Owen, Fourier, Saint-Simon, Moor, Campanella all the way back to Plato and the first Christians. Possibly, they may be found, in general, in the nature of human community life, in the collectivistic foundation of this community life. That is perhaps the reason for the need to accompany socialism with humanism and democracy. Then once again it will be a question of synthesis—this time between individualism and collectivism. In any case, this should be the topic of a separate and serious discussion. Above all, the discussion must be calm! This is difficult if, whatever the occasion, we undertake to fabricate platforms and parties.

In the final account, the most pertinent question is this: "What direction are we taking?" Are we going toward another revolution or toward an evolutionary pluralistic society? If we go to the left, we shall be multiplying parties and factions, innumerable and senseless, nurturing political ambitions, and exciting ourselves with meetings and proclamations and then arming ourselves with various "isms." Naturally, a shift to the right is possible. At that point we shall glorify the past regulations, fictitious unity of thought, etc. If nonetheless we go straight forward, we shall gain patience and will not flirt with revolutionary phraseology but undertake the difficult and interesting work aimed at the development of new technologies, information flows, the gradual introduction of a modern market, a law-governed society, a civilized separation of powers, and purposefulness of parties, spirituality and morality. We shall develop culture, unity, justice, order and humaneness.

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MEASURE OF ALL THINGS

Human Interests and the Essence of Socialism

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[Article by Aleksandr Veber, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] I

The age-old argument of socialism entered a new, a critical phase by the turn of the 1990s. It applies to the fate of the socialist idea itself. Many are those who are disappointed in socialism. Some reject the very concept of "socialism" along with all other "isms." Those who still support the socialist choice would like some clarity (or at least greater clarity) to be shed in understanding the past, present and future of socialism.

The formula "humane and democratic socialism," understood as the opposite of the authoritarian-bureaucratic system, leaves unanswered a number of questions. There are those who consider in it a "tautology" (could any kind of different, nondemocratic socialism exist?); others consider it a withdrawal from the communist ideal. "To this day we have not explained to the people what is socialism," the writer V. Kondratyev recently complained in *KOMMUNIST* (No 7, 1990, p 120). In the course of the pregress debates, the party was blamed for having no clear vision of socialism. Blunt demands were formulated: give us a new model, give us a specific image of the future....

Generally speaking, this is legitimate, when we have so many things to reinterpret and revise, and when seemingly inviolable and customary views are being questioned and disputed, while new answers to the challenges of the time clash against existing mental stereotypes. The party neither has nor could have any ready answers to all questions. We have abandoned the "comprehensive" and "exhaustive" definitions which stemmed from plans and not from life. Naturally, in statements on this subject M.S. Gorbachev has been cautious: we, he said, "are advancing in our understanding of the essence of socialism."

It is only practical experience that would provide us with a fuller and clearer concept of the new image of socialism. On this subject, as in other, no one has a monopoly on truth. Discussions of the problems of socialism and its nature will continue. In the course of the debate currently being held in our country a great deal has already been said and a few things have been clarified. However, the topic has not been exhausted and, in all likelihood, will never be.

Let us follow the advice of the unforgettable Kozma Prutkov: "Look at the source!" and let us ask ourselves the following: If socialism is not an empty dream but a necessity, then what is it? We may have thought that we knew the answer: we learned in school that replacing

capitalism with socialism is "comprehensively" substantiated by Marxism. The need for socialism, it is believed, is based on the development of machine industry, which requires the socialization of means of production and trade. The new production method is born within the old decaying one and should show up in the light of day like a newly-hatched chick, rejecting the old and tight shell of obsolete production relations and, with it, the entire old "superstructure."

According to the authors of the "Marxist Platform in the CPSU," socialism "has always been for the Marxists the objective result of the development of the laws and trends of the preceding society." Yes, it has always been.... Should the Marxists always hold on to formulations which could be erroneously interpreted as being the viewpoint of economic determinism? It is true that such formulations had their specific reasons: the bourgeois political economy classics considered the economic laws of capitalism as being natural and eternal. That is why Marx felt the need to prove that it is precisely economic laws that inevitably lead to socialism (as we know, in his letters written in the final years of his life, Engels acknowledged this one-sidedness).

Subsequent developments revealed the underestimating on the part of the founders of Marxism of the viability of capitalism and their exaggerated views on the role of the proletariat as its "gravedigger." Economic imperatives made their way under the conditions of the capitalist system as well, triggering corresponding changes in the forms and organization of capital and bourgeois society as a whole, including its "superstructure." Nowadays some of our literary authors and journalists proclaim that "over there" the very socialism to which we have aspired for so long and so stubbornly, has been reached. At the same time, however, it becomes clear that noted Western political experts are reaching the opposite conclusion, interpreting the course of events as the definitive victory of capitalism over socialism.

Actually, a variety of opinions have been expressed on this account in the West. Within the multiplicity of assessments and comments we can also distinguish various cautions addressed at the Soviet people, not to develop excessive illusions concerning capitalism, as well as the advice not to neglect the positive features acquired in the course of building a new society, as well as a reminder of the social problems which beset the so-called liberal democracies....

The recent events in Eastern Europe, in the opinion of the noted American Economist John Kenneth Galbraith, should be a lesson to the ruling circles of the United States as well. In his words, the support shown by the previous administration for the doctrines of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Herbert Spencer contributed to a "negative role of the government, deprived of compassion, insinuating that the rich need incentives, provided by an even greater income, while the poor should be urged on by their hopeless need. As a result, as convincingly confirmed by statistics, the rich have

greatly increased their share of the income while an increasing number of families have dropped below the poverty level." These facts, Galbraith concludes, "should force us to become aware of our own reality and act correspondingly. Even here the people will keep silent and suffer only to a point."

Some Western political experts had predicted even earlier than that, that the changes occurring in the world will inevitably reveal and aggravate the problems encountered in their own countries. Following the loss of "our negative pole of orientation," claimed last summer Chicago University Professor Allan Blum, one could expect "a powerful blossoming of positive demands, freed from the restrictions of the cold war and reflecting human aspirations which are not satisfied with rationalization leftovers. Movements will appear which will demand the achieving—by all conceivable or inconceivable means—of equality."

This may seem like an exaggeration, but here is what we read in THE WASHINGTON POST concerning the new ideological watershed in the United States, which is particularly noticeable today on the states and local levels. On one side are "those who consider economic growth as basically desirable. They accept and even welcome the 'constructive destruction' created by capitalism. They praise the inventiveness of man and the virtues of store-keeper immigrants and Silicone Valley entrepreneurs." The "prophets of 'restraint' are on the other side. They caution that growth has its limits and bemoan the fast pace of contemporary life. They are mistrustful of contemporary technology, seeing in it the seeds of future problems. They consider economics as essentially sterile and incapable of bringing prosperity to some without depriving of it others. They bemoan the destruction of human communities and the ruination of the land. Scornfully describing their opponents as 'technooptimists,' they predict a global catastrophe unless we (i.e., the United States) radically change our economic system."

If such is the situation, and believing that the views we quoted speak for themselves, the debate about socialism has not ended. Furthermore, could it ever end? The idea of socialism, in the final account, expresses the age-old need of the people (even if dressed in a different ideological garb) for freedom, social justice, mutual aid and cohesion.

II

At this point we go back to the very essence of the problem. Why is socialism necessary? Could we interpret socialism as a strictly economic category? This view is widespread among the conservative critics of socialism. According to F.A. Heiek, a most noted representative of contemporary economic liberalism, "socialism is nothing other than the demand of converting the market system... into an 'economy,' in the narrow meaning of the term, within which the general scale of priorities

would determine which of the different needs should be satisfied and which should not."

Some formulations provided by the Marxist classics and, to an even greater extent, provided by the practices of "state socialism," one may think, grounds for such an interpretation. In reality, however, the meaning of socialism is both deeper and broader. Marx undertook the study of capital with the commodity, as being the type of "cell," which includes within it all of its contradictions. What if the topic of the study is society as a whole? In this case, it is **man** who functions as such a "cell." It is not the specific method of organization of production or the type of power but man who is the starting and ending point of the concept of socialism.

In our country Marxist anthropology was unlucky. For a long time it was not honored, although Marx and Engels precisely discussed how to replace the "cult of the abstract man" with a "science about real people in their historical development" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch. [Works]*, vol 21, p 299). The origins of the idea of socialism should be sought in the realistic understanding of the nature of man, which is the opposite of religious fetishism and extreme egotistical individualism. Man is a social being. He depends on society and is molded by the social environment. Man also is a natural being. As a "human natural being," he is given an awareness and a will, and the ability to oppose and influence nature. Hence another most important feature of man: his **relative autonomy** as an individual concerning nature and society. In the final account, man creates his own self through his toil and actions, acting in accordance with his interests.

The tribal nature of man is dualistic and conflicting. One of its manifestations is the dichotomy of **individual and common** interests. The activities of people as individuals pursuing their specific private interests and objectives (in their inexhaustible variety) shaped the most important aspect of human life. Another aspect is the common interest, which is an objective feature, an interdependence among people as a result of the division of labor, the need to communicate, the need for social defense, help, and social guarantees and the resolution of the increasingly complex problems which exceed the person's individual possibilities.

(Private and common interests and individual and social interests are not interchangeable. These are categories of different volume and content. Individual interest includes private interest, i.e., anything which pertains to private life—professional, creative, family, or commercial or consumer activities of an individual, his likes, and so on. However, it also includes something common, related to the vital interests of everyone regardless of individual-personality differences. Individual interest means also the right to life and other basic human rights. It means being interested in social protection and the possibility of obtaining an education, medical aid, etc. As to so-called social interests, they apply to the sum total of the shared interests of individuals.)

In the pursuit of their private and common interests, the people enter into specific relations with one another and create complex social structures of an industrial or other nature. The private or common interests of individuals become the collective interest of groups, organizations, classes, and large hierarchical structures, including those of the government. In this case a private interest could act both as common for a given group or else be presented as such while remaining private in terms of the common interests of a higher order.

If we take private interest as the starting point, schematically, the "hierarchy of interests" would appear as follows:

INTERESTS	
Private	Common
Individual	Group
Group	Class
Class	Nation (Society)
Nation (Society)	Mankind

By virtue of its very nature, bourgeois society exaggerates the role of private interest. In its system of values, oriented, according to E. Fromm, toward "possession," man acts above all as buyer and seller. The common good seems to be a by-product of the sum total of diverse individual aspirations. According to A. Smith's familiar formula, the aspiration of individuals to seek their own advantages is guided by an "invisible hand" in such a way that this contributes to the social interests more efficiently than had people been guided in their activities by common interests.

This view is supported, to this day, by the ideologues of neoconservatism. For example, F.A. Heiek claims that the sum of actions of individuals pursuing their private objectives ensures the greater good. If the demons of "social justice" are still haunting some Western countries, it is their ideological policy that is to be blamed (clearly, this refers to social democratic ideology, i.e., the opposite of what Galbraith had in mind).

In terms of the economy, and even more so of a developed, a complex economy, the market mechanism is irreplaceable. This is unquestionable. However, it is equally unquestionable that in itself the market does not guarantee optimal results either to individuals or society as a whole. The blind domination of the law of supply and demand, although it includes examples of high economic efficiency (but is it always optimal?), also entails negative and even destructive consequences in the economic and the noneconomic areas.

Toward the end of the 1970s, the book by F. Hirsh "*Social Limits of Growth*," came out in England and caused quite a broad response in the West. Hirsh convincingly proved, something for which he justifiably deserves credit, that the free market shapes individual needs and one-sided consumption, ascribing them a

largely irrational nature. This leads to a situation which necessarily requires the interference of society, including state control. Hirsh used the term "unwitting collectivism" to describe this phenomenon.

Actually, as we know, a "pure" market does not exist in any country. Throughout the Western world the economic mechanism is a combination of market and nonmarket systems. Here is a typical view expressed on this account by a member of Western academic science: the choice between market and management is usually a "choice between different combinations of both and among various extents, one way or another, to which resources are deployed. If the predominant choice is in favor of the market, a substantial role for the non-market (i.e., management) is preserved and should be preserved by virtue of the comprehensive and inevitable defects of the market" (Ch. Wolf, "*Markets and Governments*," Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 1988, p 151).

Therefore, the defects of the market inevitably trigger the protective reaction of society and, consequently, the appearance of a certain type of societal feeling which expresses the common interests of the people. The assertions of our domestic supporters of economic liberalism notwithstanding, the market neither resolves nor can resolve all social problems. Furthermore, it itself triggers problems, and the more developed the market becomes and the broader the area of its activities expands, the greater the scale of such problems becomes.

Marxism has traditionally viewed the gap between private and public interest in a spontaneously developed society above all through the lens of class relations. Private interest was identified with the class interests of the bourgeoisie, and the institution of private ownership and the state as a "committee managing the common affairs of the entire bourgeois class" (op. cit., vol 4, p 426), while the role of the spokesman for the common interest was assigned to the proletariat, as the most exploited class, the conditions governing the existence of which embodied the limit of dehumanization of the individual.

The situation of the proletariat in the 19th century provided substantive grounds for such an interpretation. Obviously, in the light of all subsequent developments, this could be viewed as a special case, as a reflection of the conditions of the unbridled and uncontrolled capitalism which had developed in England and other Western countries during the time of the industrial revolution and intensive industrialization. However, it would be a major error to reduce Marx's criticism of capitalism to the problem of contradictions between capital and labor. Marx predicted the inevitable change of relations between them which could occur, for instance, under the influence of the trade union movement. It was precisely in this connection that he noted that bourgeois society (as the ruling classes themselves were beginning vaguely to sense at that time) "is not a

hard crystal but an organism which is capable of transformation and which is in a constant process of transformation" (op. cit., vol 23, p 11).

Today, when Western liberals triumphantly announce that the "class problem in the West has been successfully resolved," we find behind this assertion (which is a very strained interpretation) the real fact that in the course of the age-old struggle between labor and capital there occurred a kind of reciprocal "education" of the classes, manifested in the adoption of certain "rules of behavior," codified in proper institutions and legal standards. The social gains of the working people, which stimulate the growth of output and technical progress, contributed to the easing of class conflicts. They frequently are pushed into the background, while other contradictions and conflicts emerge on the foreground. However, they are based essentially on the same reasons: the basically uncontrolled development, the phenomenon of alienation in which the results of man's own activities turn against him as an alien inimical force.

From this viewpoint, what is the main distinguishing feature of socialism? The logic of capitalism is based on private interest (of individuals, groups, corporations, etc.), which encourages the development of individual, group, class and national egotism. Naturally, the supporters of economic liberalism themselves acknowledge the need for certain "rules," but of a nature which would rather protect private interests from society than defend the common interests. However, the constant pressure applied by democratic forces and the need, under the rules of a parliamentary system, to seek the support of the masses, force the ruling circles in bourgeois society to go beyond this narrow framework.

The prevalence of the spontaneous principle, particularly on the scale of the global community, conceals a great danger. This has been repeatedly confirmed by history. Nonetheless, the area of uncontrolled, of spontaneous development, in spreading not only to the areas of economy and technology but also to politics and international relations, until recently grew faster than the ability of the people to control such development. A situation appeared, increasingly characterized as a crisis of civilization.

The fact that life on earth is threatened is a reality. Suffice it to recall a few facts relative to the condition of the environment:

The area covered by tropical forests is being reduced by 11 million hectares annually. In the industrial countries, 31 million hectares of forests are affected by pollution and acid rain;

Every year erosion deprives 26 million hectares of land of its fertility;

The desert area is expanding at an annual rate of 6 million hectares;

Thousands of lakes of the industrial north are biologically dead and thousands of others are dying;

In many areas in Africa, China, India and North America the volume of ground waters is diminishing as a result of increased demand for water higher than natural replenishment;

In the next 20 years one-fifth of all existing species of animals and plants may disappear;

In the United States alone 50 varieties of pesticides are poisoning ground waters in 32 states; 2,500 toxic waste dumps require emergency cleaning;

It is estimated that by the year 2050 the average temperature on the earth's surface will have risen between 1.5 and 4.5 degrees centigrade;

By the year 2100 the sea level will rise between 1.4 and 2.2 meters;

Erosion of the ozone layer in the upper part of the atmosphere is continuing, etc.

It is regrettable that to this day some of our right-wing foreign critics, in condemning communism for its "aspiration to instill total rationality" and "excessive faith in human reason" (Z. Brzezinski) insist that in the future as well history should and will remain a spontaneous process. They suggest that one extreme be replaced with another, which would be no less and even, perhaps, more dangerous! Elementary common sense indicates that replacing unregulated spontaneous development with consciously regulated processes becomes, today a question of life or death for mankind.

From the viewpoint of the significance of universal human values, we consider the correlation between common and private interests as follows:

INTERESTS	
Common	Private
Mankind	Nation (Society)
Nation (Society)	Class
Class	Group
Group	Individual

This requires an explanation. Naturally, it is not a question of the fact that the interests of the individual are pushed somewhere into the background or "buried" under the thick layer of collective interests. This is not a question of subordinating the individual to the social (a concept justifiably criticized as one of the dogmas of the past) but of enhancing the individual to the level of understanding the common interest! The personal interest of the individual should then encompass within itself the common interest.

Today any thinking person must acknowledge that the stability and well-being of society is in his own interest as well. This applies even more so to problems, such as the

elimination of the nuclear threat, the prevention of the ecological catastrophe, the defeat of AIDS, etc. Actually, whenever it is a question of the survival of mankind, is this not in the interest (at least objectively) of the individual? The novelty of the present situation is precisely that today it is difficult seriously to speak of the individual interests and human rights without, at the same time, taking into consideration the universal human interests.

At this point the possible objection is the following: How could a hungry, a poor individual be concerned with the rest of mankind? This is a legitimate question which demands an answer. Wherever the situation of man has been reduced to a level below civilized living conditions, there most frequently is no individual and, consequently, the concept of "individual interests" remains merely a biological struggle for survival. Equally sad, however, is something else: there are many who are sated and prosperous and who, like one of Zoshchenko's characters, "firmly spits... on global problems, trends and doctrines." If we were to tolerate such an entirely real situation and if we proceed from the fact that it expresses the dominant trend which cannot be opposed, we are bound to acknowledge that mankind is doomed.

The essence of socialism resides in its trend toward serving the common interests of mankind and man. From the viewpoint of socialism, the common interests stand above the private; the social are above the class and the universal above the national. In this case socialism, in its broad, humanistic and democratic understanding, denies neither the importance of private interests nor the important role which the market plays as a mechanism for their identification and coordination. No, it is a question of finding, to use Lenin's expression, the level at which private interests can be combined with the common interests, the extent of subordination of the former to the latter, which would be consistent with the tasks of the self-preservation of civilization and the creation of optimal conditions for the free development of man in a free society.

This cannot be achieved through coercion. It is, above all, a question of culture. The level of man's individual development determines his understanding of his individual interest, what he invests in it and the extent to which the "I" and "we" can be combined in his awareness. A lack of general standards (whether found in uneducated people or people with a superior education, subordinates or leaders) is frequently manifested in a narrowed, in a limited interpretation of personal interests, reducing them to private interests understood in an extremely narrow sense and aimed exclusively at the specific objects of possession, whether material goods, power or anything else. It is not in vain that today a great deal is being said in our country about the "ecology of the soul:" lack of standards, spiritual and moral impoverishment, outbreaks of blind hatred and mass violence, and cruelty, which are no less dangerous than the destruction of the surrounding natural environment.

That is what makes so important the educational, the cultural, and the ethical aspects of socialist policy. The realization that the implementation of common interests requires a purposeful and conscious activity appeared a long time ago and was and is shared by supporters of various trends of social thought. For example, V. Solovyev, the noted Russian philosopher-idealist, while rejecting "materialistic" socialism, firmly objected to the postulates of economic liberalism, rejecting the principle of "everyone for himself," from the moral viewpoint. In order for everyone who works for himself to also work for everyone, according to Solovyev, "the natural ties provided by economic relations are insufficient; what is necessary is consciously directing them toward the common good" (Vl. Solovyev, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 1, Moscow, 1988, p 418).

This is even more accurate today, when the growing profound structural and technological revolution leads to the dissemination of essentially new technical and organizational forms of production, economic and other activities, indicating the advent of the postindustrial era. The radical change in conditions and nature of labor and of all human activities, related to this fact, find, among others, their manifestation in the phenomenon of the so-called new industrialism. In this context, the problem of interconnection between private and common interests becomes even more relevant than ever before.

The socialist idea gains a new confirmation and new impetus in the realities of the contemporary world. The trend toward the conscious regulation of social processes is increasingly making its way on a global scale, by coordinating the policy of the countries through the United Nations and international agreements, programs, multilateral meetings and consultations on the governmental level and through the activities of numerous intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations and institutions, many of which are based on socialist principles. To the generations living in the age of nuclear weapons, the lethally dangerous conflict between mankind and nature and other no less terrifying dangers, socialism, in the broadest meaning of the term, means, above all, a means to the survival of mankind.

III

Perestroika brings to the party and society a new vision of socialism. Once again we ask ourselves: What is socialism? It becomes necessary to review the deeply rooted concepts of it. Yet these concepts developed in accordance with the experience which society gained after the October Revolution. Socialism was viewed above all as some kind of total social entity, as an integral social system.

It was believed, in this connection, that the new society could be "built like a new building—on the basis of a detailed blueprint formulated in advance, in accordance with the requirements of the theory of "scientific socialism." Actually, there was a substitution of concepts. Scientific socialism was replaced with abstract a priori

schemes and ideological fetishes which were being imposed upon society, including vulgar concepts according to which, for instance, reaching a certain level in the production of metal, coal or cement would in itself ascribe a new quality to society and a complete socialism. In other words, some kind of speculative objective was being formulated, for the sake of which the daily vital interests of the people were being sacrificed.

Such an understanding, which was largely the product of historical conditions, and such concepts of "building socialism in a single country," and our lengthy isolation, must now be and are being abandoned. We are abandoning the very method, the approach according to which "socialism in general" was abstractly pitted against "capitalism in general." We are returning to a view of socialism as a process, as a movement, as an alternate method for resolving problems of social development in the spirit of socialist values.

We are returning to the acceptance of the fact that the main element of the socialist ideal is man himself, with his needs and interests. The substantiation of socialism in terms of the interests of man or, rather, of that facet of the interests which expresses their common aspect, provides a foundation for basic socialist values, such as freedom, social justice and cohesion. Furthermore, this is also an argument in favor of a view on socialism, which is becoming increasingly popular among Marxists, not as a "formative" interpretation of the historical process but as a general approach of civilization.

The view of the historical process as a simple change of systems under the influence of the development of production forces and as a result of the victory of the higher system over the preceding one is justifiably considered a vulgarizing of Marx's understanding of history. This view is made even more acceptable by the fact that Marx's historical views, as we know, remained incomplete. This is confirmed, in particular, by his "*Chronological Excerpts*," a work he wrote in the final years of his life and which, in the view of some Soviet historians, is a rough draft of a planned but not completed specific study of universal history.

The main feature in Marx's understanding of history is a change in production means, which are the foundations for the various types of civilization, and the possibility of the development of various trends within a specific type of civilization, determined by the development of the class struggle and popular movements. This makes convincing Z. Mlynarz's viewpoint, according to which capitalism and socialism are viewed as two trends within the framework of industrial civilization. The capitalist form of development of industrial civilization itself created a countertrend for the "defense and realization of human needs and interests which capitalism suppresses and ignores" (KOMMUNIST No 5, 1990, p 107).

I believe that this approach is worthy of attention both in the light of historical experience as well as in accordance

with the realities of the contemporary world in which general civilization imperatives are increasingly letting themselves be felt in the areas of economics, politics and social development. It also fully agrees with the expressed view of socialism as the manifestation of that aspect of social life which is related to the common interests of mankind.

The contemporary argument about socialism is heavily burdened by a confusion of concepts, partially naturally and partially artificially created. In the West, as we know, until recently the socialist countries were classified as "communist regimes," although neither in the Soviet Union nor anywhere else not even real socialism had been achieved, not to mention communism.

The communist ideal itself, however, includes a certain contradiction between the aspiration toward a rational organization of society and the principle of the free development of the individual. Human behavior is defined not by rational motivations exclusively. Emotions, passions, prejudices, impulsiveness, which frequently make human behavior unpredictable and irrational, play a no lesser and, perhaps, even a greater role. What Marx wrote about the furies of private interest, bearing in mind "the fiercest, the basest and the most disgusting passions of the human soul" (op. cit., vol 23, p 10) can no longer be classified by us as existing in bourgeois society alone. The burden of human passions is borne by any society. Consequently, any effort to find a true solution of this contradiction would mean, in practice, either a coercion or a shift in the direction of anarchy.

In any case, the communist ideal presumes the reaching of a different type of development of civilization. Is this being done? If yes, how long will it take and how will it be accomplished? These are questions which can be answered only by future generations. We must proceed from the fact that socialism cannot promise the total elimination of contradictions and conflicts from the life of society. The task of socialist policy is not to establish "harmony" but to seek compromises, developed through democratic and constitutional procedures, through dialogue, on the basis of universal human interests and values. The purpose of socialist policy is to channel existing or arising contradictions and conflicts into more civilized, and more humane and just relations.

Yes, we are progressing in our understanding of the nature of socialism. We are advancing through the interpretation of our own and the universal historical experience, debates and arguments and a comparison of views among the different trends of socialist thought. Socialism of the future is depicted as a more differentiated, a pluralistic society, thanks to which it will be able better to adapt to the fast pace of technical and social change and to the inevitable contradictions and conflicts which have an internal self-propelling mechanism and are opened to the outside world. It would be difficult, naturally, to define the specific form of socialism of the future. It will be as the people create it, as a result of their

democratic participation in the making of decisions which affect their common destiny.

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THE RENOVATING PARTY

The Party As I See It; KOMMUNIST Precongress Survey

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Jun 90 (signed to press 1 Jun 90) pp 24-32

[Text] This part of the survey completes the answers to the precongress survey made by KOMMUNIST (see KOMMUNIST Nos 5-8, 1990).

1. How do you see the ways the CPSU can come out of the crisis and the new aspect of the party? What to retain and what to abandon? What targets should the renovated party set for itself?

2. What type of internal party relations should there be so that the voice of the rank-and-file party members could be heard clearly? How do you conceive of the correlation between democracy and centralism in party activities and life under the conditions of renovation? Could we ensure party unity with the free formation of factions, and platforms, and how to achieve this?

3. What is your idea of the party's place and role in contemporary society? On what basis should relations be structured with governmental bodies, social organizations and mass movements? How do you envisage a democratic control over the ruling party?

Aleksandr Vasilyevich Bobrovskiy and Aleksey Konstantinovich Ivanov, repairmen, Mikron Plant, Zelenograd:

1. When we talk about the party, we should distinguish between the two aspects of this concept: the party as an organization and as a bearer of a specific ideology and outlook. What crisis are we discussing? Most frequently, it is claimed that the very organization of the communists has been discredited; specific names are mentioned, and identified with the party. Such identification is hardly accurate. Simple justice does not allow us to equate the many honest party members who selflessly served the people's good and the "outstanding Marxists-Leninists," whose actions do not coincide in any way with the officially proclaimed objectives. However, we must take into consideration the fact that such "leaders" caused the party's reputation a harm difficult to repair.

Nonetheless, what is determining in the case of the party is the state of its ideology. At this point it is high time to recall that Marxism is the foundation of communist ideology and that the class approach is the essence of the Marxist method.

Of late many critics of Marx's theory have appeared. They blame precisely the class approach for all the

deformations which occurred during the Soviet period of our history and for the wretched situation of the bulk of the working people in the "country of victorious socialism." It is a matter for the specialists to define the society which we so stubbornly built until, finally, realized that "one can no longer live this way." We believe that to describe this as socialism is impossible even in terms of its form, for public ownership had actually become reduced to state ownership and the slogan "we are the state" conflicts with the factual political system. Even less could we ascribe such deformations to the logic of the class approach. Anyone who has any concept of Marxism and has studied some history must distinguish between what was indeed being accomplished in the interests of the working class and what was done under the guise of concern for such interests.

In our view, it is only with such an analysis that a more accurate answer to questions concerning the way for the CPSU's emergence from the crisis and the objectives of the renovated party, could be provided. One could argue as to what specific classes exist currently in our society. The fact that they exist, however, would be useless to deny, and it would be wrong to ignore the existence of class interests in the formulation of current and long-term policies. Consequently, to say the least, it would be inexpedient to abandon the party's class approach. If we wish for perestroika in our society to be successful we must identify the motive forces of this process and define the party's attitude toward these forces. Is this not why we have been running idle for the last 5 years and were unable to "activate" the powerful motor of class interests?

Unfortunately, today many party members view as obsolete dogma the idea that the proletariat is the progressive class in society. It is not only a question of a lack of communist convictions, "unconscientiousness" or any other moral categories. The latest events indicate that with increasing frequency efforts are being made to solve various problems in the country regardless of the interests of the working class (let us use this term for lack of any other, although its content is not entirely consistent with the classical meaning). Matters would have been only half-bad had it been a question exclusively of harming specific material or social aspects or political claims. Such actions, however, are all too similar to efforts to gain freedom for some segment of society while ignoring the aspirations of a class whose interests objectively fit those of the entire society. The result may be another impasse.

An equal right to freedom can be achieved by adopting an equal attitude toward the right to ownership. What precisely are the interests of the working people from the viewpoint of ownership relations is something which science should determine through theoretical analysis. On the practical level, they could be expressed through the right given every worker to the generated revenue. This presumes the development of economic relations within the collective. Given the present level of development of production forces, when production efficiency

depends to an even greater extent on identifying the creative potential of every participant in the labor process, this becomes all the more necessary.

We are convinced that if at this turning point in our history once again the working people are assigned the role of an obedient performing mass, the consequences of the political and economic reform may become unpredictable. Nonetheless, party ideology has still not formulated the concept of the leading, the active role of the working class in the revolutionary process of perestroika. In our view, within the framework of the discussions of the 28th CPSU Congress, the following basic problems should be discussed:

Marxism, as the basis of a communist outlook;

Class approach, as a necessary analytical tool;

Socialism and socialist ownership and subjects and forms of ownership during the transitional period;

The theory of the communist movement and CPSU practical activities during different historical periods.

Without defining these problems we could hardly hope to determine the place and role of the CPSU in perestroika.

Marxism is a scientific outlook and, as such, demands a professional approach. Its development cannot be accomplished by the workers alone. Unfortunately, the progressive scientific thinking on which, one would think, until recently we could entirely rely, is now gripped by growing interest in social democratic ideas. Increasingly, this faces the supporters of the Marxist doctrine with an unacceptable choice: either to follow the old way or to seek the support of the "defenders of the interests of the workers" among the theoreticians of the OFT, "Yedinstvo," and the conservative segment of the apparat.

Andrey Ilich Zemskov, first secretary, Khoroshevskiy CPSU Raykom, Moscow, delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress:

1. The party must find a social support: for the time being the ground under its feet is loose.

In the same way that in the past we believed to be destined to achieve political success, now we find it very difficult to imagine how to resolve the crisis. Any good initiative sinks into a mass of unsolved problems. All positive ideas are quite skillfully (as seen by politically ignorant people) being tapped by more radical political opponents. We cannot hope for an economic miracle, for we cannot get a good fire started in the "stove" of the socialist economy; instead, all the rooms of our common national home become filled with smoke and fumes. If we were to pour the "gasoline" of market relations, there may even be an explosion.

It is not a matter exclusively of specific errors, economic breakdown, bureaucratization and the conversion into a

supragovernmental organization of the party itself, but of the merciless logic of the political struggle. The trouble is that, as was always claimed, being the spokesman for the interests of the entire people but failing to provide that same people with the promised prosperity and happy life, the party inevitably loses their confidence. It is being criticized from all sides. I do not believe that we would now be able easily to gain supporters even if we were to raise slogans which would be considered attractive by all social strata. Whatever the case, the situation would be working against us. Furthermore, we cannot please everyone.

An example of this is found in the constant and unfair attacks on Academician Abalkin and his program. We must accept that this will continue in the future as well, regardless of whether or not the suggested steps are right or wrong. If we were to assume that tomorrow the country's president would assign the leadership of the reform to another popular economist, critics will not be slow in showing up.

To the best of my understanding, based on the situation in Moscow's Khoroshevskiy Rayon, where I am raykom secretary, we lack any somewhat serious support among the workers and the intellectuals. It seems to me that the only broad social stratum which has retained its loyalty to the party is that of communists-pensioners, and front veterans (accounting for 30 percent in the rayon). However, unwilling to oppose the party as a whole, quite easily and imperceptibly to themselves they do so under the banner of the struggle against the party-state apparatus. If so desired, today anyone could be classified as member of this "apparatus," starting with the party group organizer and the brigade leader.

Any defense of the local party authorities although they, like the entire party, are by no means homogeneous, is futile. They are being criticized both from above and below. Let us not forget that for many long years they have become accustomed to looking up in everything to the superior authorities and to emulating them in their behavior, speeches and mannerisms. What is the good today of emulating the Central Committee? In the eyes of many party and nonparty people, it is a rather conservative authority. Some of its actions do not strengthen our positions but weaken them, forcing us to seek excuses. The people enthusiastically elect alternate deputies while the Central Committee still nominates 100 candidates for 100 seats. For quite some time in our rayon, for instance, the reserve personnel are known from materials in the rayon newspaper; in the Central Committee the appointment of a new secretary becomes a surprise even to himself.

The dislike of the party apparat is the consequence of a number of different reasons. They include the wretchedness of the Brezhnevian leadership which lacked both major theoreticians and outstanding speakers, the traditional distrustful attitude toward any authority and something borrowed from the mentality of the "cog," the party "soldier:" "We should not be blamed for anything,

it was they who made the wrong decisions and who, in the final account, led the country into an impasse."

The inadmissibly long procrastination in solving the problem of privileges, ever since it was openly put on the agenda, played a negative role. While discussions were going on as to what to eliminate and what to keep, discussions involving details concerning special dachas, special rations, and private cars inflamed the mood even further. The views held by both sides included a large number of negative elements, above all, naturally displayed by those who gauge their participation in party work on the basis of personal benefits. However, there was also exaggerated support of full equalization and a rejection of material interest. This is an essentially wrong view which swings between idealism and hypocrisy. Personally, I am in favor of ensuring a stable material situation for the party worker and the well-being of his family, legally and honestly earned. This provides a certain guarantee for his independent behavior and even his views.

I believe that the essence of the problem does not lie in privileges as such but in a state of elitism, taken to a level of absurdity. The poorer the state, the worse the people live, the more unpleasant and explosive such elitism becomes. Elitism is not a distinguishing feature of our society alone; however, I find interesting the process of the birth of a new socialist "nobility," involving a limited circle of people included within the system of privileges and the aspiration, which is present in everyone to leave something to his children, to assign important projects to people he knows personally, among whom friends, schoolmates and relatives are not, understandably, last. Hence the development of nepotism and dynasties. Had there not been repressions, monstrous in terms of range and ruthlessness, followed by recurring purges, today we would have had a fully developed class of Soviet aristocracy with its firm traditions and corresponding influence in society.

My conclusion: the party must clearly define whose interests it represents and whose interests and privileges it is ready to abandon. It is only in the struggle against a specific enemy that one could gain ideological supporters. In that case the division must not necessarily be based on class. However, the criticism of actions and intentions of a political opponent and the upholding of one's own policies, strategy and tactics should be mandatorily applied. Incidentally, this is quite successfully demonstrated by the "Democratic Platform" and other trends within the CPSU.

2. I dare to claim that even the most democratic relations within the party would hardly change anything as far as its social status is concerned. Parties are founded not in order to be examples of democracy and comradeship but for the purpose of expressing and defending someone's interests (being ready in this case to sacrifice "alien" interests) by pursuing a corresponding state policy. The renovation of the party is needed, above all, to the party members, for in their case as well its present aspect is

intolerable. Specific suggestions aimed at the democratization of internal party relations were summed up in the draft CPSU Statutes, which were discussed by all party members in the rayon party organization. Let me note the most interesting of its aspects, in my view:

Substantial increase of the rights of the rank-and-file party members, including the right to defend within the organization their good name and honor, and to obtain complete information on the activities of the primary party organization and the leading authorities, needed in order to implement a party assignment, and the right to voluntarily resign from the party;

Granting essentially new rights to the primary party organization in matters of accepting and expelling from the party, electing leading party authorities and participating in its financial and economic activities;

Giving a new meaning to the principle of democratic centralism, strengthening the rights of minorities, accountability of the apparatus to the elected authority, introducing the concept of autonomy of republic and local party organizations; clearly defining and regulating concepts such as debate, referendum, conference and congress.

Some of the suggestions were substantially "harmonized" in the course of the final discussion which was held at the joint plenum of the CPSU Raykom and Rayon Control Commission, with the participation of party organization secretaries. Some useful ideas were defeated with the itemized vote. This included the right of a party member to choose the party organization of which he would like to be a member. This would have made possible a natural development of horizontal structures within the party. From the viewpoint of the anticipated acceptability of a variety of radical concepts for reform in the CPSU, such a reaction on the part of the primary party units is quite indicative.

The primary party organizations which, one may have thought, were our hope and support, have now become confused and we, the raykoms, are unable to give them efficient assistance. For decades they worked on the following principle: receive an order from above, do not think, do not try to be clever, execute. Now we have the other extreme. The raykom has become discredited: it consists of "apparatchiks" and "bureaucrats" and, therefore, there is no reason to listen to them or to implement their resolutions! However, nor have the primary party organizations learned how to struggle for influence within the collective.

As the primary and rayon organizations gained autonomy rights, the feeling of unity within the party vanished. In the past it was based on strict party discipline. The pivot disappears quickly and a system built on unity of views, objectives, readiness and need to delegate to lower organizations (voluntarily!) some rights is as yet lacking. Everyone would like to be as independent as possible, dispose fully of party dues and (each organization!) wants its printed organ. This means that the party

is breaking up into tens of thousands of "parties." I believe that we must energetically look for new forms of centralism.

The debate on the freedom of factions as an admissible (or inadmissible) condition for the functioning of the party is, in my view, largely fictitious. If the state of health of the organization itself does not cause concern, the appearance of factions and platforms would not worsen anything essentially or change anything: Who would get it into his head to abandon the flagship and jump on a tug? When a party is in a state of crisis, even without any statutory permissions, sooner or later factions appear. The question is only whether to recognize them or not and whether to abandon the "renegades" or try to suppress them with the methods of the 1920s and 1930s which, to say the least, would be undesirable.

The faction is a form of struggle for influence and power within a party which finds itself on the crossroads. Our party, like many other, has already been itself in such a position in the past. Practical confirmation of this may be found in all the actions of the leaders of the "Democratic Platform." As long as any one of them does not become a formal leader of a new faction or a new party, he will be fiercely criticizing all the actions of the present Central Committee and the general secretary and eroding the party from within. After a separation or removal of the opposition the criticism, naturally, will not come to an end. At that point, however, it would contribute to the unification of the remaining part of the party.

3. Everything will depend on the type of ideas which will be formulated at the 28th CPSU Congress and the tactic which the CPSU will adopt for the transitional period. In a number of large cities and regions the party is already in fact in a state of opposition while in the majority of other oblasts and republics the party committees are operating as though nothing has changed. It is obvious that it will be very difficult to adopt an ideology and tactics under such a great variety of conditions. Someone is bound to disagree, to feel insulted and to be dissatisfied.

Today mastering the experience of parliamentary struggle will be a determining prerequisite for the possibility of implementing the party's ideas. Relying exclusively on the "vanguard" nature will inevitably lead to retreating to a secondary role. Therefore, the struggle for the ballots of the voters assumes an entirely different significance. Since, obviously, industrial electoral districts will not be developed any further, the problem lies in the nature of party ideas and the belief of party members and party supporters in the party cell, which is not under direct control, and their readiness to vote for candidates based on their own views and not on considerations of conformism. The need for new forms of work has not as yet imbued the awareness of the majority of primary organizations. Nonetheless, any hasty rejection of the principles of work adopted by a vanguard party would bring no benefits whatsoever. The party is too big

and just as big is the mental inertia of many party members, for which reason any drastic change in emphasis could be considered a retreat.

Yegor Vladimirovich Yakovlev, editor-in-chief of the weekly MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress:

1. Briefly, it must become a party of a new type compared to what it is today.

The present difficulties of the CPSU originated, in my view, 7 decades ago, when within a short time the party emerged out of clandestinity and assumed power. It was precisely then, after the October victory, that a party had to be created which, in a number of ways would have been different from the one which had struggled for power. The transition from an illegal party to a party which was not only legal but also totally ruling should have been marked by equally profound democratic changes within its organization. This did not happen. If it is any consolidation, let us note that this had many historical reasons.

The dramatic nature of the first postrevolutionary years retained or, one could say, canned the standards of the period of clandestine struggle. However, it was precisely the outdated preservation of such standards that played its role in subsequent tragedies. One could accept as an absolute for 1902 the justice of V.I. Lenin's familiar statement in his work *"What Is to Be Done?"* "We are marching, in a small group, down a twisty and difficult road, firmly holding each other's hands. We are surrounded on all sides with enemies and we are forced almost always to march under their fire." However, applying that standard, which was dictated by such exceptional circumstances, in an age when the party had undertaken to rule a huge country, was bound to be fatal. It was thus that the strict obedience to party order was raised to a high virtue and as the main indicator of the party's unity and monolithic nature, this time under the new circumstances. As the poet claims, a crying bolshevik can be seen only in a museum. The incalculable suffering experienced by the people during the revolution could not draw a single tear from the stony bolshevik, for this was not part of his character or the character of his party.

What kind of a person is someone who never doubts anything? He is a person who has lost his main virtue as a citizen or even simply as an individual: to act with maximal use to society on the basis of his own convictions.

You may ask, what objectives should a renovated party set itself? I repeat: it must be a party of a new type compared to what it was.

2. I admit that I am not attracted to participating in the debate which is now described as fatal to the party: What platform should I adopt: the platform of the CPSU Central Committee or the Democratic Platform? As a complete document I am not satisfied by either. Since I

do not know the author of the "CPSU Central Committee Letter to the Communists In the Country," I cannot ask him how I should act if I were to follow the prescriptions of this document: Should I withdraw from the party or remain within it or, perhaps, become a candidate member, assuming that the advantages of this institution are retained?

Furthermore, the very debates, the preCongress discussion, dominated by problems of the party's organizational structure and the standards of its internal life are, in my view, not the most successful repetition of the battles of the Second RSDWP Congress, which lies in the distant past.

Yes, a demarcation is necessary and it is regrettable that it did not take place before the 28th Congress. This deprived the majority of party members of the opportunity to express their views most clearly through the choice of delegates, thus indicating the type of policy which they were voting for. Here as well we cannot end merely with the question of democratic centralism, whether to accept or reject it, and whether or not to tolerate factions. As the circumstances develop, I find myself in the same party as people who largely support views directly opposite to mine. I find it difficult to be in the same party as they are. However, this is only half the truth. The other half is that they find it just as difficult to be in the same party as me. Our differences affect less organizational than political problems. Some are in favor, let us say, of a predominant kolkhoz production at all cost, although this method is now familiar to all. I, for instance, am in favor of equality among all types of ownership in the countryside. Some are in favor of accepting cooperative principles and market relations with which they could conceal the "shame" of the administrative system. I favor the radical priority of market relations. Some are in favor of retaining, in as much as is possible, the principles on the basis of which the Soviet Union has existed so far but is now showing one crack after another. I favor granting true freedom to each republic in determining its own fate and the conditions under which it is ready to remain within the Union, whether as a federation or confederation, whatever the case. The list of such problems could be extended, although it is no longer all that long. It is only by achieving a reciprocal understanding on political problems that it would make sense to determine the type of organizational foundations which the party should have if it intends to implement such political assignments.

If you are trying to reorganize life in accordance with a preformulated idea-system, regardless of the strength of the resistance of the material you have chosen for this historical experiment, you need the type of organizational forms which would promote qualities which would not require too much thought or cause too much dissent. In terms of the priority of universal human values, a range of opinions is inevitable. One must abandon that which obstructs such movement and all stereotypes, although sanctified by a historical-party way of thinking.

3. The status of the CPSU, which it acquired in the recent past, does not suit me any more than any usurpation of power. Today's status of the party in society is a cause for concern and alarm. The party's destiny is my own. I have been linked to the party my virtually entire conscious life, nearly 4 decades. My father joined the party at the dawn of the revolution, and the party's crisis is my pain.

I was one of the people's deputies of the USSR who voted at the Third Extraordinary Congress for introducing the institution of the presidency, although I cannot consider myself a supporter of a "strong hand," and cannot say that the presidency is precisely that which I have always missed.

I was guided by other reasons. Five years of perestroika convinced me that unless we dismantle the core of party-bureaucratic leadership which, so far, has been the only real power in the country from top to bottom, a democratic society would remain, as has already been frequently the case in the past, an unattainable line on the horizon. For the time being, we have been unable to conceive of anything to rescue us from this paralyzing power other than instituting the position of president. I welcomed the moving of the center of government, as is now being said, away from the Kremlin's Staraya Square. However, this does not mean in the least that I am abandoning my party and voting for committing it to an "old people's home." The making of a radical change in our political life undertaken by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, seems to me to be an inevitable surgery which would be followed by the restoration of the party's health rather than a public acknowledgment of its disability.

A great deal is being said about the president's 100 days. However, the party as well has its "own 100 days"—the period between the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution and the 18th Congress. One hundred days in which to formulate the framework of a society which has rejected this article and chart a course to a multiparty system.

One hundred days is a long time. Allow me to draw a historical parallel. Under the revolutionary conditions of 1917, 100 days was the period from April, when the need to wage a struggle for the masses became clear to the party, to July, when it became necessary to make a choice between the victory of the revolutionary forces and the forces of the monarchy.

It is no accident that it is precisely that period that comes to mind. The current situation of the party, in my view, is quite similar to those times and provides food for thought. It was at that time that, for the first time coming out of clandestinity, the party had to face the workers, peasants and soldiers. Today, once again, the party is facing the masses, for this is the first time that it has abandoned its "noncompetitive" status, the constitutional right to handle everyone and everything. Handling or persuading are as distant from each other as love and hatred. Yes, more urgently than ever before the party is

facing the requirement of being trusted. This becomes more difficult than ever before, for in life one must pay for everything, including the errors of the past.

Has this task been properly interpreted and is it being implemented with the very start of the party's "100 days," when every day with no change leads to political bankruptcy? In its bureaucratic-command structure, we can clearly see in the party a predilection for putting a brave face on a sorry business: Article 6 is dead, long live Article 6! At a recent military parade, the defense minister asserted that the Soviet forces (all, without exception?) support the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress. Even if he did not include people such as the army political workers who tried to organize reprisals against USSR People's Deputy Officer V. Lopatin, in any case his is a voice from the past. The party must struggle to earn the support of the masses in the armed forces and among the civilians, and discard the habit of taking life easily. The gap between the party's leadership and the majority of party members remains unchanged. Their views, even on the most pressing political problems, are simply unknown. Is this not a confirmation that the idea of having a party of a new type and of the need to create a new viable organism has as yet not been accepted?....

One hundred days in the course of which radical steps must be taken is a long time. One hundred days, if they are wasted, is a catastrophically insignificant period. I tirelessly reread Lenin's "April Theses:" "You are afraid to betray the old memories. However, in order to change one's underwear, one must take off a dirty shirt and put on a clean one."

As to the last question in the survey, "How do you imagine a democratic control over a ruling party?" in my view it is dictated by our commonly shared stereotypes of the old way of thinking. A truly democratic society does not need to invent any special forms of control. A democratic society can be nothing but a democratic society, and anything else is the devil's work.

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The Readers Think, Argue, Suggest

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[Text] I. Bachurin, docent, party organizer, department of sociology, Saratov University imeni N.G. Chernyshevskiy: **Debate Without Split**

Meeting with a Russian nonparty people's deputy, students at Saratov University asked the following question: "When and where will a split within the Communist Party occur?" Naturally, the question was left unanswered. The results of the current debate within the party cannot be predicted at this point. However, we can see through the lens of this question a badly concealed impatience to hasten the hour of "babble" within the

party. Such moods are typical not only of the ordinary mind. We hear from official party fora calls to separate ourselves from the "democrats," who "oppose the fundamental ideological-political and organizational foundations of the CPSU" (from the materials of the plenum of the Saratov Party Obkom).

Naturally, after such accusations aimed at the "democrats," one unwittingly becomes their opponent, and the outcome of the debate becomes predetermined. Nonetheless, there is something which prevents us from making such a choice. Above all, it is the unknown views of many "persecuting" party members concerning the role to be played by the CPSU under the conditions of a multiparty political system. Many participants in the pre-congress debates proceed from the following confrontation: the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform is directing us toward ensuring the party's vanguard role, while the "Democratic Platform" calls for the adoption of a parliamentarianism identified with the removal of the CPSU from the political arena. Arguments are brought forth about the absolute incompatibility of these two party types.

Can we accept such a contraposition? I believe that we cannot. The preservation of political leadership on the basis of the democratic renovation of society precisely presumes active parliamentary activities. What is its essence? The CPSU abandons the juridical and declarative formulation of its vanguard role and expresses its desire to struggle for the implementation of social interests through its communist deputy representatives. In that case the plans of the voters become the plans of the party. In the final account, it is the ability of the parliamentary groups supporting the views of the CPSU to ensure the legislative and executive initiative in the implementation of these plans that will determine whether or not the party will remain a ruling party after the latest elections.

The logic of such views is simple: the party's political leadership is not a gift of God but is secured, not least, by its parliamentary mobility. If the party is able to pass the test of the voters it will be the vanguard of the people; if not, this will mean that it stands on the margin of the political process. Mere statements about the vanguard role of the CPSU or assertions that it is the party of the working class and all working people could not ensure victory in the political struggle today.

Acknowledging the sovereign will of the people as the only source of power, as stipulated in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, dictates rather strict rules of the game in the field of politics which is now taking shape. Therefore, in order to win the parliamentary struggle, the party must undergo substantial transformations which will make it a party for the people. The communists will be able to resolve this problem only if they retain their ties with the labor collectives. Therefore, the parliamentary aspect of the party does not conflict with its political leadership but helps it.

Why then are the supporters of party "vanguardism" frightened by the parliamentary "clothing" of the party? Apparently, they fear that in such clothing the party could become confused and fall behind its rivals in the political race. Therefore, "cut your coat according to the cloth." This gives the people a real choice: to give its preference to a party which is not only prepared to carry out its own plans but also to heed the interests of the voters.

Naturally, the core of the discussion concerning the place and role of the party in a renovating society is not that of defining the type of organization we need today. In the final account, the party's aspect will be determined above all by the existence of a live link between party ideas and reality. Reality is such that it cannot be encompassed one-sidedly. A variety of approaches are needed. That is why it is so important, in my view, not to hasten to split the party and not to make this a self-seeking aim. The main thing is not to abandon all the essential features included in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and in the "Democratic Platform," but to preserve the party's reform potential.

V. Ovchinnikov, doctor of philosophical sciences, Kaliningrad: *Second Wing*

Increasingly one can hear at party meetings and private conversations the following: "I am a communist but in my heart I am a social democrat." Many people justifiably assess the "Democratic Platform Within the CPSU" as being social democratic. I have discussed with its drafters the fact that such a definition would be more accurate and every time the answer was the following: Consider that strategically our program is social democratic.

Why is it that, all of a sudden, an attraction for social democracy, its experience and its ideas has developed? What is this: Is it an irresponsible thrust, as is usually observed during a period of major reforms, or something bigger, something related to deep trends existing within the present historical age?

As we know, Lenin classified social democratic parties as parties of the working class. However, as early as 1925, at the 14th VKP(b) Congress, Zinovyev said that the social democratic movement is not the right-wing of the working class but a leftist trend in the bourgeois class. Stalin as well supported this view, intensifying it in a number of its aspects. It is thus that one of the strong and durable ideological stereotypes developed within our party, a stereotype which, like many other dogmas which became established after Lenin, accounted for a great deal of the harm caused to the communist movement.

Social democracy is not on the other but on this side of Marxism. This thought is now being accepted by the communists, albeit with some delay. I am convinced that in the labor movement these two wings must mandatorily be present as a dialectical dialogue, as an alternative and, finally, as the need to acquire a variety of experiences and theoretical views on the future of our own

movement (let us parenthetically note that history has alternatives and always provides choices, including the history of any liberation movement). From the very beginning, the communist parties were oriented toward social revolutions and a struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the political domination by the working class. The social democratic parties were oriented toward social reform and the struggle for general democratic development principles. However, this is only the starting point in said political orientations. They were backed (and still are) by many specific aspects of the labor movement, definitions of its targets and objectives and methods for achieving them. Step-by-step, varied yet dialectically interrelated social experience accumulated. Within one of the trends the experience was one of revolutionary changes, action in extreme situations and granting social rights to the working people. The other accumulated experience in reforms and, on their basis, in upgrading the level of well-being and social justice and creating conditions for the functioning of an efficient economy and the development of political democracy. Let us particularly emphasize that the experience acquired by these alternate variants is unique and is of universal human value.

It also would be pertinent to recall that our party as well was born within the social democratic movement. It became a separate faction and developed an independent movement, supporting an alternate orientation. Acting under the conditions of a multiparty system, the Leninist Party was a classical model of political behavior: relying on its own authority (moral, ideological and even personal), it honestly and persistently struggled for the masses. It educated, rallied and organized them for the revolutionary struggle. As it reorganizes itself now, essentially the CPSU regains its lost identity as a political party, making extensive use of the social democratic experience in the labor movement. The essential novelty of the pre-congress platform is related precisely to this turn.

History teaches us that any alternative, after undergoing certain stages in its development, ends up with a situation of choice. This also applies to the alternative which historically developed in the labor movement and, correspondingly, in Marxism, and is advancing toward its positive resolution. This, however, does not mean any defeat on the part of communist parties in the ordinary understanding of the term. It is a question of their new evolution, of qualitative transformation into parties consistent with socialism of a democratic type, oriented toward universal human values. Our domestic lessons indicate that the structure and functions which developed within the party after Lenin were logically and essentially adapted to advancing on the path of state-administrative socialism, becoming a factor of security and stability. The conversion to a democratic model of socialism presumes essentially new party structures and functions consistent with the criteria of the new type of social development.

Such is the historical context which enables us to judge, on the evolutionary level, the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress. This also applies to the "Democratic Platform." On this basis, the difference between them is less qualitative than quantitative, for both are essentially within the same historical vector of movement. If the draft Central Committee Platform takes one step toward social democracy, the "Democratic Platform" takes one step and a half. Let us not forget that some quality is always found behind quantity; the advance of the "Democratic Platform" also predetermines the long-term development of the entire party which is gradually turning into a party of democratic socialism. It is important to understand today the fact that the common trend has become apparent.

I agree with those who believe that party restructuring is a gradual process with its own sequence and logic. It presumes not the absolute negation of the entire past but, conversely, the use of anything valuable and significant which was gained as part of the CPSU experience and is part of its theoretical arsenal. Personally, I support the views expressed in the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU," but specifically within the CPSU. It makes great sense for the party members who share the ideas of this platform to remain within the ranks of their party, encouraging its democratization from within. Today in a number of cities, including Kaliningrad, efforts are made to create a social democratic party on a parallel basis with the CPSU. However, it is my belief that at the present stage of perestroika the most productive and constructively justified is not this path but another, which is related to the internal renovation of the party and its systematic conversion into the sociopolitical force of democratic socialism.

N. Kulakov, CPSU member since 1959, Nakhabino Settlement, Moscow Oblast: **Less General Statements!**

The first paragraph of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform reads: "...The people... take over the affairs of the state." This claim raises some doubts. The party has led, leads and, for the foreseeable future, will continue to lead the state. This is confirmed by the thesis included in the seventh section of the draft: "The CPSU will pursue its policy and struggle for retaining its status as a leading party..., by garnering in the elections the votes of the electorate in order to obtain the mandate of the people to set up leading authorities in the center, the republics and the local areas." Naturally, the party must express the interests of the people. However, no sign of equality is warranted in this case. Suffice it to recall the slogan "Party and People Are as One." That is perhaps why the draft should not stipulate that the people are taking over the affairs of the state, for this is not entirely consistent with reality.

The draft calls for "daringly and consistently following this path, opposing the forces which would like to turn our society back." I believe that the effectiveness and efficiency of the platform could be enhanced by indicating specifically the nature of these forces. One cannot

defeat one's enemy without knowing him. Yet the enemy of perestroika is powerful and it is no accident that perestroika is running idle.

The first section of the draft begins with the assertion that "our ideal is a humane and democratic socialism." Despite its entire attractiveness, however, this slogan is quite similar to the slogans of the period of stagnation, because of its declarative nature. It does not include any indications about the specific economic, political and social foundations of the new system (new because the "old," the traditional type of socialism familiar to us since childhood, became bankrupt and entirely discredited). Furthermore, no scientific proof is provided of the possibility for building such a socialism. The result is that the party is appealing to the people to follow a path without having a clear idea as to the destination of this path and what we can expect at the next turn. I believe that it would be expedient for the CPSU Central Committee draft platform to provide a more accurate definition of "humane and democratic socialism," noting the essential differences between this system and all other systems we are familiar with.

"The CPSU deems essentially important clearly to distinguish within our past that which was the offspring of Stalinism and the consequences of violating socialist principles, and that which was the real contribution made by the party and the people to progress in their own country and of all mankind." That is how the draft reads. However, in order to draw proper conclusions on the correlation between the positive and the negative in Soviet history, the people must be familiar with the entire harsh truth about Stalinism. To this day we do not know how many people were repressed and how many died. Nor are there any answers to many other questions of interest to the Soviet people. Why is it that the slogan "no one is forgotten and nothing is forgotten" does not apply to the victims of Stalinist repressions? When will work on the rehabilitation of those who were unjustly sentenced be completed? In my view, the CPSU platform would benefit if, instead of general statements on this problem, a more specific standpoint is formulated.

V.I. Lenin defined socialism as the "system of civilized members of cooperatives with public ownership of the means of production" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 373). From the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, the dominance of the public form of ownership is what distinguishes the socialist system from the capitalist system. Therefore, the conclusion found in the draft Central Committee platform to the effect that the existing economy "must be replaced by planning-market economy based on the variety of forms of ownership" cannot be perceived as anything other than a withdrawal from the socialist path of development. Therefore, an internal contradiction arises between the party's appeal of building socialism and the path which has been chosen to attain this objective. It would be proper for the finished draft of the CPSU platform to eliminate this contradiction.

Such are some of my thoughts in reading the draft CPSU Central Committee platform. I have deliberately abstained from providing an overall assessment of the document, for I do not consider myself sufficiently qualified to do so. Furthermore, the press has already published a sufficient number of such assessments.

A. Riotto, Rovno: Reading the Leninist Statutes

One of the fundamental principles of democracy as a form of organization of a governmental system is the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial. It is logical to assume that internal party democracy can be ensured only when democratic centralism will include the principle of the separation of powers.

It looks as though the draft new CPSU Statutes take a small step toward the organizational separation of control from executive powers. It suggests that the control functions of the Party Control Commission be transferred to the current auditing commissions elected at congresses and conferences, after changing their name. However, actually the situation of these commissions is that they are under the party committees. Since in the period between congresses the legislative authority is absent, the result is that the draft statutes preserve within the party the full authority of the party committees and their bureaus.

In my view, by including in the draft statutes the organizational principles of party democratization, we should turn to the democratic traditions which existed in the party during Lenin's lifetime and, finally, to consider in its essence Lenin's official motion submitted at the 12th Party Congress on the creation of a Central Control Commission as part of the Central Committee. Following are the organizational standards of democracy as codified in the party statutes, adopted at the August 1922 Party Conference:

1. Holding an annual party congress with accountability reports and the re-election of central authorities;
2. Guberniya and oblast party conferences to be held once every 6 months with the same procedure of accountability reports and re-elections (no standards are set as to the length of membership within the Central Committee or the oblast and guberniya committees are stipulated for the elected members. However, the regular reassertion of this right at the regular congresses and conferences was mandatory);
3. A general party conference held every year, between congresses, consisting of the expanded Central Committee Plenum with the participation of the first secretaries of republic, oblast and guberniya party committees (currently such conferences do take place but do not have the status of party conference);
4. A Central Committee Plenum to be held once every 2 months;

5. A written report to be submitted by the Central Committee on its work to republic, guberniya and oblast committees, also once every 2 months.

Lenin believed even these standards to be inadequate. Under those circumstances he realized that the party apparatus, headed by Stalin, had acquired strength and power, which enabled it to define the party course regardless of the interests of the majority of party members.

Lenin suggested at the 12th Party Congress that the Central Committee be separated into two collegiums. One of them—the Central Control Commission—would deal with internal party disputes, including disputes among Central Committee members and would consider violations by party members. The other would be working on implementing the resolutions of party congresses. The Central Control Commission, according to Lenin, was to be in charge of improving the state apparatus. According to Lenin, party democratization and, therefore, the adequate representation by the party of the interests of producer classes, could be achieved by separating the power within the party into legislative (the congress), executive (the Central Committee) and arbitral (or judicial), the Central Control Commission. This level of democratization enabled the party to ensure its development along with the development and changes in society.

I am not suggesting that Lenin's ideas submitted at the 12th Party Congress be automatically applied to the 28th Congress. It is clear, for example, that under present circumstances the task of improving the state apparatus is being resolved within the soviets, while the implementation of control functions within the party could be achieved with fewer forces, compared to the past, within the central apparatus. As a whole, however, to this day Lenin's motion appears relevant.

As to auditing work, in general this is not a political function. There is absolutely no need to choose personnel to check on accounts and the observance of internal party instructions. I believe that appointing an auditing commission could be the prerogative of the Central Control Commission.

V. Karbalevich, docent, Belorussian Agricultural Mechanization Institute, candidate of economic sciences, Minsk: **Vanguard or Parliamentary?**

The debate as to the place and role of the CPSU in society and the mechanism of its functioning sharply raised the following question: What legacy are we rejecting? Usually, it is suggested that we reject the Stalinist party model as an "order of knights," and preserve Lenin's idea of a vanguard "party of a new type." Is this concept, which was developed during the specific historical circumstances of Russia at the turn of the century, applicable to the contemporary situation and how can we correlate the political tasks and possibilities of party activities in two essentially different ages? We know that the term "party of a new type" itself

was used in its present connotation by Lenin for the first time in March 1917, in his letter to A.M. Kollontay, in which he pitted such a party against the parties of the Second International. It is precisely this distinction that we shall discuss.

The first organizations of the proletariat resembled more the Bolshevik Party than the social democratic parties of Western Europe. The Alliance of Communists and the First International were formed at a time when the labor movement was in its embryonic state. That is why the Statutes of the Alliance of Communists, drafted by Marx and Engels, stipulated rather strict membership conditions. Thus, the members of the union were to lead a model life and engage in activities consistent with the purposes of the organization, obeying all of its resolutions and keeping all union affairs secret. A new member could be accepted in one of the communities only by unanimous vote, etc. This indicates that the union had the features of a "closed" organization. The First International and, subsequently, the Comintern was a single centralized international party. Its statutes called for the subordination of all sections and federations to the resolutions passed by the General Council, which had the right to expel them from the International.

With the development of capitalism and the labor movement in Western Europe social democratic parties began to be formed, working within the bourgeois parliamentary systems, supporting a course of reforms and struggling essentially for the votes of the electorate. In this case, clearly, it is a question not of "betrayal of the cause of the working class," as our historians have claimed so far, but of the fact that such methods of struggle under those specific historical conditions were quite efficient and yielded results at the lowest possible costs. Since the tasks also defined the nature of the organization, parties appeared, which were wide open to new members, with the freedom of developing trends and groups within them, the relative independence of parliamentary factions, etc. It was this concept of the party that was accepted by the Second International.

A substantial number of Russian revolutionary exiles (the future mensheviks), above all those belonging to Plekhanov's Liberation of Labor Group, raised in the traditions of the European social democracy, wanted to create a Marxist party in Russia modeled after the parties in the Second International. P.B. Akselrod and Yu.O. Martov frequently mentioned the need to "Europeanize" the labor movement in the country. They obviously underestimated the peculiarities of the situation in Russia and its distinctive features; they were ideologically closer to the accepted leaders of the Second International, who supported them.

Unlike the mensheviks, the bolsheviks, led by Lenin, realized that under the conditions of tsarist Russia a party of a parliamentary type would be unviable. The gravity of the class struggle and class hatred here were unparalleled elsewhere in Europe and the possibility of resolving contradictions the parliamentary way did not

exist. Consequently, there were no grounds for reformism. It is by no means accidental that in our country the party of the proletariat appeared before trade unions. Based on the conditions and tasks of the struggle, different from those prevailing in the West, the question of the party's role and functions was formulated differently. The CPSU history textbooks stipulate that Lenin developed a theory "of the party as a revolutionizing, leading and organizing force of the labor movement." Lenin indeed substantiated the role of the subjective factor in history, considering the Marxist Party as its main element. In the social democratic parties of the West theory was assigned an auxiliary role, that of no more than explaining the laws governing the development of society, while pragmatism prevailed in politics. Lenin considered revolutionary theory a powerful means of the reorganization of the world. "The role of the progressive fighter," he wrote, "can be fulfilled only by a party guided by a progressive theory" (op. cit., vol 6, p 25). This means that a party, as it leads the people to revolution, must have a model for the reorganization of society.

The Leninist concept of a Marxist party can be defined most accurately by the term "vanguard party." It is not simply an organization which expresses the interests of the proletariat. It is called upon to head the class struggle, to awaken to revolutionary action and to instill a socialist awareness in the labor movement. Obviously, this concept does not allow for the existence of several parties and organizations representing the interests of the various strata within the same class. The bolsheviks believed that all other organizations of the proletariat (trade union, youth, insurance, and others) should function only under the party's leadership. That is why the concept of "neutrality" of trade unions was firmly condemned at the Fifth RSDWP Congress. Toward the mensheviks, the policy was the following: either act within the framework of a single party, based on the principles of bolshevism, or fight the mensheviks as opportunists.

Lenin believed that within the party the "authority of ideas must be converted into the authority of the system" (op. cit., vol 8, p 355). An organization with a loose structure, poor discipline and significant autonomy of local party organizations could not perform the role of a vanguard party struggling for the victory of the revolution under clandestine conditions. It is no accident that it was precisely because of differences on matters of organization that the initial split occurred between bolsheviks and mensheviks at the Second RSDWP Congress. Although differences concerning the first paragraph of the statutes initially seemed insignificant and nonessential, basically this was a controversy as to what type of party should the RSDWP be: a party of a "new type" or a parliamentary party. The mandatory participation of every member in the activities of one of the party organizations was a characteristic feature of a vanguard Marxist party, which Lenin visualized only as a type of organization with strict centralization and firm

discipline, for "refusal to obey the leadership of the center equals a refusal to be a party member and equals the destruction of the party" (op. cit. vol 8, p 351).

The bolsheviks won in the historic debate with the mensheviks. Since one of the main tasks of any party is political power, this task was brilliantly implemented by the bolsheviks. The party of a new type proved to be better adapted to the period of sharp class battles. Even after the victory of the October Revolution, under the extreme circumstances of the struggle for remaining in power, it was only the party of a new type, strictly centralized and disciplined, that could successfully meet its historical purpose. In 1920 Lenin wrote that "the bolsheviks would not remain in power not 2 and a half years but even 2 and a half months without the strictest possible truly iron discipline within our party" (op. cit. vol 41, p 5).

As we know, shortcomings are extensions of qualities. The features of the party of a new type which gave the bolsheviks the advantage during the period of clandestinity and fierce struggle for power and for remaining in power, had their negative side as well. The concept of revolutionary theory as a powerful means for the reorganization of the world became a dogma. The conclusion of the growth of the role of the subjective factor within the party as its main element was the foundation for a belief in the unlimited possibilities to change reality. It was precisely this type of thinking that, after the victory of the October Revolution, led to arbitrariness and to the violation of the historical process. The concept of a vanguard party, which rejected any opposition, inevitably led to the strengthening of the administrative-command system and became one of the reasons which substantiated the failure of the NEP, for the further development of market relations demanded political pluralism.

The principle of democratic centralism was the starting point for the withering away of internal party democracy. Although the first postrevolutionary years have been frequently depicted as the period of its blossoming, already then centralism prevailed. In addressing the 12th RKP(b) Congress in 1923, L.B. Krasin pointed out that the party is continuing to act as a clandestine organization. In other words, internal party life and the level of democracy had remained on the level of a clandestine party (in extending this idea, one could say that the CPSU began to emerge "out of clandestinity" only after the 19th All-Union Party Conference). The debate on internal party democracy of the end of 1923 and start of 1924 clearly illumined the growing antidemocratic trends within the RKP(b), which inevitably converted it from a party of a new type into a "order of knights." A peculiar morality in which loyalty to the party idea prevailed over any other ethical concepts shaped the mentality of the "cog," of the thoughtless "party soldier" ("ready to perform any party assignment;" "I shall work wherever the party sends me"). This was a peculiar recurrence of "Nechayevism."

The idea of sacrifice, which had profound traditions in the Russian revolutionary movement, was entirely natural for a party operating in profound clandestinity, consisting of professional revolutionaries. However, in the case of a multi-million strong ruling party this idea leads to a restriction of democracy and the rigid obedience of rank-and-file members to the leadership. Sacrificing personal interests to those of the party presumes that someone should define and express these general party interests. But who? Obviously, the leaders. One can see better from higher-up, how to handle the party members who are ready to go wherever told and do what they are ordered. That is why Stalin was able to force the old bolsheviks to sacrifice themselves to the party and falsely "expose Trotskiyites" at the public political trials of 1936-1938 with relative ease. G.L. Pyatakov said that to him there is no life outside the party, outside of being in harmony with it. "If in order to achieve victories and attain its objectives the party demands that white be called as black I shall accept this and this will become my own conviction."

The concept of the party's leading role in socialist society in the initial period of the existence of the Soviet system was not legally regulated. The question arose of correlating the functions of party and state authorities. The resolutions of the Eighth RKP(b) Congress stipulated that "the party tries to direct the activities of the soviets but not to replace them." Lenin also repeatedly mentioned the need to demarcate between the functions of the party and the soviets. However, the logic of the exercise of the party's leading role in a one-party system inevitably led to the duplication and merger of party and state authorities on all levels.

A "statified" party cannot operate other than on the basis of centralism. "The leading role of the CPSU" takes over from even an efficient economic mechanism and a well-organized state management system. Efforts to demarcate between the functions of party, soviet and economic authorities within the framework of an administrative-command system are pure utopia.

Under the conditions of a law-governed state, a multi-party parliamentary system and a market economy, where the social system sensitively reacts to state control measures, and where there is no need to mount a "battle for the harvest" or struggle for the implementation of the "5-Year Plan ahead of schedule," a party of a "new type" is unnecessary. In such a case the party cannot efficiently function, for its rigid organizational structure finds it difficult to adapt to democratic conditions. Such a party inevitably begins to lose authority and influence and suffers major defeats at the very first free multiparty parliamentary elections. The ruling parties of a vanguard type in Poland, the GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia quickly surrendered their positions in society partially because their primary organizations, which had become accustomed to act strictly according to orders from above, had become unused to showing initiative. They passively waited for the latest instructions and surrendered to fate. These processes affected the CPSU as well:

it has been universally acknowledged today that the party is experiencing a crisis and that its authority is declining. The structural production principle (ignoring the territorial organizations of the retired) leads to the fact that the party turns out unprepared for the electoral struggle during the period of electoral campaigns in the territorial districts. Yet the struggle for power is the main task of any political party.

Under those circumstances, the choices left to the party of a new type are the following: either to become a sectarian organization with little influence or to develop into a party of a parliamentary type, which is what happened with the SED in the GDR, the PZPR in Poland, the MSZMP in Hungary, the CZCP in Czechoslovakia and the BCP in Bulgaria. These parties abandoned traditional orthodox ideology, democratic centralism, and the production principle in their structure and undertook to make major reductions in their apparatus.

If we were to try to analyze the activities of political parties in the capitalist countries, we would inevitably note that starting with the 1950s a period of peaceful evolutionary development of capitalism has been taking place. The communist parties (parties of a new type) which relied on the revolutionary change of the existing system increasingly kept losing ground (particularly in the 1970s and 1980s). Conversely, the social democratic parties (the parliamentary type), with their reformist course, proved to be better adapted to such circumstances and assumed leading positions in many Western countries.

The absence of an international organization rallying the communist parties is by no means accidental. The majority of communist party leaders were convinced that an international organization of communists should be established exclusively on the basis of the same organizational principles as the individual parties within it. After World War II efforts to recreate the Comintern in its new quality failed despite the activities of the Informbureau. Three international conferences of communist and worker parties took place in an atmosphere of sharp disagreements. Unsuccessful efforts were made over a period of 20 years to convene a new conference. Meanwhile, the Socialist International remained active, holding annual congresses and seeing its authority grow.

Given their limited internal party democracy, the role of the leaders in the parties of a new type is exceptionally great. Consequently, randomness in formulating a policy plays a great role. The painful history of our country is a clear confirmation of this fact.

Different attitudes toward factions and groups stem from the different concepts concerning the principles governing the organization of the party. In a party of a new type the existence of factions and groups is a painful problem. Democratic centralism and factions are incompatible. Officially, groups are not rejected but in practice

a distinct shade of views which may appear is accompanied by sticking labels, looking for social origins, and so on. Actually, after a short period of time, this ends either in a split or in "expelling the opportunists" from the party. Therefore, the danger of a split within the parties of a new type is much greater than in parties of the parliamentary type in which the existence of factions and groups is a usual and normal phenomenon, while the absence of rigid discipline makes possible the coexistence among different trends within a common program and even outside the program. This makes it possible to preserve the necessary stability, for in political life, as in mechanics, the rule is that the more autonomous and self-governing are the individual elements of a system the more durable and viable the system becomes. The existence of groups and trends enables the party sensitively to react to changes in the political situation and to take better into consideration the moods of the electorate. The existence of factions, combined with competition with other parties makes it necessary steadily to improve the party's program and the tactics and thus to prove its political viability.

The draft of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress and the party statutes themselves prove that some steps have already been taken by the CPSU in that direction. The declaration of abandoning the monopoly of state power and readiness to compete on an equal basis with other political organizations confirms the aspiration to reinterpret the party's place and role in the political system of Soviet society. An important concept is that of the possibility of establishing platforms within the CPSU and freedom of debate. The party must be both a debating club (however greatly we may have feared this) and an efficiently working organization.

Nonetheless, some stipulations in the CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform also confirm the aspiration to preserve its status as a vanguard party. This is confirmed by stipulations in the draft statutes such as the preservation of party agencies in state institutions, the armed forces, the MVD, and the KGB; the principle of democratic centralism; the prohibition of factions; the mandatory requirement for every party member to work in a party organization.

Therefore, the preconference documents include a forced compromise which presumes the possibility of the further development of the vanguard party into a party of a parliamentary type. The conversion of society to a multiparty system and the appearance of opposition organizations will urgently encourage the CPSU to make such a change.

**G. Nikolaichev, CPSU member since 1974, Chita Oblast:
On the Social Base**

We have become accustomed to the term "party of the whole people," which was introduced into the political lexicon at the 22nd Congress. I believe, however, that this inclusion played a negative role in the destinies of

the CPSU and encouraged the mushrooming growth of its ranks. The annual acceptance of candidate members came close to 1 million people. No amendments proved able to change this process. Whereas in the past 30 years the country's population increased by 40 percent, CPSU ranks more than doubled. Control over the social composition of the party was replaced by bureaucratic regulations. It was much simpler for a young salesgirl to join the CPSU than, let us say, an experienced social science teacher or a contributor to a party newspaper, for her candidacy immediately "improved" four indicators: worker, Komsomol member, woman, under thirty.

If we look at the concept of the "party of the whole people" from the ideological-political viewpoint, it becomes clear that we are still far from having reached the type of social homogeneity of society which would lead to identifying party ideology with social consciousness. If we have in mind nothing but the elimination of antagonistic class contradictions, the conclusion of the "whole nation" status should have been reached as early as the second half of the 1930s. In addition to everything else, this formula clearly excludes a multiparty system as a possible component of the socialist political system.

Lenin's letter "On Conditions for the Acceptance of New Members in the Party," written in March 1922, comes to mind. Incidentally, it was no less prophetic than the famous "Letter to the Congress." "Unquestionably," Lenin wrote, "today in its majority our party is insufficiently proletarian." He then said: "...We must not delude ourselves or others by defining the concept of 'worker' in such a way that this concept would include only those who in fact, by virtue of their condition in life, are bound to develop a proletarian mentality. This is impossible without having worked for many years in a factory and without any other objectives, but on the basis of the general conditions of economic and social way of life" (op. cit., vol 45, pp 17-21).

Today, when the working class is the biggest social stratum, this formulation of the problem is substantiated also from the viewpoint of the party's social base. We should not be afraid to narrow it: this is necessary as one of the means of getting rid of fellow travelers and preventing their future acceptance. We must not forget that the spirit of the party, the comradely atmosphere within it are defined not only by the program and the statutes but also by the mentality of its members which, in turn, is shaped in the environment from which these people came to the party.

Therefore, in my view, the stipulation in the Central Committee Draft Platform according to which the party "expresses the interests of the working class and all working people" needs a clarification. The CPSU Draft Statutes must define precisely and in detail the principles governing the structuring of party ranks.

**A. Makarov, candidate of technical sciences, Leningrad:
Customary Evil?**

We initiated perestroyka, for it became obvious that business as usual was no longer possible. However, this obvious fact was insufficient if we were to make a turn or a radical change. It is also necessary to know how to come out of the current situation, for otherwise, as Montaigne described it, the following could happen: the population of Capua replaced their city authorities because of their numerous sins, after which they held a long session in an effort to elect new authorities, eventually reappointing the old ones, for a known evil is better than an unknown one. The situation today is such that society is already considering that example.

Our leading economists and politicians, it seems to me, have still not entirely realized what was it that, precisely, led socialism to an economic crisis. The majority among them are blaming the Command-Administrative System (with capital letters) or state capitalism. They seek the solution in ownership pluralism. Is this sufficient? It is entirely obvious that neither "state capitalism" nor "state socialism" existed in our country in the 1970s and 1980s (to the extent to which they existed during Stalin's times). State capitalism or state socialism presumes the existence of a single management center. It is naive to believe that the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers or the Gosplan is such a center (take, for instance, any resolution passed by such authorities concerning capital construction: Has even a single one ever been implemented?). What has been indeed created in our country is a departmental monopoly with a developed infrastructure with which, for quite some time, we shall have to fight (as with single-shift work, reduced capital returns, hindering technical progress, etc.). Paradoxically, the alienation of labor collectives from ownership was by no means complete under that system. "My plant," both worker and director sincerely say. They say this not because they have been contaminated down to the marrow of their bones with "communist propaganda." They say this because in frequent cases this stupefying and thundering monster is the only force which is capable of giving them a place to live and their daily bread. It is precisely such departmental ownership that built (and, at the same time, destroyed and poisoned) our cities and depopulated the countryside, with the full support of labor collectives-owners.

I am asking you the following: Who has the power and how can such power be acquired? Is it the party, which does not actually have it, being itself "dispersed among departmental premises," or a sectorial ministry which, together with the sectorial trade union, expresses the interests of the multi-million strong masses of owners (without strikes in the past and with strikes today)? Let us assume that we pass a law and make them the legal owners. What will change? Even though the owner does not go on strike he can simply stop selling his goods as he wishes. Most enterprises do not even conceive of ending their subordination to the ministries. This is natural, for a monopoly status is to the advantage of the owner. Sooner or later, after fluctuations and hesitations, such owners will support the state price system, converting it,

essentially, into a system of their own monopoly prices. By following this method we could develop an even less controllable economy and an even greater chaos.

So far, the USSR Supreme Soviet has been dealing essentially with questions of power. Today it is actively discussing prices and it is quite likely that tomorrow such debates will be supported by both the ministries and the strikers. In Poland, for example, they have already taken that path and, one would think, have understood that the only objective instrument for assessing the social usefulness of labor is the market.

The main feature of the political mechanisms today, I believe, is the self-preservation of sectorial ownership. That is the crux of the matter, which has brought us to this kind of life. Our scourge, our main trouble, is the sectorial monopoly. It would be probably useful to keep repeating that it must be ended.

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Democratization is the Aim of the Statutes

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[Interview with Nikolay Zolotarev, head of a consultants' group, Party Building and Cadre Work Department, CPSU Central Committee; conducted by Yevgeniy Khokhlov]

[Text] [Khokhlov] Preparations for the 28th Party Congress are noted by mass suggestions of rules. Even prior to the publication of the CPSU Central Committee Draft, changes of the statutes were suggested by the party organizations of Uralmash, Moscow State University, Novosibirsk, etc. However, in addition to those published in the local press, there have been dozens if not hundreds of other drafts and numerous suggestions submitted by the party members, speaking for a great variety of collectives. These documents express a rich experience. A large number of properly formulated such documents are based on the history of our statutes and take into consideration the practical experience of foreign parties. Our readers are interested in the way these suggestions were considered and what were the principles governing their choice.

[Zolotarev] This entire information was addressed to the CPSU Central Committee Task Force in charge of formulating the draft statutes. Many thousands of suggestions applicable to all aspects of the statutes and more than 50 separate complete drafts were received. They were adopted as a basis for future work. Most of them lean toward the Leninist traditions and suggest that the statutes become a shorter, stricter and strictly legal document and, in terms of content, a maximally democratic one.

Ten groups consisting of social scientists and party workers were especially formed for the purpose of

studying all the received suggestions. They drafted recommendations and the texts were selected from the suggestions after repeated comparisons and considerations of the different choices. A separate group of specialists developed the concept of the new statutes. Another group drafted the finished text. As the work proceeded, the materials were repeatedly discussed by the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Problems of Party Building and Cadre Policy and the Politburo. The outcome was the document which was submitted to the participants in the expanded Central Committee Plenum. Many of them had their own versions of the statutes and introduced various amendments. Therefore, in the course of the plenum, although it essentially preserved its structure, in practical terms the draft was once again rewritten and resubmitted for discussion. I am confident that an equal number of changes will be submitted at the 28th Party Congress which will pass on the new statutes.

Now as to the criteria which governed the choice of suggestions. The first: the party must remain an organization of a Leninist type. Understandably, debates on this topic were particularly extensive. Eventually, however it was agreed that the deformations which were paralyzing party life and served specific purposes were alien to an organization of revolutionaries-transformers, as Lenin had conceived it.

Second: the purpose of the statutes is to ensure the profound democratization of party life. Preference was given to suggestions which maximally met this stipulation. The intention was to preserve only a minimal mechanism needed for preserving the organizational structure itself, for without it no democracy would be possible. I cannot claim that today all possibilities of democratizing the statutes have been exhausted. The debate is continuing, and new radical ideas are appearing. The delegates to the 28th Congress continued the work on the draft statutes.

Third: anything that was essentially new was considered. Unfortunately, there was also a clear lack of constructive suggestions which would lead the party away from performing command functions. In the course of the discussion this gap was filled. Many valuable suggestions were made, for instance, by party raykom and gorkom secretaries and secretaries of party committees of large primary party organizations, who were members of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Preparations for the 28th Congress and who had worked on the draft statutes in Moscow, throughout the month of May.

Fourth and last: the way any given standard could influence the party functioning under the conditions of a multiparty system was taken into consideration. Many suggestions had to be abandoned because of the aspiration of their authors to introduce excessive regulations.

[Khokhlov] The supporters of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" openly state that we need a party of a parliamentary type and presented substantive arguments

to this effect. The submitted Central Committee draft calls for status governing a leading, a guiding and a ruling organization of the "vanguard" type. Could this become an obstacle to a party which must become part of the new political system?

[Zolotarev] Let me above all note the new perception of the draft statutes. It does not strengthen the party's leadership but calls for painstaking work, if you wish, struggle for political leadership in society and the fact that the party can justify its claim to the role of political vanguard through the sum total of its activities and service to the people. The concept of ruling party, although this is a fact of our life, is not included in the draft statutes as something permanent. It is to be asserted with each election to soviets of people's deputies, in competition with other political forces. In my view, the document does not include in the least a party claim to a leading role, a role which for many years was organically part of the command-administrative system and served as its sociopolitical cover. The recent amendments to Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution, I believe, constitute the new reality of our time and of the immediate future.

It is clear that a renovated party, which is also the purpose of its statutes, must work under the conditions of a multiparty system. Political groups which aspire to the role of parties and are offering a great variety of programs, are already beginning to be established under a variety of names. Virtually all of them proclaim themselves to be of a parliamentary type or, more accurately, parties which aspire to have a parliamentary system. Obviously, this trend has affected the CPSU as well which, as conceived by some party members, should also become a parliamentary-type party, in order to be able to win the competition for deputy mandates in a social situation to which it is unaccustomed.

Let us try, for no more than an instant, to forget the customary idea as to the nature of a communist party under the conditions of a multiparty system and a narrow understanding of its role and tasks. Let us recall that during the various stages in its activities, whether in clandestinity, during the relatively short period of a multiparty system, which began in February 1917 and lasted for some time after the October Revolution, and during the period of social pluralism of the 1920s, our party was precisely a Leninist type of organization which ensured its success in the parliamentary struggle. At that time, however, as a revolutionary party, its initial task was to be with the masses. It was initially created to work not within the system of the government but directly within society. That is its main function.

If we look at a parliamentary-type party in the classical meaning of the term, its type of organization, methods and objectives are defined, above all, by political interests. Such a party aspires to assume a position within the social structure, thus allowing it to hold the real instruments of power. Its main purpose is to take over the rule

of the state at least actively to participate in performing the functions of state power.

Under the new circumstances, the party becomes much more active than at any other time in our history. It will become involved in parliamentary activities. Nonetheless, even this is not its aim. Acquiring a parliamentary majority is, to the party, the result of comprehensive activities within society—theoretical, ideological, political and organizational. Excessive attention paid to matters of governmental administration could lead to the loss of its basic political function. We are all too-well familiar with such a situation, based on past experience. This leads to a paradox: we try to acquire a new quality and abandon any exaggerated power and the right of being a "state party;" nonetheless, we are asked to resume the same role but as a parliamentary party. The statutes need new guidelines and another emphasis.

I hope that your readers have noted that the draft statutes ascribe a leading place to the primary party organizations. They guarantee their autonomy and increased rights, which would enable them to live and function on the basis of full political autonomy and responsibility. Many rules which involved the party organizations and party committees in the direct implementation of administrative functions in society and within the governmental system have been deleted. All party cells now have the possibility to engage in extensive and autonomous activities and have scope to maneuver. The full implementation of these statutory stipulations would lead to an enhancement in the party's authority, strengthen its vanguard role and the foundations of its parliamentary activities.

Under the conditions of political rivalry, the mechanism of interaction with state agencies and social organizations assumes great importance. This mechanism is based on the idea of political partnership, the standards of a constructive dialogue and consideration of the variety of interests. In particular, in the course of the electoral campaign, the possibility of alliances with representatives of other social organizations and giving electoral support not exclusively to members of one's own party become admissible.

For decades the control rights of the party were focused on cadre policy, which assumed a strict form of deployment of cadres through the nomenclature. The new statutes make the new CPSU cadre policy quite flexible, under the conditions of a multiparty system. It is considered that party organizations and party committees will recommend for the various work sectors competent people and will back their recommendations strictly through "parliamentary" methods, to the extent of their own influence and the authority of the entire party. They must also control, naturally, their cadres openly, be responsible for them, defend them if necessary and, should they make a wrong choice, openly admit to their error. The number of such errors as well will influence the party's authority. It may turn out that the party may be in power but that some areas or regions remain

outside its influence. In a system of political pluralism this is an entirely normal situation. To the party this is an indication that somewhere the job was not completed.

The apparat is being eliminated, that same apparat which "replaced the elected authorities." (In my view, this concept is not entirely accurate, for the apparat always was the executive authority and acted in accordance with the resolutions of the party committee and its bureau. The fact that it acted through command methods which, precisely, gave the impression of its omnipotence, is a different matter.) In the draft new statutes the apparat has been removed from providing direct guidance in party work. It must provide information and consultation services and help in bookkeeping. The future "apparatchik" will be a specialist in the area of party building; he will be a specialist in politics and sociology, a lawyer, or an expert in specific problems. In a word, he will be a professional who has joined the apparat based on recommendations from below, of the party mass, but who works for a salary and is protected by the labor legislation. With such an apparat the problem of demarcating functions between party and soviet authorities would hardly arise. One of the obstructions to the renovation of the political system will disappear.

[Khokhlov] The idea of the democratization of the party, in the view of many KOMMUNIST readers, conflicts with the categorical prohibition of factions. In this case, reference is usually made to the experience of the post-October period, when our party found itself in an incomparably more difficult situation, as well as the example of foreign parties which allow extensive opposition within their ranks. The question is posed almost rhetorically: Could an organization which so zealously protects itself from an internal struggle successfully wage an external struggle?

[Zolotarev] This is another paradox. It is precisely the appearance of a multiparty system that will make it necessary, perhaps for the first time, truly to raise the question of party discipline, of the need to consolidate the party and of unity—not mechanical but the type of unity which is forged through the variety of opinions, in the course of a free democratic discussion. The current statutes as well prohibit factions. However, has anyone been bothered by this of late? No! Understandably, for the prohibiting formulation, as it were, "was unfunctional," for no opportunity for the appearance of factions existed. Today people are thinking about the usefulness of factions and even of the need to free communist deputies from the obligation to obey party resolutions. All of these searches, however, are taking place in the specific situation of a transitional period. It is thus that we become trapped by current concerns, the purpose of which, with a single party system, would be to find a method for the formulation of a political line outside the official viewpoint. Yet we must think on a long-term basis. The statutes are supposed to last more than a couple of years.

In preparing the draft close study was made of the experience of foreign parties. I can tell you that, for example, the French communists, whose parliamentary activities we recently studied, have an envious internal party democracy. I personally was most impressed by relations of true equality within the French Communist Party, freedom of assembly regardless of rank, that which in our country is described as party comradeship but which, very regrettably, we have lost. Externally, however, this party operates as a single organization with a clear political line. Could a parliamentary faction be independent of the Central Committee? It is difficult to imagine this under conditions in which a single vote could determine the fate of any law to be passed by parliament. The communist deputy must proceed from the programmatic and statutory principles. This does not apply to the party members alone. All parties and parliamentary factions observe party discipline. This does not prevent in the least democracy in intraparty relations.

The draft statutes makes clear the concept of factions, inadmissible within the party. Essentially, it is a question exclusively of prohibiting divisive activities within the party. We must not ignore the fact that already now there are politicians within the CPSU who, in the heat of the struggle to promote their viewpoint, exceed the limits of normal debate and are ready to sacrifice the interests of the entire party. It is as though unless we accept the views of our comrades and the basic programmatic ideas, we should leave the organization. Such an action, in any case, would be morally justified and worthy of respect. As to the possibility of expressing one's own viewpoint and to struggle for it while remaining within the boundaries of party-mindedness, this right is codified in the new statutes for every party member separately, for minorities and for a committee or an organization as a whole.

[Khokhlov] The draft CPSU Platform calls for the reinterpretation of the traditional meaning of democratic centralism. However, we can easily find in the draft statutes those same five points which characterize this principle. Our opponents do not object to "electiveness," "accountability" or "collectivism." Sharp debates are taking place on the subject of party discipline: on the extent to which the minority must obey the majority and on the mandatory nature of the resolutions passed by superior authorities for their subordinates. How can such contradictions be resolved and what guarantees will the new statutes provide against "bureaucratization" and the possibility of the appearance of "cults?"

[Zolotarev] If we were to abandon in its entirety the principle of the mandatory nature of resolutions the entire structure would crumble. It is impossible to do without any management, and no implementation of the will of the masses can be achieved through organizational amorphousness. A party united on a voluntary basis needs a certain level of organization. What type precisely? The question here is not one of the principle of

democratic centralism as such, which is an unquestionable prerequisite for the existence of any social organization, but of the correlation between centralism and independence. This is precisely what we are debating and the debate is bringing to light a variety of approaches.

However, in frequent cases the arguments are based not on the content of the entire array of ideas included in the draft but of some separate and compromised concepts. The prejudice expressed against some statutory standards is due to the fact that they are related to negative phenomena, such as bureaucratism and the "cult of personality." This must be taken into consideration, for the sources of the apprehension of the party members may be traced not only to the difficult party history but also to their personal experience. In this sense any incautious formulation or a hasty comprehensive concept may aggravate mistrust. A certain subjective perception has influenced the draft statutes as well.

I, for instance, find the following contradiction clear. We must rigidly restrict any condition which could lead to the appearance of a cult of personality—an authoritarian system, one-man rule, and excessive power given to the "leading individuals." I believe that the concept of the election of first secretaries directly at conferences and congresses should, for this reason, be viewed with some caution, for this clearly weakens the controlling role of the plenums. Nonetheless, it was included in the draft under the tremendous pressure of the party organizations. From the viewpoint of the party mass this can be understood, for the people want to participate in decision-making when it concerns first secretaries. However, I would not consider this rule as a superior achievement of democracy. It precisely strengthens the principle of centralism.

Let us now consider the type of rules which have been included in the draft statutes to prevent unnecessary centralization. Here is a small segment of the new features: the primary organization is given the opportunity to object to the decision of a superior authority. At the same time, the superior party committee has no right to annul a resolution passed by a primary organization if it does not conflict with the program and the statutes and does not concern personal files. The very technology of decision-making changes in the direction of greater democracy. To begin with, the minority is guaranteed the right to continue to support its view and to demand another debate. Second, in the case of differences (even if a single member is "against") the disputed matter must be reviewed and resolved with a two-third majority vote. Incidentally, this concept was violently opposed by those who had become accustomed to command and not to persuade. This is a warning symptom.

We must be realistic and understand that the new standards will not begin to function by themselves, immediately and at full capacity. In my view, currently even the full potential of the current much less democratic statutes is not being applied. Therefore, the party's

life will be complex and every party member must undergo the difficult training in democracy.

[Khokhlov] Let us note the lack of clarity of some stipulations in the document, about which there have been lengthy debates. For example, it is stipulated that the CPSU is structured on the basis of the production and territorial features. Does this mean that a party member is given the right to decide where to register? Or else let us consider the delicate topic of the status of a CPSU veteran. What does it introduce in terms of relations between the veteran and the party organization? It is precisely on this subject that highly emotional debates broke out, including among the readers of our journal.

[Zolotarev] There neither is nor will there be a simple answer to this last question. This affects a large group of party members, many of whom can no longer actively participate in party work for reasons of health. Today it is even less suitable to preserve any formal-organizational reasons for accusations or, which is even worse, a forced loss of membership. It is considered that veterans will have the possibility, without losing their feeling of involvement with general party matters, to be free from unbearable obligations. The attitude toward them shown by the party organizations, in my view, should be structured primarily not on statutory but on the basis of ethical standards, including respect and concern. After its essential approval by the congress, the status of "party veteran" will have to be interpreted in accordance with the numerous suggestions which were voiced in the discussion of this new statutory concept.

The draft also does not strictly regulate the question of the principle of party structure. Some party members favor exclusively the territorial feature. Essentially, these are supporters of creating a party of a parliamentary type. Others, the majority, believe that the party should not take its organizations out of the labor collectives. The suggestion of giving the party members the right themselves to choose where to register, whether at their place of work or place of residence, deserves, in my view, some attention. The idea of a double registration is unacceptable. More than anything else it would create the illusion of "comprehensiveness," according to which the party members will be registered everywhere but work neither here nor there. Instead, a rather broad maneuver is being contemplated. The registration of communists and primary organizations will remain the prerogative of the rayon and city party committees. In all likelihood, more sharply than anyone else, it is the raykoms that feel the lack of reliable support among the city microrayons and the helplessness of the majority of territorial organizations. There is a common interest of correcting this situation. I would favor, above all, the strengthening of the organization at the place of residence.

[Khokhlov] The unwritten party ethics suggested that no detailed interest should be expressed concerning the material aspects. Today discussions on this subject are

constant and, furthermore, are supported by action: dues are being withheld and the owners of party property are changing. From this viewpoint the respective section of the statutes already appears obsolete. For example, was it necessary to quote specific amounts in rubles in a long-term document when inflation is officially acknowledged to exist? Here is a more essential question: What gives the CPSU the ownership rights stipulated in the draft?

[Zolotarev] To the best of my knowledge, for at least 20 years the party has been pursuing its activities exclusively with its own funds. This question is quite difficult and applies not only to the CPSU but to any other public organization. The recently passed law acknowledges their right to ownership. However, we shall have to develop a legal mechanism for the practical exercise of this right.

As to the size of dues, I too object to specific figures. I cannot find an explanation, for instance, as to why a primary organization could use for its own purposes no more than 50 percent of the dues and not, shall we say, 40 or 60. It would be more logical to grant the party congress the right to set the amounts of dues and withholdings depending on real needs and the views of the majority of party members. It is above all those who consider the need for stable monetary income that insist on introducing a firm scale in the statutes. Clearly, this argument as well will be resolved at the forthcoming congress.

[Khokhlov] The new statute will function in a period of historical changes. It is very difficult to predict the further development of events. Nonetheless, what is your assessment of the permanence of the statutes?

[Zolotarev] Concepts as to the correlation of social forces in the 90s, under the conditions of an existing multiparty system, are indeed lacking. All we have are assumptions based on the experience of other countries or our own historical past. In all likelihood, however, the situation will prove to be more complex, unlike any other European parliamentary standards or prerevolutionary Duma practices.

The drafters of the statutes proceeded from the fact that the party will work for the creation of a society of humane and democratic socialism. Such is the purpose of perestroika. This document is entirely suitable for the transitional stage as well as for the subsequent participation of the CPSU in a multiparty system and for the long-term future. The possibility exists also of introducing an entire array of democratic changes within the CPSU itself, based on the projected changes in its functions and role.

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Understand Others; Editorial Mail and Some Personal Digressions

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[Article by Svetlana Yarmolyuk]

[Text] There always is a direct motivation, an impetus to publish. In this case, it was a letter from Tiraspol, an excerpt of which follows:

"Recently a friend of my son's came to me and excitedly said: 'Mikhail Lvovich, you have been a party member for almost half a century. Tell me what to do? My Serezhka, a fifth-grader, came to me from school, crying. What was the matter? It turned out that the teacher was asking the children about their father's job. My son said that I am a party gorkom instructor and, during the lunch break, others began to tease him, calling him 'bureaucrat,' 'apparatchik,' and who knows what else...."

"I know this boy's father," goes on to say M. Khazanov. "He is an excellent specialist-technologist; he worked at a big enterprise and had a good salary and bonuses. By switching to the gorkom he lost income and had more work. I asked him: Why did you shift to party work? He was invited to the gorkom where he was told of the great need to strengthen the young with competent specialists, politically knowledgeable and not burdened by old dogmas, people who were honest and knew how to work with others. 'you understand, they asked me, the difficult situation in which the party finds itself today? What could I, a communist, answer? I agreed. I work honestly yet it is my kid who is getting the lumps.'..."

I am unwilling to draw direct analogies although they do appear. I remember from childhood the hidden emotions felt in our big Moscow "community," when a neighbor who had come back from the war was cruelly reminded of the fact that he was the "son of an enemy of the people." Nonetheless, he became what he wanted, a student in geology (and a good geologist). However, this intelligent and optimistic person was not accepted in the party because of public opinion.

Is this now happening to the children of party members?

What is the matter with us? Why are we thrown from one extreme into another? Is it because of our "broad character?" We dance until we collapse; we drink ourselves into oblivion; when we fight we trample on our opponent.... "Today it has become fashionable to kick the party and each such kick hurts my heart as though I personally am being kicked," writes R. Mandrusov, a refugee from Baku. But I read such "kicking" letters which, to my great regret, are many and I am amazed at how similar they are in tone although coming from different areas.

Here is a suggestion as to how to act with the communists, with those who are "in power:" "...They will have to go to work wherever assigned! From their comfortable

premises they will have to move, at best, into roach-infested slums and, at worst, they will change places with railroad workers, from comfort to trolleys.... That should apply to everyone other than scientists, VUZ professors, teachers and physicians" (M. Frolov, Kuybyshev).

Here is the decisive appeal: "The enemies hurled a challenge at us. We must accept it. Enough blaming the old generations. Now is the time to act to rescue the Homeland, to rescue the communist line. I believe that we should not fear to have political prisoners and we should stop looking behind us, saying 'oh my God, what will the princess say...', i.e., the West" (M. Kulikov, Moscow).

From one extreme to another. The extremes meet in the search for that same "enemy," and in hatred. When has hatred been a constructive force?...

I am by no means in favor of universal forgiveness and for "whitewashing" the party. A very great deal has been written and is being written about its past and the present, including in our journal and, particularly, during the pre-congress discussion. However, it hardly pays to discuss humanism and mankind if we fail to see the specific individual; it is hardly proper to express views on the party if we cannot distinguish the faces of the party members.

"I recently took the bus. There was a loud and insulting outpour of words against the communists, shouted indiscriminately. Everyone kept silent. Only two elderly people turn pale. I went to that man and asked him whether it was precisely myself and my wife (both of us are communists) and another 90 million people that he intended to destroy. Accusations poured. We began to argue while the rest of the passengers listened closely. We proved that it was the party that suffered, most of all, during the Stalinist repressions and the Civil and Patriotic Wars. Naturally, there had been many people (and still are) within the party whose actions had brought shame on it both at the top and locally. The people can see such things, which cause discontent and indignation. In this case as well it is difficult to argue and prove otherwise, for I too feel indignant. There were millions of party members who worked and are working honestly, with dedication, and who should be protected from insults and slander. Let us give glasnost its due. May the accursed 1930s never come back, when people could be put in jail for a single word. Let there be alternate parties, and so on. I accept all this. I do not accept that the entire party and all party members be insulted!" (V. Silchenko, Yeysk).

Someone remarked that "if we lived better we would look for fewer people to blame." Do we seriously intend to live better? I always try to understand, above all, what motivates a person to attend a meeting or, let us say, to write to the journal? Unfortunately, I realize that all too frequently this is motivated by the aspiration to destroy rather than promote, and even in promoting to apply the tried methods, to use the customary tone.

Here, for example, is a view on the authorities: "...What should have Gorbachev started with? 1. Have the state confiscate the surplus money; there are many ways of doing this, but this is already a detail. 2. Through his personal example and modest and sensible behavior to strengthen order and discipline in the state. 3. For the good of our projects, to have executed or put in jail for 20 years a few hundred inveterate scoundrels, and only then take up other matters!" (V. Uvarov, Leningrad).

Here is a suggestion on how to solve the problems of the countryside: "Request the city to resettle a certain number of workers and see to it that this is done! The government should order them to work under the same conditions as the kolkhoz members. Should they refuse to go to the kolkhoz, they should be tried as saboteurs and have 25 percent of their annual wages docked..." (K. Khutoryanskiy, Novosibirsk).

Here is an answer to the preparations for military reform: "...One must deal with that same Sobchak and others, who have not served in the army but who give advice. That major who donned a naval uniform and, unsolicited, suggested the formation of a professional army, who asked him to solve such problems without the general staff or the USSR Ministry of Defense? What is his value to the USSR Armed Forces? He should be sent to 'Kushka,' to form a squad of criminals and give him 5 years in which to prove the usefulness of keeping such an army" (V. Baranchikov, Balakovo. I hope that the author will not be angry for the deletion of a few swear words).

That is how we begin to live in a new way. Probably we should not ask about or try to prove the origins of such categorical and intolerant statements. Perhaps we should also become accustomed to the fact that all statements and slogans, from the right or the left, today as in the past, are usually made in the name of the people. I read in a paper that "from the period familiar to us we became accustomed to love, hate, betrayal and denial simply, immediately, in the crowd, as part of the big 'human mountain.'"

In a word, the people. But then we should understand what "people" means.

"I am in the people and the people is in me! Never, not for a single day, have I separated myself from the people, something which you cannot claim." This was addressed to me personally by that same reader who wrote about the "roach-infested slums and trolleys." Perhaps he would have been less harsh had he known that, in my case, no resettlement is necessary (I live in a "roach-infested slum"). The author goes on to say: "You found the 'gold vein' and are unwilling to lose it.... You are unfamiliar with the interests and the pains of the people and you find it hardly worth it to lose your own well-being for the sake of that unfortunate people...."

Naturally, this is not the place to speak of my own history or the history of many of my colleagues and to clarify the criteria of "belonging to the people." There is no need to do this, for someone else has already figured

out everything. A thief has always been known as a thief and a fool, as a fool. There are among us, however, people-abstractions, people-symbols. That huge community which encompasses conservatives and radicals, people who think and people who do not think very much, morally healthy and corrupt, people who are honest and people who have no longer any conscience, people who are unprepared for reforms and people who prepare such reforms, dragging that heavy cart and making their way across the malice of opposition and apathy, and all of this assumes some kind of symbolic nature: "People." Everyone today speaks for the people....

Let me go back to the letter sent by M. Frolov from Kuybyshev or, more accurately, the letters (he answered our answers as well). I am looking at three of this letters, which sound "abusive," and I would even say enraged. What can make a person so enraged?

"Why is it that my anger has reached a limit and has even gone beyond it? Because I owe my life to the Soviet system! To me it is mother and father! How can I remain indifferent when I see them dying? My entire life does not allow me to look silently the way the work of the people is being destroyed! Nine August 1945. The order came to cross the border. We held a brief meeting. Our Komsomol speeches were brief and, having crossed the border, I submitted to the battery party organizer a request to be accepted candidate member of the VKP(b). I was 18. Since then I have been secretary of a Komsomol organization for 4 years, secretary of a primary party organization for 7 and chairman of the shop committee for 15. Through all that time I have worked in the same shop and the same plant, always on the same machine tool, doing most urgent and complex work. In 33 years I have never been absent or even late. Where did I acquire an endless energy and enthusiasm? It came from my deep belief in the ideals of socialism! It is not I, it is not the workers who brought shame to the party but the parasitical class! I can understand those who are leaving the party, but personally I cannot! Now, for the first time in my life, I shall not vote! Rascals and rogues are running the government like stupid children. Perhaps they are not all that stupid, shrieking all over the place...."

N. Vatutin, our reader from Volgograd Oblast, may be right when he notes that "no one is more irreconcilable than yesterday's 'like-minded people'." As we read these violent letters we get the idea that this man is shifting to others the blame for having been tricked, his past expectations and pompous speeches, past obedience and endless patience. Yet pride and the difficulty of what was experienced prevent him from acknowledging this and supporting the new developments. Perhaps there is a lack of understanding of such new developments. Hence the sharpness of the letters, the abuse of cooperatives, reforms and laws.... Hence, in my view, also the aspiration not to speak for oneself but for the people.

Do you know how his last letter ends? I quote his words: "There is no Stalin! Why are you howling? Could it be that we shall begin to see the light?"

Is this what we want?

One way or another, virtually all of these violent attacks are backed by the author (without concealing his exultation) with quotes from the statements made by some members of the party's Central Committee and some people's deputies. He writes to the editors that "before you sent me your official answer you did not know the type of speeches which would be made at the congress by the people's deputies. Personally, I could not expect their bluntness and sharp criticism. Nonetheless, I expected and hoped for such speeches.... I was not wrong.... What we heard, what the people heard, choked them with anger! Allow me to cite from these speeches...." This is followed by excerpts essentially from speeches which support the all too familiar "tradition of defamation." However, it would be a waste of time to find here references to the speech by a woman deputy who went to the rostrum to stop the "inflamed" audience and end this tradition: "I beg of you to be worthy of our age!..."

Did anyone hear these words? Is it frequently pointed out today that democracy unquestionably includes respect and dignity of the individual?

A journalist I know, who tempestuously made his way in the press and on television during the "starry hour" of perestroika and who is now struggling (for it?), who regularly broadcasts on Western radio and who lives here as well as there, once asked me: "What is it with you, are you abandoning the struggle?" Perhaps this is the way it looks, considering the nature of the struggle as shaped by social morality. I favor active action, restlessness. However, I oppose the type of struggle in which the heart runs on hatred, on the rejection not only of what is truly hostile but simply unfamiliar or else understood, but only if one bothers to think. I oppose statements, including some in the press, which trigger malice and which destabilize an already difficult situation.

I feel more comfortable with another approach: we are not on the battlefield or in court. We are judging our own selves. It would be far more useful and more moral to try, above all, to understand ourselves, to interpret the dynamics of society and the party and our own place in such dynamics and to restore within ourselves the constructive principle.

I shall not resort to global summations but, judging by the mail and the materials which we publish in the journal, such an interpretation is taking place, including criticism, constructive suggestions, confusions and hopes. Let us turn to the letters.

"Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev frequently presents one view or another in the name of the workers. I am a worker. I not only accept perestroika but consider it as the only light in our window. I agree with our president in the essentials and in many particulars. However, I do

not agree with everything and, in as much as I can judge from conversations among workers, I am not alone in this. Let me say a few words about myself: I am an electric welder, head of a family, 45-years old. I live in a rayon center in the Smolensk area and, in many respects, I live quite well. Therefore, this letter is not about local scandals which, naturally, exist among us, but which are no worse than elsewhere." This working man thinks about the organization of the system and the formulation of programs for the development of the settlement, the city, the republic and the economic and social development of the entire country and their variants and alternatives, and the existence of an opposition. In particular, he writes: "Thanks to the support of the apparat which reliably controls the situation, Gorbachev will be able to pass all the resolutions he needs. Do you think that such will always be the case? You may trust that the apparat will be at his service as long as the General Secretary does not seriously threaten its interests! This iron front it puts up can be breached by no one. It may yield a foot and let scientists mend the economy but then it will regain its own ground with interest.... The only 'tumbler' of the apparat is one which turns off internal processes. In order to convert it from a machinery which suppresses society into a constructive force, this monolith must be split. At that point each one of its parts, in order to preserve its role in managing the country and its privileges—let there be privileges!—will begin to fight not against freedom and democracy but for earning the trust of the people. 'Such a diktat could be maintained even in the presence of three or four parties,' Mikhail Sergeyevich said in February 1989. I agree. However, this will raise a different problem: How to avoid it? ... We can no longer eliminate true opposition. We can only shove it into clandestinity. What will happen at that point with this deformed child?" (V. Tsukanikhin, Vyazma).

"Who is consulting with me, personally, as a party member, on governmental affairs? No one. What decisions do I make in the party? None. Do I have any additional rights? None.... I am not the opponent of the Soviet system. Why am I a party member? What decisions can I make? One can work well even without the party" (S. Sidelnikov, Lvov).

"What kind of communist am I now? This is a question which keeps torturing me. Failing to find a clear answer, I decided to make a small confession. I obtained my party card on 22 April 1970, on Lenin's centennial. This was an especially timed event! '...I want to be in the leading ranks of the builders of communism....' I wrote in my petition, which was a cliché but nonetheless sincere." In describing in his letter how unsuccessfully he tried to fight corruption and promote "truth and justice," in recent years as well, the author writes: "The conclusion is the following: glasnost may be glasnost and perestroika may be perestroika, but, as in the past, one must listen closely and perhaps even more closely than in the past. Once again there are doubts: Could this all be a fictitious myth—honesty and principle-mindedness? It

may not be very honest but it is very clever, but where is it? It is traveling in a limousine while you, boy, where are you? Everything remains the same! You are not fed up? Learn how to live, learn!

"I am fed up! I will submit a petition to resign. I shall resign 'for reasons of poor health.' My nerves are truly stretched to the limit. I am currently employed in a big office, I am the 'head' of the press center (while serving in the MVD I managed to graduate from the department of journalism). I write little articles, I attend meetings and keep quiet. I pay my membership dues accurately and absolutely, from all types of earnings. I do not quarrel with anyone and I try to please everyone (particularly the bosses) and a promotion is likely. Everything is decent, everything is peaceful....

"However, there is something in this tranquillity that makes me sick. I can no longer live this way! I am choking! I thought that I was a decent person when 'I am on horseback slashing with my saber.' Once again my heart wants to go into battle. Therefore, not everything is lost....

"How to go on living, and how to struggle? Who to trust and who not to trust? Careerists, bores, double-dealers and hypocrites live and prosper. They hold their old bastions which, as in the past, remain strong. That is where the danger is: they are strong as in the past and we are helpless as in the past. Why are things not different?" (V. Tatrintsev, Gorkiy).

We are seeking answers. Unfortunately, in the case of many people the answer is to leave the party, under various pretexts.

"Questions have been put on the agenda: What will the CPSU become, what is the status of the party in society? I am a Marxist-Leninist propagandist and a party member since 1981 but I will leave the ranks of the CPSU. I remain a convinced communist in the sense in which Marx understood it: as a 'practical materialist.' I say 'yes' to the bolsheviks of the mid-1920s and I say 'no' to the members of the CPSU in the age of 'developed' socialism and perestroika.... We must leave behind us the 'kingdom of trick mirrors.' The nomenclature exists by exploiting the 'communist mentality' of the working people. The consequences could be terrible, for we have a basis for comparisons. We must see to it that the nationwide struggle against wealthy people be replaced by efforts not to have poor people. I choose to oppose the present situation and to take up the defense of anyone who does not have a position, of those who engage in free labor, and of the communities" (M. Onishchenko, Severodvinsk).

"Personally I am profoundly convinced that the urgent need for a radical restructuring of internal party life and a radical purging of its ranks through self-disbanding and the creation of new, compact leading party organs, accessible to the rank-and-file and chosen by direct vote,

became necessary a long time ago. That is why I am leaving the ranks of the CPSU" (G. Ovchinnikov, Novosibirsk Oblast).

"I believe that it is not those who have lost their faith or the careerists who are resigning from the party. The majority honestly acknowledge the uselessness of any further membership because of their age, ills and unorganized life. I do not approve of the nonparty people, including myself, but I do not see any particular merit in party membership, which is invariably emphasized in the Encyclopedia or else in obituaries. The entire world is familiar with the names of Nobel Prize winners and of our elite in the areas of science, literature and art who had nothing to do with party activities" (V. Pronko, Khimki).

"I am leaving the CPSU on the 40th year of my party membership. This is not merely 'because of age and state of health.' The main reason, to be honest, is the chronic poisoning with the terrible lie which Stalinism inflicted on the party and the people, along with bloody repressions, a lie multiplied by the notorious Brezhnevism. For nearly half a century I and my coevals, alas, swallowed the party lie and drowned in innumerable dogmas. Unwittingly I deluded myself, having worked as a propagandist for more than 20 years. Unfortunately, today as well many of the actions of the party apparat on all levels are not to my liking and clash with my moral principles.... I am leaving the party, believe it or not, with communist convictions. However, I will show my sympathy for the party of perestroika which will not be burdened, as is the CPSU, with such a huge and expensive bureaucracy. I firmly believe in the possibility of the imminent creation of a new workers party" (A. Bratenkov, Kemerovo).

How to react to such letters? In such cases persuasion or exhortations are hopeless and even harmful. Nonetheless, the concern is expressed as well: "Shall we thus leave the CPSU with a feeling of indifference?..."

Recently the entire press carried the story of the expulsion of Major Lopatin from the party, which jarred public opinion as a blunt recurrence of the past. It was no accident that the decision (after the intervention of the Party Control Commission) was postponed and, subsequently, annulled. However, this story contained one noteworthy and encouraging fact which, in my view, provided the moral cancellation of this entire matter: the fact that the primary party organization, where the major was known, refused to expel him, displaying both principle-mindedness and human decency for which we yearn so greatly today. Even though disbanded by order, this organization remains an alliance of true like-minded people, promoting the healthy principles within the party and giving moral support and confidence to its comrade, a people's deputy.

He is not in a hurry to surrender his party card....

I recently found out that a woman with whom journalistic work had led both of us to Prague for quite a long

stay, had left the party. It is difficult to describe the feeling when a telephone conversation is suddenly interrupted by a Russian word with a Czech accent: "Aggressors!..." We also were there when our troops entered Afghanistan and the entire sharpness of the reaction of our foreign colleagues somehow penetrated within us, while our own awareness refused to acknowledge this new military action as a real fait accompli.... Had anyone among us left the party at that time, as a protest against the humiliation of our own and a foreign country and our own humiliated life with its constant feeling of guilt and shame, one could respect this although there are different forms of protest. How to consider such an action today and what kind of action is it, when with such great difficulty and, unfortunately, by no means by all of us jointly, a road is being laid to never again have to experience such humiliation?

I sense in one of the letters concern: one should have "the possibility of leaving the party without generating a public opinion." But is it a question of "condemning" and stigmatizing" (if that is what is meant by public opinion)? What is most valuable and perhaps most difficult today is to be true to oneself. Probably this too may have different interpretations. For example, I feel closer to people to whom this means following their own way to the end, without denying their own selves and their past life. Academician P. Simonov, who extensively studied man not only in the social but also in the basic and direct physiological sense, began his article in our journal "Nature of the Deed" as follows: "People long ago reached the conclusion of the need to judge a person not by what he says and even less so by what he thinks of himself, but by what he does. The action, the deed, is the only way leading to self-knowledge. How could one know oneself? Goethe asked. Only through action but never through contemplation. Try to fulfill your duty and you will find out what there is within you" (KOMMUNIST No 8, 1988).

Today we can and must remember those who defended human freedom and human rights by leaving the country. I would like to suggest that we look around us and see those who, even during the most difficult years, defended them here, as members of the party, risking a great deal and losing a great deal, ignoring the unfortunate "comfort" but protecting their good reputation; those who, with their own hands, killed totalitarianism and who led to the dialogue which is nonetheless asserting itself in our society. Insulting the communists and demonstratively surrendering a party card is unlikely to affect the hearts of rascals and careerists in the party. This, once again, is a heavy burden above all for the healthy forces within it. I believe that they will endure, as I believe that they are in the majority. Not only the "close retinue," but many meetings in the center and in the remote areas after decades of work in the press and taking those same trips in pursuit of letters and the analysis of social conflicts, drastic clashes with some members of the apparat and true respect for the minds and actions of other lead me to believe to rely on my own

experience as well in assessing the active forces in the party and its membership potential. It is particularly this that strengthens my faith and does not give me reasons to surrender my party card in a state of repentance or anger.

Naturally, a realist would hardly start arguing against the fact that the current condition of the party could hardly be described as healthy and that its cadres as a whole and its moral foundations are not satisfactory. I recall the letter of Z. Volkova, from Moscow, who resorts to "parallels," in comparing (from the "nobility" viewpoint) the members of the party and of the clergy today. The very comparison was in answer to some suggestions of turning moral upbringing over to the Orthodox church. In formulating her objections, the author nonetheless also expresses her condemnation of the party.

"Our party was ruling and, one would think, had unlimited opportunities to ensure its full blossoming." Alas, paradoxically, it suffered mainly human losses and, as a consequence, moral losses. Today it appears as a heterogeneous and somewhat confused and unattractive community. What are the reasons? During the period of the 'cult of personality' it was its 'gold stock' which suffered, people who stood out, along with their other positive qualities, with their nobility. To this day the party continues to suffer the heaviest possible damage from people who 'sneaked' into it, for it was the ruling party. They duplicated themselves (to me this was particularly obvious in the 1970s) and they are unable (even though the 'best' among them favor perestroika) to work ably. I do not think that examples are necessary at this point, for they are plentiful on all levels. The people see this, however, and the party's authority and the trust in it decline.

It is entirely obvious that today the efforts of many party members are directed against the party itself, for the aspiration is growing somehow to drag down those who are enthusiastically and skillfully supporting its activities. In frequent cases the most active party members are dismissed from their jobs and expelled from the party. There have been many reports to the effect that honest party members are leaving the party ranks seeing no light, surrounded as they are by the "joiners." This is confirmed by the survey of letters in KOMMUNIST No 1, 1990, in which it was reported that of late the number of anonymous letters has drastically increased. The authors of such letters explain why they were forced to remain anonymous.

All of this weakens the party. Naturally, the following question arises: How to correct this? Intuitively, it seems to me that the most radical method is to have "surgery," to separate the "wheat from the chaff." Immediately one asks: How to do it and who will be the judge? Unfortunately, I have no answer to this question, although I realize that this is a delicate matter and could easily cause damage.

We are already familiar with suggestions as to how, using democracy and glasnost on all levels and to the fullest

extent, we could advance toward the renovation of the party. It seems to me, however, that one must perform one's service to the end and make skillful use of our party's historical highly moral capital. The moment a highly moral background develops, the "joiners" will considerably pale and feel uncomfortable....

It is legitimate to discuss morality when the position of the individual in society becomes the party's main interest. "Today morality is assuming political significance," the party leader says. "Today life demands the humanizing of our relations," appeals P. Chechko, an old communist from Brest Oblast. It is in order to assert this that Petr Vsevolodovich set down to write "Thoughts on the Eve of the 28th Party Congress and the 45th Anniversary of the Great Victory," which he sent to the editors. His proof is his own life, in which evil was mixed with good, a life from which his coevals are now departing, "good communists and to whom 'there is no time' to pay final respect."

He recalls the war years: "In 1942, when we were summoned by the party commission at the political department of the First Air Army, approximately one-half of those who had submitted petitions for joining the party did not come: they were either dead or wounded. They went into battle as communists and to us the communists were the standards of decency and self-sacrifice. As the saying goes, there is no talking when there is singing. The feeling of self-preservation did its work, acting in order to escape repressions and not find oneself in the camp of so-called enemies of the people. There were those who kept silent and those who looked at the conductor's baton, saying one thing but thinking something entirely different. I recall the following: a party member defended a soldier who was a believer, who wore a cross and a letter of prayer written by his mother. Publicly, the cross was torn off the soldier's neck and the letter of prayer was confiscated. This was a piece of his mother's love, written to protect the soldier. The sergeant who defended him was demoted and expelled from the party and, later, he vanished somewhere, altogether."

In times of peace, living and working all those years in the same rayon, the letter writer was able to come across a party member who "showed me a blank (order) for detention, already stamped. All that was left was to fill in the name. Let this show you who you are dealing with." He has good words to say about communists who had "the courage, the decency and intelligence not to surrender to the general mood. Those were dark times. It was believed that in the class struggle charity, humaneness and compassion had no place.... One can frequently hear that perestroika has contributed nothing. Nothing comes by itself. It is only the sum of actions that could and should restore morality, humaneness and charity. We must admit, however, that many among us, party members, are still far from this."

The same idea is developed by L. Burakov from Orenburg: "We shall either, as in the past, march, driven by

the shouts of officials, or be comrades who respect one another.... We keep seeking enemies. We criticize bureaucrats in the housing office and the public bath but then how are the people in the party committees treating us, who are like-minded? Go to the obkom or raykom and ask how the party members live and what they need. Twice at difficult times I turned to the party for support: once when I was slandered and once when I was unemployed. In both cases nobody helped me. In the first, it is true, sympathy was expressed; in the second, I was insulted ('this is not a labor exchange!').... I am not resigning from the CPSU, that is not why I joined. However, I suffer for the party, for the sluggishness of thoughts and actions and for indifference toward the people, the party members. How can we build new humane relations if there is neither warmth nor understanding within the party?"

The idea stands above man, was what was claimed for many long years, and the split personality of the party member has just about become the standard. On the basis of one type of logic one acted simply as a person; of another, as a party member, in the name of the "lofty idea," which was frequently falsely understood. In my view, the story of the expulsion of Major Lopatin from the party convincingly proves and confirms that the people are already abandoning their former split personality and that it can and must be surmounted. This can be achieved through the logic of perestroika, the concepts of which do not diverge from humaneness and humanism but are structured precisely on that basis: "Discovering the new possibilities of socialism through the new possibilities of man."

At this point I can already hear the voice of one of our readers (unfortunately, he is by no means alone, expressing himself in a well-familiar tone): "Listen here, comrade editors, are you not fed up dealing with this nonsense written by those 'scientists'-utopians, especially in answering 'what is socialism,' 'classical socialism,' etc. How long will those pseudoscientists keep stupefying the working people?" (G. Sovik, Ivano-Frankov Oblast).

The tightly wound spring uncoiled in another direction. "No ideals, no lofty ideas!" We already read in the central press: "Today it is not a question of lofty ideals. The image of the Temple is not the prime need of the thinking person." One can easily imagine his reaction, had M. Bondarev, our reader from Tula, attended one of our ordinary meetings and said what he wrote to us: "I have never been officially a communist but have always shared the ideas of communism as being the best expectations of the people and mankind, expectations which will never vanish."

Possibly, having ridiculed or abused him for such words, as is today accepted at some meetings, some of its participants would go back to their apartments, turn on the television set, and see on their home screen a city in India in which quite prosperous people from prosperous countries come, spending a fortune to live modestly

there, promoting goodness and justice, giving their children a modern education and raising them in a spirit of high morality and love of others....

Naturally, one could turn the television off. However, one could also try to understand them.

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THE STATE AND SOCIETY

A Communist Utopia or Communist Idea?

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[Response by the Department of Letters and Social Problems to a letter from L.A. Kallistov, CPSU member, war and labor veteran]

[Text] Dear Editors!

Your journal is called KOMMUNIST. Consequently, it ought to study and support communism, the basic principle of which is "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." Let me try to prove that this principle is utopian.

In order to implement it, a high degree of consciousness and self-denial is necessary. Maybe Christ had this. However, after all, he was just one person, and semi-mythical at that. The attempt to raise a "new community" of highly conscious people in the USSR has led, perhaps, to the reverse outcome and has proven the impossibility of its implementation. It simply is impossible to limit needs, which means that it is impossible to satisfy them.

As far as people's abilities are concerned, they are maximally needed to provide an abundance of all products and consumer goods. However, if all needs are satisfied, the stimulus for the development of abilities disappears, without which the development of society also comes to a halt. The circle is closed, without exits, proving the impracticability of the principle of communism, and communism itself becomes an illusory idea.

Having realized this, communist parties in many countries (Bulgaria, the GDR, and others) have rejected the utopian label "communist." This may also explain many people's withdrawal from the CPSU and the appearance of parties with other names here. What is the sense in clinging to a name and pursuing an unfeasible goal? After all, General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev himself sees the goal as the creation of democratic socialism. So, the party ought to be social-democratic.

I would like to know what arguments the journal KOMMUNIST, which, by the logic of things, is also in need of a name change, can make in favor of communism and of retaining the party's name? (L.A. Kallistov, CPSU member, war and labor veteran, Zvenigorod, Moscow Oblast)

The editors chose this letter from among many similar letters, because the author formulated highly topical questions quite clearly and concisely. His logic is attractive because it is simple and direct. The communist idea (as more people than he alone assume) lies in the promise to build a society of free and unrestricted consumption; the impracticability of this promise has become obvious; therefore, this means an end to communism. As everyone knows, precisely the simplest questions are also the most complex. The question that L. Kallistov has raised is often asked at meetings with readers. Explanations seem in order for another reason as well. During the years of perestroika, our society has rejected many old textbook maxims, for instance, the "theory of developed socialism," the assertion that our economy must be non-market in nature, the total statification of social life, the priority of "class" over common human values, concepts to the effect that the ethnic problem will be resolved once and for all here and in the best possible way, and the one-party dogma. A natural question: Where is the limit to the changes? What values are we keeping?

The readers of our journal have had many opportunities to assure themselves that we support the humane, democratic values of renovated socialism and are retaining our adherence to Marxism and the Leninist legacy—not to the dogma, but to the spirit. Let us add that we do not intend to reject the idea of communism.

Mainly, we would like to speak precisely of the idea, not the name of the party (or the journal). To a certain degree, the name is an separate matter. Sometimes the names of parties reflect their future, at times distant goals, but sometimes they do not really express their goals for the future. For instance, the Republican Party of the United States functions in a state where the republican idea has been implemented from the very day of its birth. A tactical maneuver or historical tradition, transient moods of the masses, a scientific idea, or sometimes simply the name of a founder or of an ideology may determine the name of a party. Marx and Engels, by no means changing the basic goal of their struggle, were at various times members of the Union of Communists, the International Fellowship of Workers and the Social Democratic Party; Lenin belonged to the "Alliance for the Struggle to Free the Working Class," the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party and the Russian Communist Party. Yet another word, "bolshevik," was added to the names of the last two, which, by the way, seemed "distorted" to Lenin. This had no scientific meaning at all and reflected only a random confluence of circumstances in a long-past episode in party history, yet was nonetheless accepted by the party masses.

Precisely historical circumstances, not strategic goals, have determined many name changes. Thus, the social democratic parties of the Second International were compromised by the fact that, having promised not to allow a fratricidal war among the workers of different

countries, they betrayed their promise in 1914. Many communist parties were formed after this.

Let us not argue about the party's name, but speak of its goals. Should we consider the idea of communism impracticable?

"The party solemnly proclaims: the current generation of Soviet people will live under communism!" What street in our memory has not been decorated with posters reproducing the words which concluded the first version of the 3rd CPSU Program, passed in 1961! This promise enjoyed truly universal fame and was not rejected for 25 years, until the 27th Congress passed a new program. Did not these circumstances—the former loudly publicized solemnity of a promise, its now revealed impracticability and its rejection—lead to widespread concepts regarding the collapse of the idea of communism? However, the idea did not collapse: its gross vulgarization did. The idea of communism never was that which was expressed in this promise.

Lenin characterized concepts to the effect that the socialists promise everyone the right to receive any amount of truffles, automobiles or pianos from society as ignorance. "This is ignorance," he explained, "it has not entered the head of a single socialist 'to promise' that the highest phase of communism's development will begin, and the vision of great socialists to the effect that it will one day begin presumes neither today's labor productivity nor today's Philistines, who are capable, like Pomyalovskiy's seminarists, 'of ruining the treasure-house of public wealth and demanding the impossible for nothing' (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*) [Complete Collected Works], vol 33, p 97).

These famous words, written on the eve of October, are the more striking because the promise, characterized as a sign of ignorance by Lenin in 1917, was solemnly proclaimed in the Program of Lenin's party 44 years later. The Stalinist ax sharply dropped the intellectual and moral level of the party's ruling, upper ranks. Some were unaware that an illiterate thesis was being introduced into the party document, while others feared to say so.

So, the great socialists did not promise communism, but they did have a scientific vision. This can be ascertained by directing attention to the economic manuscripts of Marx in 1857-1859 (see, for instance, K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 46, part II, pp 207-222). The prospect for scientific and technical progress depicted by Marx shows that this vision related to the distant, historical future and could, therefore, no longer serve as a direct slogan for a political party: it is impossible to speak of exact time periods. This vision could not be a goal for political struggle either, because it presumes complex, objective processes in the development of material production, the course of which cannot be rushed. How did Marx and Engels see the idea of communism as an everyday goal for a political party? In the "*Communist Manifesto*" they wrote: "In the place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class

opposition, will come an association in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all" (ibid., vol 4, p 447).

The creation of conditions for the free development of each is not a task for the distant future alone. To the extent of available material possibilities, it should be implemented at all stages of society's development. Precisely this goal serves as a measure of the socialist nature of use of the market, the plan, state power, democracy and other categories inherent in various social systems. The free development of each is the goal of our society. This goal encompasses both the material and spiritual aspects of social development. It predetermines the choice of both economic as well as political instruments of development. What is so bad about this goal? Who in our society could benefit from rejecting it? The more so, since the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all. This is the essence of the communist idea. It meets the highest criteria of humanism.

L. Kallistov's letter, essentially, also demands an answer to another question. In his description of the idea of communism, the author avoids the problem of raising labor productivity, instead stressing the re-education of consumers. It is as though someone suggested ensuring unlimited consumption only through the extreme restriction of consumer aspirations. It calls to mind the image of a glutton with a spoon so small that a little bowl is enough for him.

So, our past sins of our policy, our propaganda and our science are coming back to us now. The vision was replaced by a promise. They talked endlessly of a new man, having in mind above all a person who would be convenient for the leadership and be easily subject to manipulation, including in the sphere of consumption. Except this is not the ideal of a communist, but the ideal of a bureaucrat. The communist idea and its creators cannot be blamed for subsequent distortions.

"Communism" based only on consumer self-denial should not only be considered utopian, but also barracks. It has nothing in common with Marxist concepts. Marx's vision of freedom from material restrictions on development comes from the prospects for unrestricted growth in labor productivity. The mechanism described by Marx for the future conversion of science into a direct production force promises precisely unrestricted growth, not growth by percentages or "all at once." In the above-mentioned economic manuscripts, we read: "...To the extent of development of big industry, the creation of real wealth depends less on work time and the amount of labor expended, than on the power of agents that are put into motion in the course of the work time and which themselves, in turn (through their powerful effectiveness), have no correspondence at all to the direct working time required for their production, but depend, rather, on the overall level of science and the progress of engineering, or on the application of this science to production" (ibid., vol 46, part II, p 213). Of course, this

suggests not a simple linear growth in the mass of the same items, but a qualitative transformation of the production structure itself.

These words of Marx's are as willingly quoted, as they are misunderstood. Yet they give grounds for many important conclusions. For instance, conclusions concerning the time periods needed for historical changes of such a scale. It is now clear that the industrial revolution familiar to Marx did not have this effect. For the time being the new, present-day scientific and technical revolution has not had it. However, it has confirmed the possibility of this through its achievements in certain fields. Their more extensive spread is predicted in the next century.

Without guessing in vain about unpredictable time periods for revolutionizing the development of technologies, Marx also did not write about their correlation to the time periods for socialist revolution: what would happen first, and what—later. Right now, when far more is known about the time periods for this revolution and for another, the social and technological revolution, consideration of their interrelation would be of direct practical interest. For instance, how should we evaluate the fact that the most advanced capitalist countries today have better succeeded in creating the labor productivity that makes communist consumption possible, than the socialist countries? In any case, this circumstance in no way undermines faith in the reality of the communist idea, but forces us to think once more both about the complexity of history's zig-zags, and about the coming social consequences of technological revolution in countries with various social systems.

It goes without saying, Marxism has always presumed the formation of new features in consumer behavior, to which the above-cited words of Lenin attest. In scientific concepts, however, the formation itself of a new consumer by no means presumes consumer self-denial, but the elevation of needs, which will not be reduced to obtaining a certain sum of things. This elevation of needs is possible only under the conditions of material abundance, not of aesthetic "simplicity." Moreover, the shaping of a highly cultured consumer is conceivable only as part of the larger process of developing the individual, in the course of which, above all, a person's attitude toward labor changes and, only along with this, his attitude toward consumption. The change in attitude toward labor does not presume the "educational" speeches of propagandists or even material incentives. It will occur only when the content and nature of labor itself changes. Monotonous, heavy, dangerous labor cannot be a vital need. Only creative, varied labor can act as such a need, and it is still far from predominant in contemporary industry, although its sphere is gradually expanding.

It is interesting to note that most of Lenin's important post-October works devoted to the problem of bringing up the new man ("The Tasks of Youth Unions" and

"The Childhood Disease of 'Leftishness' in Communism") say nothing about the upbringing of man as a consumer. The center of attention is given to the upbringing of a worker and fighter for social progress. In one of his typical discourses, Lenin foresaw a very slow and gradual conversion "to the elimination of the separation of labor among people, to the education, instruction and training of comprehensively developed and comprehensively trained people, people who know how to do everything. Communism is moving, should move and will move toward this, but only through many long years. To attempt in practice now to anticipate this future result of a fully developed, fully established and formed, fully blossomed and mature socialism, is the same as teaching higher mathematics to a 14-year-old child" (op. cit., vol 41, p 33).

Incidentally, this discourse mentions communism simultaneously in both the present tense ("communism is moving") and the future. Neither contradictions, nor a sharp boundary are seen between socialism and communism. Today, we set the accent on putting a socialist society in order, because this task is nearer and more urgent. We also put the stress on democracy, because Soviet society, above all, does not have enough democracy in order to meet our concepts of socialism. We are not confused by the definite tautology of the phrase "democratic socialism" (a non-democratic society cannot be socialist). In this case, we must emphasize the direction in which society is being restructured. It is not the inhuman, Stalinist "socialism" that we want to see in our country, but real socialism, democratic and humane. Such a formulation does not rule out communism as a strategic goal. On the contrary, it defines the next stage on the path toward this goal.

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Avoid Hasty Decisions

905B0024H Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 9, Jun 90 (signed to press 1 Jun 90) pp 63-69

[Interview with Albert Kauls, USSR people's deputy, member of the Presidential Council, by *KOMMUNIST* correspondent O. Latsis]

[Text] There is hardly any need to introduce Albert Kauls to our readers. A great deal has been written about him and his prosperous "Adazhi" Agricultural Company, including in *KOMMUNIST*. The main thing that has always been attractive about him is his ability to think broadly and on a large scale, to take reasonable risks, not following events, but outstripping them. It is probably entirely logical and natural that his "career" has been more than successful since the start of perestroika. He is not only a successful manager, but also a sober politician with a well-conceived and thoroughly considered program. Kauls was elected a USSR people's deputy and was later appointed a member of the Presidential Council. He recently headed the Farmers Union of Latvia. The latest news, quite unexpected for many, is that Kauls wants to

run a family farm. Will he really leave the work to which he has devoted 20 years of his life? *KOMMUNIST* correspondent O. Latsis began the interview with precisely this question.

[Latsis] They say you have decided to become a farmer...

[Kauls] I am one already, although I have not yet set aside my duties as chairman of the agricultural company.

[Latsis] We usually compare the family farm, the individual farm and the collective farm. In the course of recent discussions, when some economists started arguing that kolkhozes in general ought to disband, that their existence itself is unnatural, I always objected: "There are kolkhozes and there are kolkhozes. Perhaps the weak ones, resting on the state's shoulders, should be eliminated, but no one of sound mind would leave a super-kolkhoz such as, for instance, 'Adazhi.'" One day, when I made a similar argument, I was told: "But Kauls has become a farmer!" What is the reason for this?

[Kauls] I agree with your opinion on the subject of kolkhozes. Of course, they have a right to exist, just like sovkhoses or individual peasant farms. It all depends on the specific conditions. As far as my decision is concerned, it was dictated above all by our society's underestimation of a farm manager's labor. The whole 20 years that I was kolkhoz chairman, I sensed this constantly. Recently, it seems as though everything is being done especially to set the workers collective and the people against the leader. I simply no longer have the strength to maintain discipline and order, see to the observance of technology, resolve supply problems, think about the future, be a diplomat and then still struggle with such attitudes. So, I decided: let me start managing on my own a bit. I took a plot of land and did the first sowing along with my sons.

[Latsis] Do you have experience in running such a farm?

[Kauls] Where would I get it? True, my grandfather had land after the war. However, I went off to elementary school when they started organizing kolkhozes. Therefore, I have to learn.

[Latsis] So, now you are not only the chairman, but also a farmer. Consequently, your material position has changed. Has this influenced your attitude toward land ownership?

[Kauls] As before, I believe that we must not transfer land into private ownership. The land is the property of all the people.

[Latsis] In my opinion, it should be transferred for use, perhaps, by inheritance...

[Kauls] I am not at all sure that introducing private ownership can solve all our problems. Is it right to think that only this is capable of becoming a driving force for developing the economy? I recently returned from a trip to the U.S., where I met with leading scientists and big financiers. We talked a great deal with them about

contemporary capitalist society. More than once they said that private ownership in the classical interpretation, about which K. Marx wrote, no longer exists. Might it not happen that, by giving all the land over to private ownership, we would be taking a step backward?

These doubts make me think that disbanding the kolkhozes would be a great mistake. Of course, they cannot stay in the same form. We must solve production and property relation problems in a new way. Possibly, it would be worthwhile to make joint-stock farms or to find some other variant...

[Latsis] ...without, in this regard, discarding accumulated experience as being unnecessary and harmful. We have already canceled out everything reasonable that was in our history after the revolution. Everything was abandoned, as though the previous social system and culture included nothing of value. Today, this approach is being condemned. Yet, are not some of the politicians, in calling for forgetting everything we have achieved in 70 years, still guided by it? In all this time, have we really only done foolish things and only accomplished crimes? Have we really created nothing sensible?

[Kauls] No matter how we regard the kolkhozes, in Latvia they produce one-third more food than its inhabitants can consume. For instance, here we produce 123 kilograms of meat and 737 kilograms of milk per capita annually. Ill-considered decisions might undermine not only the republic's economy, but also its economic sovereignty and even perestroika itself.

Rather, in this aspiration I see political motives. Really, is it possible to put the economy off as second priority and not see that arbitrary decisions, ignoring reality, could lead to catastrophe? The approach of the Farmers Union of Latvia to this problem is more pragmatic: we are suggesting our own system for reorganizing the agroindustrial complex, in which the individual peasant farms, cooperative farms and kolkhozes can coexist together, helping each other. We could eliminate many problems, it seems, if we were to succeed in eliminating the state monopoly on the processing of output, maintenance of equipment and material and technical supply.

[Latsis] How do you intend to carry out such a reform?

[Kauls] By organizing a system of self-management and improving cooperation, having decentralized the processing enterprises and enterprises which serve the farms, i.e., by transferring them to those to whom they, in principle, already belong... This will enable both the peasants and the leaders to fully display their enterprise: healthy competition will spring up, the possibility will appear to utilize all the income that the intermediaries are now taking. Then, we will sit behind the conference table with the government as the basic customer, as equals, and settle the problems of prices, taxes, material and technical support and interrelations with other sectors of the economy.

An important economic force will be in our hands. This force is the only one capable of forcing the government to solve the problems of agriculture such that this will meet the interests of both the peasantry, as well as the consumers of their output. Strictly speaking, it is a question of reasonable distribution of the national income. We should have some influence over this distribution, not hoping for the kindness of some "nice uncle" or the President. Meanwhile, there is no question of talks on equal grounds. Using its monopoly, the state continues to dictate conditions to us and we cannot produce the output which, on the one hand, the market needs and, on the other, would bring us the income that we need for development.

[Latsis] Monopoly not only hurts you, but us, the consumers, as well. Until you decided to establish an enterprise to make the so-called "quick breakfasts" that are produced throughout the world, this idea had never entered any of our heads. Yet, after all, such breakfasts are both less expensive and more beneficial than that which the food industry has been offering us, and there would not be such a crush of people in lines for sausage. This is a manifestation of monopoly too: no one is interested in having a diversity of products in the country, so that there would be a broad choice.

[Kauls] It is alarming that in the republic, although people realize the danger of monopoly, nobody is rushing to take real steps to eliminate it. The Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers of Latvia have treated our proposals seemingly with understanding, but the development of a new tax system worries them more, it seems. Yet, in the form in which they are being formulated, taxes may freeze further development and modernization of agricultural production, and may decrease the farms' level of interest.

Would it not be better, instead of extracting more taxes from the kolkhozes and then actually returning them in the form of state financial injections, to interest the peasants in producing as much as possible, and of better quality, and to obtain the necessary funds for the budget in the form of a moderate tax, but on a large volume? The same also applies to individual farms: if we are in fact trying to develop them, we must give them opportunities for a "running start," freeing them from taxes not for 2 years, but for a minimum of 5 years.

Unfortunately, we are heading from one mistake to another, as though this is an indispensable condition for obtaining optimum results.

[Latsis] One gets the impression that some of our readers think that it is easier and smoother to learn from their mistakes, than to imitate sensible experience.

[Kauls] I am afraid we are not even avoiding mistakes in implementing the land reform. Right now, preparation is in fact being done in order to return the land to those who owned it before 1940. It is a question of people who were forcibly deported or left on their own during years that were difficult for the countryside. There is an

opinion that some emigrants will even return. In one sovkhos the workers formulated the question as follows: our grandfathers once broke their backs for others and had nothing. Now we have our own land, and they want to take it away and make us into hired laborers once again.

These words leave a bitter aftertaste. In fact, over past decades the peasants have built things up for themselves and made homes for their children and grandchildren. Now, it seems, they are supposed to give everything away. In my opinion, this is entirely capable of sparking a civil war in the countryside between the old and new owners. I believe that the kolkhozes and sovkhos, jointly with the soviets, must take an inventory of the land and discover how much they can use intensively and how much should be transferred into a free fund, from which we should endow all who wish. We must not break everything "down to the foundation," in order later to build a "society of prosperity" on ruins and someone else's grief.

[Latsis] Incidentally, does not the same desire to break everything "down to the foundation" guide the actions of those who support Latvia's rapid secession from the Soviet Union? The consequences of such a step, affecting the fates of millions of people, could be unpredictably serious. The more so, since no one in Latvia has taken into account what restructuring the republic's economic structure will cost or how much unemployment it will cause. There are no answers to these questions supported by convincing calculations.

[Kauls] I personally do not think that development outside the Soviet Union is impossible theoretically or even in practice. However, in making such a decision, we must consider everything thoroughly beforehand. We must substantiate and look at how relations with other republics will be changes and we must offer guarantees to citizens of non-native nationalities that their rights will not be violated. Meanwhile, a more than strange situation is being created in the Baltic region. One would assume that the final goal of any changes made in society and in the state should be improving the lot not of an abstract "people," which we talked about so much before, but of every specific person. By following the supporters of rapid secession, we will get a directly opposite result. After all, declaring independence does not at all mean becoming independent. You can pass hundreds of decrees, but sovereignty does not come from this.

Some leaders in Latvia, while proclaiming the idea of independence, have no clear and consistent economic program and do not take present-day realities into account. What exactly are these realities? In my opinion, they are obvious: for all the postwar years, the Latvian economy has developed under conditions of integration with the Union. We have had broad access not only to raw material resources, with which the Soviet Union abounds, but have also received machines, equipment and technologies at inexpensive prices. Therefore,

nothing supports the promises that everything will immediately appear here after separating from the USSR.

I could not find explanations in a single program about where we will get everything that was previously imported into Latvia from other republics. Should we return to the pre-1940 economic orientation? Should we sell our butter abroad and buy tractors? What will we do with our machine-building, radioelectronic and textile enterprises, which can only exist at the expense of firm economic ties with the USSR?

[Latsis] As a rule, such an argument does not reach the ordinary person. Apparently, not even every economist can clearly imagine the possible consequences of secession from the republic. Only a sufficiently literate and objective person can guess what this will lead to: how many people will be unemployed, what will be the fate of existing enterprises, how will the republic's foreign economic relations take shape, how will prices grow and, finally, what will happen to the people? For the time being, all this is being interpreted according to imaginary categories.

Many residents of our republic quite sincerely assume that the whole problem lies only in whether or not the Moscow authorities will start "punishing" us for proclaiming independence. If Moscow will behave honestly and nobly, they say, and observe economic relations with Latvia (they hope that it will not break off relations, because the Union is also interested in the output of local enterprises), everything will remain as it was. There is no realization that even if relations were preserved, things would no longer be the same. Neither the supporters of Latvia's independence, nor its opponents have explained to the people that, in the event of secession from the USSR, many enterprises will remain not at our own will, but at the mercy of inevitable objective circumstances. The commodity structure itself of Latvia's exchange with other republics is such that converting reciprocal accounts from our wholesale prices to world prices would result in huge losses and a prolonged crisis in the Baltic area.

[Kauls] I agree with you that today the people have no clear idea of how they will live under conditions of independence. However, after all, even the Center, in declaring a renovated federation and special status for the republic, has not given these concepts real meaning. Even the right to economic independence that we received is not really being implemented. The Union departments are erecting every possible obstacle against us, and we ourselves, to be honest, do not know what to do with this independence. Having declared the development of agriculture a priority direction, we have thus far only annoyed the kolkhoz workers. The planned budget allocations in this sector are 49 percent higher compared to last year's. However, these funds are not backed by any resources at all. We are simply in no condition to assimilate such capital investments.

[Latsis] Yet the deputy-agrarians continue to demand increased financial injections. The countryside needs something quite different. It needs real prices for the output produced by it, so that the goods needed by consumers will be profitable. It also needs an opportunity to buy the things it needs. Above all, this requires a market. Money must become money. Pretty "gifts" in the form of money which is impossible to use and which actually nonetheless remains in the hands of the state, give nothing. Such a policy is ruinous for both sides, the state and the peasants.

So long as there is no market, neither Moscow nor Riga will change positions. Yet, if things really accelerate and market relations are introduced as of next year, it would then be possible to speak of genuine independence. Otherwise, today's resolutions are worth nothing. After all, assuming that you have independence and you get more money, it is still impossible to buy anything with it! What is a right worth without the possibility of exercising it?

[Kauls] Of course, this is a very complex issue. Our internal republic market is too unprotected, because most goods come arrive in from inventories, and they hardly always get to those for whom they were intended. This system must be decisively changed. We must think about this more, not about hypothetical variants of development. Meanwhile, that being suggested is nothing more than an impractical scheme. The slogan "foreigners will help us!" has no real grounds. When I met with White House associates and big American businessmen, they repeatedly stressed that we do not always behave sensibly, that we must understand: if Latvia secedes from the Soviet Union, it will hardly be able to count on deliveries of raw materials and equipments in the same volumes that we receive from the other republics. At the same time, they are ready to cooperate with us, if we can find mutually acceptable solutions.

[Latsis] So, you think that secession from the Soviet Union is hardly reasonable right now?

[Kauls] In my opinion, we cannot speak of this seriously. Not everything is as simple, as some of us think. We must survive these "growing pains." I think, we will finally find a variant that will suit both sides.

[Latsis] It seems premature to me to speak of a consensus now, when even in Latvia there is no unified view on the subject of paths for development. One gets the impression that most parties and social movements, having entered the political arena, are not striving for a dialogue either among themselves or with Moscow.

[Kauls] This is probably because each of the political forces interprets the goals of perestroyka in its own way. Some see the future in a socialist orientation, others prefer the opposite path. I myself have been a communist for 30 years, and I joined the party because of my convictions, not in order to become chairman of the kolkhoz. Today, though, I am forced to verify that

neither the Latvian Communist Party [CPL], nor the independent Latvian Communist Party have anything to offer people. The Communist Party put off solving the most important social problems and has ceased to exist as an organization of like-minded people. Many communists have switched their activeness to other sociopolitical organizations and fronts. It is as though the leadership has played give-away with its opponents, surrendering position after position.

The situation that took shape in the Latvian Communist Party has to a certain extent reflected the growing crisis phenomena in the party on the whole. The absence of a clear ideological and political platform, consistency, decisiveness and unity in the implementation of perestroyka, and the burden of old dogmas, which has hindered movement forward, have all in the final account led first to confusion, then even to a loss of guidelines. However, as everyone knows, an ideological vacuum cannot exist or, in any case, not for long. Therefore, it is quite natural that this vacuum was filled here in Latvia by the political slogans of the Popular Front and the Interfront: the struggle between them, essentially, has begun to define the struggle within the party itself.

[Latsis] What do you think: are both parties equally responsible for the split?

[Kauls] I think both the one and the other are guilty to an identical extent. Of course, formally great responsibility lies on the "independents," because they had prepared for the split in good time, they had their own program and leaders, and they knew who would stand at the head after proclaiming a new party. However, a fair share of the blame also belongs to the leadership of the Latvian Communist Party, because it failed to organize work in local areas, and the cadres selected by it were incapable of initiative, exploration, or independent decisions, continuing to act only on instructions from above.

The split was imminent long ago: even 2 years ago, I stated that we were in fact working under conditions of a multiparty system, meaning that the Communist Party no longer represents a monolithic force. Of course, under conditions of pluralism no one has the right to demand like-minded thinking of party members, but, after all, it was necessary to seek out points of contiguity that would enable it to preserve organizational unity. Yet, the main thing is that the Latvian Communist Party should have decisively changed the forms and methods of its work to more democratic, more flexible forms, taking the situation into account.

Naturally, under the previous political monopoly, few people dared to stand up for an independent viewpoint: those sitting on the presidium raised their hands, and all the rest imitated them. When new social movements and parties began to appear, we turned out to be in no condition to wage a debate against political opponents, since we awaited instructions from the leadership out of

habit and it, alas, had nothing to say either to communists, or to all people. In general, it was in a soporific state of non-resistance which, understandably, worked in favor of those who strived for the split.

[Latsis] Do you agree with the position of the majority at the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress, when the line toward a split became obvious?

[Kauls] You can see, I am sure, that it was necessary to cleanse the party—there could not be two opinions here. How can those who support strengthening the party on Marxist-Leninist principles coexist with those who are trying to turn it into some kind of discussion club which lacks principles? When some are calling for using the possibilities now being created for genuine economic and political independence as part of the Soviet Union, while others are insisting on separate independence?

In my opinion, it was senseless and purposeless for these two currents to exist within the framework of one party. They had to be separated, but how? In any event, not by purges: the history of our party has repeatedly shown the destructiveness of such an approach. The "purest" cleansing is a separation in which not the apparatus, not an arithmetic majority, but the communist himself decides to which party he belongs. This is a difficult and serious, but nonetheless necessary choice.

[Latsis] However, the split undermined the chances, not good even without this, for the communists of Latvia to lay claim to a vanguard role in society, the right to be the ruling party, since the division occurred along both national, as well as social lines. By the hand of fate, the NCPL turned out to be a rural party and is not supported in large cities. The CPL has minimal support among the Latvian population, especially among peasants and the humanitarian intelligentsia, and its influence is not great even among workers and engineering and technical workers.

[Kauls] True, and this is the tragedy of the communist movement in our republic. However, I nonetheless would not dismiss the CPL. The positions of the "independents" are somewhat weaker. Indeed, today we have ended up in opposition to the government, meaning that we must work out fundamentally new tactics for action and must master the skills of parliamentary struggle. The general goals of the party are clear, but they should be given specific meaning. We should develop the established tasks in stages and we should determine at the expense of what and how they will be fulfilled. He who has the more realistic program for getting out of the crisis, the economic crisis above all, will have the trust of the people, both now and in the future.

[Latsis] Meanwhile, not one of the communist parties can offer such a program and, it seems to me, at this stage, bitter though it may be to realize, the Communist Party has ceased to exist as a vanguard political force in Latvia.

[Kauls] Well, if this is really true, we peasants will have to create our own party, which would stand up for our interests. Under such conditions, it is highly likely that the Farmers Union would become this party, uniting within its ranks, regardless of party or ethnic membership, all who are interested in developing the countryside, agriculture and the agroindustrial complex. It still remains for us to work out both strategy and tactics, but meanwhile we are restraining ourselves from making hasty conclusions or forecasts. We are trying to adhere to moderate views based on realistic approaches.

[Latsis] Have you aired your ideas on the future of the Baltic area and its economy at the Presidential Council, and how were they received?

[Kauls] With understanding, I would say. An atmosphere of frankness and benevolence prevails at our meetings, which creates good possibilities for collective searches for constructive proposals. We are drawing ever closer and understanding each other ever better. This is extremely important when developing the strategic issues of domestic and foreign policy.

As far as the future of my republic is concerned, let me say just one thing: it is very important to avoid hasty decisions, no matter where they may come from—from Riga or from Moscow—and to carefully consider the political, economic and social consequences of any steps. Yet, the most important thing is that these decisions should meet the desires not of individual leaders or parties, but of the entire people, and should not harm anyone's interests.

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The Conversion of Secrecy: Senseless Insufficiency
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[Article by Petr Nikulin, candidate of juridical sciences]

[Text] According to some data, up to 70 percent of the normative acts in the country are classified (see "Socialist Legality," No 9, 1988, p 7). The USSR Ministry of Justice Scientific Center for Legal Information was unable to make an inventory of existing normative acts, not at all because of their abundance, but because the departments are afraid of publicity: after all, not only archaic, but also simply illegal acts are functioning in the country.

The closed, departmental nature and illegality of many normative acts makes performing even the simplest, vital tasks into a "series of trials and tribulations," often insulting in both form and content. Let me refer to my own experience, although this is not the best argument. A year ago, my family with many children received a long-awaited apartment with more space. It took us 2 months to be released from our previous place of residence. We even had to appeal to the rayon prosecutor

with a complaint. It was no easier to register at our new address, although I had only moved from one street to another in the same rayon. They demanded a certificate from my place of employment. I asked: "What for?" They answered: "To be sure you are not a parasite." "But you already know perfectly well where I work. Incidentally, are things in Moscow really such that they have started casually handing out apartments to parasites?" "A certificate is necessary. Do not get upset: our instructions require it!" "Would it be possible to see these instructions?" "No, they are for official use."

Truly, the fetters of much-suffering mankind are made of office paper. It is even more alarming that an enormous volume of departmental administrative and directive instructions to this day are reliably concealed in a shroud of secrecy. Precisely this secrecy enables these "instructions" and "orders" to freely contradict each other and to be used and interpreted depending on the views of officials.

Without a decisive review of the existing system of secrecy, it will be impossible to form a new system of economic relations, accelerate scientific and technical development, and assert fundamentally new concepts about intellectual property and individuals in our society, under today's conditions of the high value of knowledge, high technology and science-intensive production. It is thought that converting military industry will require billions in outlays and only after then will begin to bring profits. This is possible: let us not argue about it. However, in my opinion, there is one sphere where conversion can have a positive effect virtually immediately and without serious investments. Academician V. Avduyevskiy, chairman of the Soviet National Commission on Assistance in Conversion, states that the generally overdeveloped system of secrecy and departmental barriers have led to the fact that even within the military-industrial complex the best achievements cannot be freely circulated, running up against invisible, but quite solid boundaries (IZVESTIYA, 7 February 1990).

The solution to this problem is obvious: we need a **conversion of secrecy**. We will not have a strong, civil economy without this. Incidentally, it is just as impossible to fully meet the obligations accepted in the Vienna agreements, to implement the principle of equal openness proclaimed at the London Information Forum, to legally and organizationally ensure the right to intellectual ownership, etc. If you consider that unjustified secrecy continues to inflict a multibillion loss on the country due to direct expenditures and a neglected potential profit, comparable to the share of the USSR state budget allocated to education or health care (see "A New Day," No 10, 1990, p 28), the urgency of the problem is even more tangible.

Experience, the Fruit of Hard Mistakes

A year and a half ago, KOMMUNIST (No 13, 1988) published an article by V. Rubanov, "From the 'Cult of

Secrecy' to an Information Culture." Its author "revealed" the phenomenon of secrecy. Seemingly, unjustified secrecy is doomed to fade away, although not rapidly, but unquestionably. On the whole, the process has taken and could not help but take this direction. The 19th All-Union Party Conference resolution "On Glasnost" required a clear determination of the limits to necessary secrecy, the establishment of responsibility for obstructing the implementation of citizens' rights to information and for the concealment, distortion or illegal use of information.

However, first we should speak of the current system for safeguarding secrets which, being aimed at supporting mainly military and political goals, has achieved a certain perfection over its years of existence. At the same time, its development in a formal and procedural regard has led to a loss of the socially significant goals of classified measures. As a consequence, we have an erosion of the object of secrecy itself, aggravation of the conflict between the form and content of classified and secret activity, between proclaimed goals and obtained results, between administrative concepts and the common sense of material production and, finally, between instructions for safeguarding Soviet scientific potential from foreign encroachments and the realities of scientific and technical progress. All this has artificially (if not to say forcibly) caused us to maintain the system of secrecy.

Right now, social relations concerning secrecy have been "squeezed" into the sphere of material production and distribution, but are not "growing" out of it naturally. Therefore, the economic reform to an ever greater extent is revealing their "intrusion" on production forces. Accordingly, the producers are beginning to react by rejecting secrecy mechanisms, if only due to the very fact of their administrative origin. In this regard, another aspect is left outside the field of view, namely, the social significance and usefulness of the mechanisms for the subjects of material production and distribution relations themselves. This was realized long ago: "...The most diverse motives force people to shield one or another of their relations from third parties and to wrap them in a shroud of secrecy: the psychological factors here may include the whole, endless scale of reasons for our actions—from an almost instinctive feeling of shame to considerations of a purely material nature" (V. Rozenberg. *Promyslovaya Tayna* [The Industrial Secret]. St. Petersburg, 1910, p 1. Later in the book, the "secret of processes for producing wealth" (industrial) and the "secrets of processes for distributing wealth" (commercial) are examined as means of protection from unscrupulous competition).

The formal, purely perfunctory attitude of our enterprises toward the administrative establishment of classified and secret procedures prevents their labor collectives from realizing, in terms of economics, that secrecy is not just an unpleasant duty, but also an additional opportunity to implement and protect their interests. It is not only an burden on production and commercial

activity, but also gives an enterprise greater freedom for economic maneuvering. In the latter case, secrecy is an element of marketing, a method for maximizing an enterprise's profit, creating optimum conditions for its participation in scientific and technical progress and for displaying enterprise in solving the problems of guarding its intellectual property.

The radical economic reform is called on ever more to expand the possibilities of exchanging information (intellectual resources) among enterprises both within the country, as well as beyond its borders. Our enterprises will be spontaneously dragged into stiff competition for which they are unprepared either economically, legally, psychologically, materially or technically. Under such circumstances, our intrinsic, careless openness, manifested in various forms, but above all as a free exchange of "leading experience" in economic management, will turn out to be not simply senseless, but economically dangerous.

From the practice of market management, it is known that secrecy protects the producer from unscrupulous competition (for instance, in the form of industrial espionage). However, our enterprises, having no right to industrial secrecy (i.e., above all, the right to protect their own intellectual property), will be unable, being guided by economic expediency to guard their own industrial and intellectual property, to choose between using secrecy measures or using patent, license or other protective methods.

Hence, we must consider the existing establishment of a classified-secret order not in an abstract, general formulation, but within the framework of entirely definite social relations. In other words, the struggle against unjustified secrecy and the struggle against careless openness should be carried out, so to speak, in dialectical unity. For this, we must carefully analyze the social, material and spiritual content of one or another specific form of classified-secret activity, and define the limits and conditions of the "work" of a classified measure, in which the development of production forces is stimulated and facilitated. The development of a strategy itself for classified-secret activity should be a permanent function of the state management bodies responsible for the formation and conduct of policy in vitally important spheres: foreign policy, military, economic, scientific and technical, etc.

'For' and 'Against'

The existing system for safeguarding secrets in our country is typified by the total closing of information in many spheres of state and social activity, high cost, a lack of criteria for the expediency of classifying something as secret, and a constant aggravation of the contradictions between freedom of scientific creativity and restrictions on the dissemination of scientific knowledge. Improving within the framework of the accepted methodology and originating from the "image of the enemy" in the 1930s-1950s, this system acquired a number of merits in the

eyes of its supporters. In my opinion, these merits are far from unquestionable, especially from the viewpoint of contemporary conditions. First place here is held by the claim that the system has enabled us to achieve parity in the arms race.

This allegedly happened because the secrecy system formed immediately after World War II made it possible in a timely manner to classify information falling under the requirements of the "List of Information Comprising State Secrets." It supposedly ensured the possibility of global control over the safekeeping of secret information, including during the implementation of international scientific and technical or trade and economic ties. Such certainty is based on a conviction that the upbringing of people, permitted access to secrets, has always been implemented here in the spirit of high political vigilance and exigency, on the basis of their training in the skills of maintaining the established secrecy measures. Of course, the efficient organization of the inventory, storage and movement of large flows of secret information through various media and its use within acceptable time periods, supplemented by the sufficiently reliable (although not guaranteed) protection of information on the most important programs for the development of arms and military technologies, were achieved thanks to the use of modular design principles for secret information and the restriction of the circle of persons with access to it.

A question arises: if our system of secrecy is so good and reliable, how come it is being so heavily criticized? Let me cite another example. "The classification and secrecy service needs a great deal of restructuring. In its existing form, it sometimes hinders the expansion of economic ties, both domestic and international, and obstructs scientific and technical progress and the creation of a modern system of information services. Moreover, precisely due to its totality and formal, bureaucratic nature, the classification and secrecy service is ineffective. In such a tremendous control network, which has almost completely engulfed material production, the leakage of information is equally possible; a leak of both really important secrets, as well as the drawings of the Mosin rifle, still jealously guarded as before, are also equally probable," writes Yu. Andreyev, USSR people's deputy (NOVOYE VREMYA, No 15, 1990, p 33).

Here is the authoritative opinion of P.L. Kapitsa, who appealed to N.S. Khrushchev back in 1964: "...Life long ago showed that in the modern world the classification of new scientific processes is impractical (if it even exists, it is only in Glavlit's unhealthy imagination). Our scientists, just like the Americans, can guess everything that is classified without particular difficulty, and usually spend 1-2 years doing this (the atomic and hydrogen bombs were the best example of this)" (KHIMIYA I ZHIZN, No 7, 1989, p 8).

Obviously, the existing system for protecting secrets has a number of weak points to which we can no longer close our eyes under contemporary conditions if we seriously

want to progress toward the positions of the new political thinking. For instance, the following are some of the most important flaws in the various areas of classified and secret activity:

As applied to its **political and juridical** foundations, it is a question of a lack of legislative support for the system's activity, which is based on numerous, often contradictory normative regulations and acts by the USSR Council of Ministers, ministries and departments. There are no legislative resolutions that directly relate the system's functioning to the interests of USSR national security, as well as no legal standards defining areas of information, the classification of which is intolerable from the viewpoint of protecting the rights of USSR citizens and the political, economic and other activities of various organizations (enterprises) in our country.

As far as **methodological** support for protecting secrets is concerned, at present we lack a scientific and methodological apparatus for considering the value of information in terms of strengthening military security and of damage from its disclosure, and for assessing the effectiveness of the system for protecting secrets and its components. A methodology has not been developed for substantiating the selection of an expedient structure and content for information which is subject to classification and subsequent protection. The methodology for revealing, assessing and eliminating indirect information that exposes secrets has been weakly developed and in practice is not applied.

Information-analytical support for classified and secret activity is characterized, in particular, by the fact that there are no regular procedures for providing ministries, departments, enterprises and organizations with information on our secrets. This does not promote the reasonable and timely classification and declassification of information.

In **organizing and managing** the system for protecting secrets, no measures are being planned to safeguard them on a state-wide scale and there is insufficient coordination in implementing the sum total of measures to establish and protect secret information. There is no scientific body capable of proposing realistic and effective solutions to the problems of evaluating the expediency of the classification, inventory and distribution systems for protecting secret information, of estimating the labor outlays needed to organize and optimize classified and secret activity, of introducing cost-accounting relations, etc.

Currently, there are no methods and procedures for the determination and expert analysis of expenditures for classified and secret activity. A procedure for financing classified and secret measures and a protocol for interrelations among the creators of arms and military technologies and their customers, within the framework of state orders and economic contracts, have not been determined. In my opinion, the training of specialists for service in the classified and secret agencies is completely

unsatisfactory. In terms of their earnings and, consequently, also their skill, they are among the third category, which negatively affects their professional level. There are in fact no incentives for the work of these associates, leading to a decline in the prestige of their labor. We lack criteria and methods for estimating the staff size of classified and secret services, which does not enable us to optimize their number in enterprises.

The situation with **engineering and technical** support is no better. Suffice it to say that, due to the lack of advanced office equipment (for instance, personal computers) which makes it possible to increase labor productivity and improve the inventory, storage, movement and processing of documents, manual labor predominates in technological processes. The classified and secret services are poorly equipped (I am referring to modern systems for protection, including means of communication).

Add to this the fact that we essentially have no information economy, no reliable legal safeguards for intellectual property, no special legal procedures with regard to "computer piracy" or those who spread computer viruses, and that our specialists, as a rule, do not know how to conceal the essence of an invention from future buyers, because not one of our VUZs teaches this, etc., it becomes entirely obvious that the existing system for protecting secrets and its means and methods lag significantly behind the requirements of life.

Through the Thorns...

The conversion of secrecy in our country started in 1988 when, on the order of the USSR Council of Ministers, we began to carry out a comprehensive research program on restructuring classified and secret measures. The USSR Council of Ministers State Commission, jointly with the USSR KGB, USSR MID, USSR Gosplan, USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Academy of Sciences and other interested ministries and departments, worked to fulfill this program.

This problem has troubled specialists before. Of course, some theoretical and applied studies were done, but most of them never left the framework of purely departmental interests, which is why this work was done basically by specialists in a fairly narrow field. Like the parable about the elephant and the blind man, in the problem of classified and secret activity each researcher perceived only that which was "knowable" in this complex phenomenon from the positions of his own education and profession. Secrecy itself, having divided the scientific community into departmental groups with various forms of access to secret information, obstructed the comprehensive study of the problem of secrecy.

Above all, it still remained to develop scientific categories and concepts, properly reflecting the influence of the new political, legal and socioeconomic realities on the form and content of protection of secrets, in order to find ways to bring classified and secret activity into conformity with the processes of perestroika in the country and

with the changes evoked by it throughout the world. Later, it was possible to switch to creating scientific bases for the protection of secrets under contemporary conditions, for the preparation of draft normative documents and practical recommendations on improving the state-wide system for protecting secrets.

It was necessary especially carefully to define the socio-political and socioeconomic spheres in which retaining classified restrictions in the interests of ensuring the security of Soviet society and the state would be lawful. It was necessary to sensibly distribute the competence of bodies of state management in work to protect secrets and in its political coordination. The growing significance of information as the most important national resource and as an essential element of the country's military, economic and scientific and technical potential required the political and economic substantiation of classified and secret activity, in order to eliminate the contradiction between the political form of decision-making on the classification of information and the economic content of measures for material support of the preservation of secrets.

From the very start, to bring the system for protecting secrets into accordance with the restructuring of the economic mechanism, it was suggested to divide the safeguarded information into state secrets (state secrecy) and enterprise secrets (industrial secrecy). Thus, the economic rights and responsibilities of the subjects of economic activity would be coordinated with their administrative and management functions in the protection of secrets, making it possible to ensure the realization of enterprises' economic rights to intellectual property and the implementation of the functions of ownership, utilization and disposal of it. Moreover, this approach gave an opportunity to remove the political burden from secret information which is the intellectual property of an enterprise, and is not a secret of bodies of state power and management. Finally, the separation of secrecy into state and industrial secrets brings the organizational and economic prerequisites for joint activity by Soviet and foreign enterprises closer in areas relating to the "company secrets" of both parties.

Although I risk burying the reader in the list of all the tasks that must be done, I would nonetheless like to note the following. A key element in the perestroyka of classified and secret activity is the determination of its strategic goals, taking into account the reform of the existing system for ensuring the country's security under the categories of the new political thinking. In this regard, special attention is required for the development of a strategy for protecting secrets on the basis of the priorities of foreign policy and implementing the USSR's political course in military, economic and scientific and technical areas. However, the growth in the role and significance of information in solving modern political, economic and social problems, on which the development and security of the country depend (the state has

no functions more important), justifies considering classified and secret activity a special area in the state's information policy.

All the above-mentioned problems were included in the comprehensive research program, a draft of which was sent to more than 20 interested ministries and departments and examined by them. In its final form, the comprehensive program included a number of specific positions, for instance, on the development of a draft law on secrets; working out procedures for regulating interrelations between participants in classified and secret activity in the form of the state order (along the vertical: state—enterprise) and in the form of economic contracts (along the horizontal: enterprise—enterprise); study of the status of state, cooperative and joint enterprises under conditions of their realization of rights to industrial secrecy and full cost-accounting; the determination of forms and methods for improving labor and cadre support for classified and secret activity; the solution of problems related to including classified measures in the basic production work of enterprises, institutions and organizations; the study of the correlations and interrelations of secrecy to scientific and technical cooperation and competition on an international plane; and the influence of secrecy on the content and form of informatization of our society, on its cultural development, on the creative activeness of the Soviet people, and on the realization of their intellectual potential.

I assume that without this detailed enumeration of directions for the comprehensive program to restructure classified and secret activity in our country, it would be impossible sufficiently clearly to illustrate the scale and scope of the problems raised and the originality of the approach to solving them.

The comprehensive program was approved by an order of the USSR Council of Ministers. A fairly broad circle of scientists and specialists from the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Council of Ministers Academy of the National Economy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, Gosplan, the KGB and other departments were involved in its fulfillment. Speaking honestly, most of them did not display particular happiness or enthusiasm in this regard: such a "mixed" group has never before been gathered for the joint solution of one problem. The more so, since 15 months were allotted for everything. However, to the credit of all "involved," they actively participated in the work, which has unquestionably enriched each of them, precisely due to the diversity of views and approaches.

'Carthage Must Be Destroyed!'

The scientific and practical results of fulfilling the comprehensive program, unquestionably, merit public attention. Above all, let me note that in the course of the studies which were done, the basic ideas of the accepted

concept were fully confirmed, although alternative variants were also suggested and examined. In the "Final Report," the main principles for classifying information were formulated as follows:

- The principle for presuming the non-secret nature of information, meaning that secrecy, not glasnost, is subject to strict regulation;
- The principle of equal openness and equal secrecy in international relations;
- The priority of international law, which regulates relations in this sphere, over domestic law;
- The correlation of openness of information within the Soviet Union to the openness of information about it in the international arena;
- The principle of economic expediency and compensation of damage, i.e., classification should be considered inexpedient if the damage from declassifying information is less than the profit lost as a consequence of classifying it;
- The lack of justification for concealing information, the probability of disclosure of which exceeds the likelihood of keeping it secret;
- The subordination of departmental measures on classification of information to state-wide interests;
- The dependence of the time period for secrecy on the nature of the information.

It noted the need to ascertain all classification measures related to infringements on the rights of citizens allowed to work with secret information and on the amounts of compensation for such restrictions in a separate normative act. This must be specially emphasized in view of the urgent need to deflect the threat of a "brain drain," related in particular to the simplification of the procedure for travel by Soviet citizens outside the USSR.

An important condition for actively including our country in the world economy and ensuring its economic security in this regard is to solve the problem of what the Soviet Union can take into the world market, given the international division of labor that has already taken shape and the presence in many cases of an insuperable gap in the levels of technology and specialization of production between us and leading Western countries. The opinion of our experts in this case was virtually synonymous: the basic share of future goods and services which the USSR should prepare for the world market relates mainly to our country's intellectual resources.

In this regard, it was decided that in foreign economic activity it is expedient to involve only those information resources which will give us real economic advantages. Thus, economic expediency is the main criterion here.

One of the conditions for involving our country's information resources in foreign economic activity should be

a guarantee of international legal forms of protection, which demands the broad participation of the USSR in international agreements on protecting industrial and intellectual property, as well as the conclusion of the appropriate agreements on a bilateral basis.

Rationalization of USSR participation in the international exchange of scientific knowledge and technologies should lead to the revocation of currently existing resolutions which hinder the effective use of existing scientific and technical achievements in the interests of the Soviet economy, including those applied in defense sectors. Therefore, within the framework of the new mechanism for protecting secrets, there should be no areas of knowledge or activity which are wholly classified, as happened to the nuclear and space industries. Only individual zones within one or another area of knowledge or activity, which would fall under the category of a state secret, can be singled out.

Specialists in international economic relations have come to the important conclusion that the solution of a number of problems stipulated by the comprehensive program cannot be found within the framework of the existing system for managing information resources. In their opinion, this system is not fully formed and is intolerably friable and imperfect. Hence, the task of restructuring classified and secret activity is an important element of the overall problem of creating a new system for managing information resources in the USSR.

The proposals which they drafted on creating a national system for managing information resources and improving information procedures in the area of USSR foreign policy can be considered a great contribution to resolving the tasks of the comprehensive program.

Another group of specialists presented some interesting considerations concerning the influence of changes in forms of ownership and in the methods of realizing ownership on secrecy measures. The Academy of the National Economy under the USSR Council of Ministers suggested development work in the service of protecting the commercial interests of state enterprises. They propose the centralized implementation (on the scale of state enterprises) of a set of steps to ensure the protection of the commercial interests of state enterprises, to preserve their scientific and technological priority, and also to safeguard confidential information during the scientific and economic activity of a state enterprise and in interrelations with state management bodies. In this case, the protection of commercial interests implies a system of coordinated measures of an economic, legal and material and technical nature.

It would be possible to speak of other, equally interesting research results obtained by program participants. Nonetheless, the main point is that scientific prerequisites have been created for developing and conducting a goal-oriented information policy in our country. For the first time, essentially, the attitude at the state level

toward information, first as an object of political management, and second as an object of the right of ownership, was defined. Thus, a theoretical foundation has been laid for studying and building an organizational and legal mechanism to manage information resources throughout the country on a unified conceptual basis, which cannot help but favorably affect the solution of the problem of informatization of our society.

The scientific experience obtained may directly contribute to the study of the topical problems of conversion (above all, conversion of intellectual potential), the restructuring of production relations, progressive changes in social awareness, and the formation of an international economic domain and legal support for it.

It may... but how soon? After all, for objective reasons, a number of problems now facing the comprehensive program have not been solved. The fact that they cannot be resolved in such a brief time period was clear from the start. Consider the legal aspect of the problem alone: a law on protection of secret information. So long as it has not been passed, it is simply impossible to introduce new theoretical approaches and principles into the practice of classified and secret activity, including the development of the appropriate normative documents and the implementation of specific steps to protect secrets (the program proposed doing precisely this). Only a law is capable of restraining departmental arbitrariness in the classification of information. Its absence may at any moment reduce the legal domain of glasnost to the size of a point, like the one underneath the exclamation mark after our customary cry of "It is forbidden!"

All these and other problems were discussed throughout the course of the working meetings of program participants, starting from the very moment of formation of the concept for the perestroika of classified and secret activity. Including the latter in the social relations that are being restructured presumes renovating it only within the full context of transformations of the USSR political system, of building a rule-of-law state, and of carrying out a radical economic reform. The final image of the future system for protecting secrets will take shape only as a result of solving these basic problems, assuming that work on this program is continued.

Right now, at its own discretion, the USSR Ministry of Defense and several others, at their own fear and risk, who are basically voluntary participants in the program (I will not name them, so as not to complicate their lives—what are you doing, this is secret!), are doing this work. So, "Carthage" has stood its ground, but the conversion to the leading principle for building an institution to protect information—the principle of ownership and economic expediency (in other words, sort of a conversion of secrecy)—does not exist for the time being. The results achieved in fulfilling the comprehensive program are clearly insufficient for this, which is why it is entirely senseless to halt the research that was begun.

Meanwhile, unjustified secrecy continues to inflict tremendous harm on us. To whom, where and how must we still prove the need to develop an integral information policy and to create a nationwide system for managing information resources, with a new organizational and legal mechanism for protecting secrets? The administrative-command system, a bastion of secrecy, will apparently be the last to surrender. Therefore, its attempts to limit the perestroika of classified and secret activity to the application of a layer of cosmetic gloss must not escape the attention of the USSR government, more interested than anyone in the economical expenditure of the country's budget. Until recently, our hope was tied basically to the people's deputies and, of course, to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Science, National Education, Culture and Upbringing. Its chairman, Yu. Ryzhov, considers the reform of classified and secret activity an important element of restructuring our national security system.

In the overall opinion of the specialists who participated in the comprehensive program, in the interests of further developing a system to protect secrets, we must form a long-term program to create a system for managing the country's information resources, as well as a 2-year (1990-1991) program to develop the rudiments of such a system. I would not be wrong, I think, to say that the scientific and intellectual potential for solving these problems on the whole has already taken shape and is ready to continue the work that was begun.

The problem is not one of muscles, but of brains." Thus, they say, one American scientist answered an American military officer, when the officer reproached him for undermining national security (the scientist had protested against unjustified secrecy). I do not want to draw any analogies here, but let me return to the thesis that the existing system of secrecy allegedly helped us achieve parity with the Americans in the military sphere. Let it even be so. I am still certain that the conversion of secrecy, for now being implemented both senselessly and inadequately, should nonetheless occur. May the USSR Presidential Council help us!

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Soviet History at the Center of Attention

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[Interview with Professor Robert Tucker, president of the U.S. Slavic Studies Association, by V. Bushuyev]

[Text] Robert Tucker, historian and political scientist, president of the United States Slavic Studies Association, is one of the leading American specialists on the Soviet Union. His works include "The Philosophy and Myth of K. Marx," "The Marxist Revolutionary Idea," "Soviet Political Consciousness: A Study of Stalinism and Post-Stalinist Changes," "Leadership in Politics" and "Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia." For many

years these works were unknown to Soviet readers, except for a narrow circle of specialists and historians.

Today the situation is changing. This spring the "Progress" Publishing House published Tucker's book "Stalin: The Way to Power, 1879-1929" in Russian. This is the first part of the author's planned three-volume study of the problems of Stalinism.

KOMMUNIST associate V. Bushuyev met with and interviewed Professor Robert Tucker.

[Bushuyev] You lived and worked in the USSR during World War II, and you later visited our country during the Khrushchev "thaw." Relying on your personal familiarity with Soviet reality and on the results of your scientific analysis of our postrevolutionary history, what do you see as the essence of Stalinism? In your opinion, is it correct to consider it an inevitable phenomenon of Soviet history, as some researchers suppose?

[Tucker] Very often in discussing Stalinism, scientists and journalists in both our country and yours seem eventually to presume that they know full well what this phenomenon is. However, this is far from always so. The main problem lies precisely here, it seems. Its significance is such that it will be surrounded by heated debates for years. Historians are obliged to explain the nature of Stalinism and the reasons why it appeared. It would be wrong to reduce it, for instance, only to the repressions, to the victims of collectivization, to the consequences that it had on culture, etc. We should not forget that Stalinism did not yet exist in the 1920s, although Stalin himself did, as a political leader whose influence and power grew during the process of intensified struggle for succession, for the Leninist heritage. We must ask ourselves: What essentially occurred, and where did Stalinism come from?

I have tried to illuminate this question in my books, analyzing the key problem, in my view: the gradual decline in revolutionary political culture in the Soviet Union during the late 1920s. After Lenin's death, there was a schism among the bolsheviks and their leader. Different trends began to appear. Formally, everyone supported Leninism and stood in its defense, yet the interpretations of Lenin's legacy were most diverse. It is commonly thought that two trends struggled: the left (Trotskyite) and right (Bukharin-Rykovist). Stalin allegedly had no policy of his own in general. This approach originates from one of Trotsky's concepts. According to Trotsky, Stalin originally took the side of the right in the struggle against the left, but later switched to the left in a struggle against the right, having no position of his own whatsoever in this regard. Let us assume that matters were otherwise.

I must say, I generally like the Russian saying "God loves a troika." In my opinion, in the 1920s in practice there were not two, but three trends. On the one hand, there were the supporters of the left, who still hoped for a world revolution. They were opposed moderately by the rightists, headed by Rykov. The rightists were prepared

to weaken the emphasis on the idea of world revolution, already realizing that it obviously will not happen: they preferred that the Western democratic countries not fear the USSR, but start out along a path of normal cooperation with it. They were marked by an aspiration to build a sort of cooperative agrarian socialism in the Soviet Union, introducing it gradually, with assistance, to the rural commune, which had still been preserved throughout the country in the 1920s. To a certain extent, their concepts conformed to Gertsen's idea that precisely the commune should be the core of Russian socialism. Possibly without even fully realizing this, the moderate rightists were thinking along precisely this direction, and I would therefore call them Russian national bolsheviks. In other words, they had counted on adapting bolshevism as a political culture, as a whole set of formulations in political and ideological life, to the country's national culture. Although many people in the party at that time had a negative view of the NEP, there were nonetheless many who believed in the advantages of a market economy and gradual development, without leaps and bounds. The supporters of this course has especially strong positions in the government apparatus, which Rykov headed after Lenin's death.

One asks, which trend did Stalin support? He seems to have sided with first the one, then the other. However, if we carefully analyze all of Stalin's statements from that time, it is possible to include him among the national bolsheviks of a radical persuasion. Of course, I am not thrusting my interpretation on anyone, but Stalin, in my opinion, somehow combined the two trends within himself. First, there are the severe ideas and formulations that prevailed under the specific conditions of "war communism" and which Lenin once shared. Second, there are the ideas of Great Russian chauvinism which, conversely, Lenin had always detested. This mixture of the severe ideas from the time of "war communism" with Great Russian chauvinism is, in my opinion, the essence of Stalinism. If we follow Stalin's activity from the late 1920s, such as his approach to collectivization and restoration of a strong central state, we see that in reality he invariably spoke of building state socialism, not at all the kind of socialism that Lenin and other bolsheviks, both right and left, supported.

I am not sure that Stalinism was the platform of the entire group, which included people such as Molotov, Kaganovich and others. In my opinion, Stalin never fully shared his thoughts, even with them. Essentially, Stalinism as such took shape in his own head and had acquired definite features by the 1930s. I think the fact that he gained the upper hand was a tremendous tragedy for your country and your people, although, unquestionably, the country achieved impressive successes in economic construction in the prewar period. The whole point is the price at which they were achieved. I do not share the opinion of those who believe that Stalinism was inevitable from the start. It seems to me that people in those years, especially the country's leadership, would have thought seriously about what awaited them and

would have investigated Stalin's policy in time: they would not then have allowed him to annihilate them. However, the danger that he concealed within himself was made clear to them too late.

It is quite possible that I am wrong, but then, conditionally, let me allow for the following possibility: if Stalin had simply fallen ill or died in 1927, I think, the whole history of your country would have taken a completely different path. By this I mean to emphasize again that Stalinism was not predetermined by the course of development of events itself. However, this does not at all mean that the NEP would have mandatorily continued without Stalin. There probably would have been certain serious economic changes, and other complex problems would have appeared. However, I think, nonetheless the tragedy which fell to the lot of your people would not have happened. Nor is it ruled out that World War II might have been avoided.

It goes without saying, these are only guesses, conditional assumptions. Of course, it is far more useful for historians and thinking people in general to try somehow to recreate and analyze events that happened in reality, to show why this happened precisely so, and not otherwise, and how our contemporaries should evaluate that which happened. To be sure, there are always people who prefer to avoid answering the bitter and painful questions. In my opinion, however, such thinking is not very productive and the future does not belong to these people.

[Bushuyev] What precisely, in your view of history, encouraged Khrushchev to start along the path of reform after Stalin's death, to take the initiative in de-Stalinization?

[Tucker] Khrushchev always seemed like a remarkable person to me. In my opinion, he was the only one in Stalin's circle who was capable of performing a genuine feat in 1956: giving his famous speech on the cult of personality at the 20th Party Congress. In any case, I can think of no one else from Stalin's command who would have dared to take such a desperately bold and courageous step.

I have thought a great deal about why precisely he took this step. In my opinion, for many years Khrushchev was a believer in a certain sense: not in God, of course, but in Stalin. After all, he gained access to Stalin when he was still fairly young. When one really believes in someone, but later discovers the truth about the one to whom one had bowed, an sharp, inner change in one's psychological state is inevitable and a reassessment of one's values begins. Moreover, we must not forget that in the Stalinist years Khrushchev, in order to survive and remain alive, was himself forced to commit a great deal against his own conscience. It seems to me that this contributed to the growth of a protest within him against all that had occurred, in particular against that in which he himself was entangled in one way or another. It is also important that Khrushchev, as opposed, for instance, to Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich or Kalinin, was not a broken

man. Stalin jailed and exiled their wives, their sons, and God knows whom else. They themselves were constantly under threat of reprisals. So it is, in the final account, that all of them were completely broken. It seems to me, this is precisely why Khrushchev was not broken or, at least, not completely broken, and was able to find the courage within himself to say what he knew and thought about Stalin and his policies.

In this regard, we should keep in mind what the period from the late 1920s to early 1930s meant to Khrushchev. If we read his speeches from those years carefully, there can be no doubt: he deeply believed in the necessity of and justifications for everything that was done at the time. This means that he accepted in the name of socialism all the horrors of collectivization and the starvation that it caused in the Ukraine, and not even there alone, since even now nobody knows precisely how many people perished in that period throughout the country. This means that it never entered his head to dismantle the system created by Stalin, which, incidentally, continued to exist in Khrushchev's time. He only supposed that within the framework of this system the local leaders would be better able to cope with managing the economy if many central ministries were abolished, having replaced them with the councils of national economy. Khrushchev thus counted on salvaging or correcting the economic situation that had taken shape in the country. Of course, these plans were doomed to failure, since a far more profound, radical reform of the entire economic system was required. Khrushchev was unable even to think about this. That is why his reform activity was limited mostly to the level of the higher party leadership. With Stalin's death, the stage of autocratic rule and one-man power really came to an end here and, as Khrushchev liked to say, Leninist norms were restored.

The changes under Khrushchev involved not only the economy, but also touched on culture. Tvardovskiy's NOVOYE MIRE existed, and reformist thinking spread among various strata of the population. It is impossible to cancel all this out of Soviet history. I consider it a true tragedy for your country that the transformations begun under Khrushchev were halted, followed by almost 20 years, virtually the lifetime of an whole generation, of what you now call the stagnation. I have no doubt that if the Khrushchev reform had managed to continue and intensify in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet people would be living incomparably better today and the country would not be faced with so many urgent problems.

[Bushuyev] What do you suppose was the sole historical possibility for starting radical changes, which was neglected in the postwar period?

[Tucker] Unfortunately, there is no one, sole possibility. In my opinion, enormous possibilities were overlooked back in 1945. The point is that during the war a great

many Soviet people, perhaps subconsciously or instinctively, expected some kind of restructuring, a postwar thaw.

I well remember the day in May 1945 when, coming out of our embassy building—it was on Mokhovaya Street at that time—I headed for Red Square. A throng of happy, excited people had gathered there, celebrating the Victory. I heard one officer say: "Now it is time to live!" I think many people thought this. Really, after such a terrible war, the time had come to live for real. So many young Russian men had died, the people had suffered so much! Naturally, people dreamed of a new life. I know for certain that there were many, for instance, who expected the abolition of kolkhozes. The fact that Stalin permitted the expansion of private plots during the war generated a great deal of hope. There were rumors that young people would be allowed to study abroad after the Victory. The fact that the USSR now had allies—England and the U.S.—inspired optimism. No one in those days would have guessed that the "Cold War" could arise. In any case, of the associates at the American Embassy in Moscow in 1945, I can think of nobody who could have imagined or foreseen this.

Writers and the intelligentsia had set their hopes on the postwar respite, obviously hoping for what is now called glasnost. Therefore, I have grounds for claiming that in their hearts the Soviet people expected changes and restructuring back in 1945. Yet, it really only began in 1985. Just think, how many broken destinies! In the course of all these 40 postwar years, a sort of internal "cold war" occurred: the persecution of scientists, the literati, doctors and dissident intellectuals, and your country's isolation from the outside world.

In 1946, I married a Russian girl, a student at the Moscow Polygraphic Institute. Her father was a worker, a typewriter specialist, and we often sat down with him for a cup of tea in the evenings. I remember Stalin's radio broadcast of 9 February 1946. He said that there is still imperialism in the world and, so long as it remains, the possibility of war still exists. Finally, he announced that, in order to insure the country against any such chances, three or four new 5-year periods were necessary. My wife's father, who recalled both the first and the second 5-year periods, did not say a word, but only crossed his arms on the table and weakly collapsed his head upon them.

This was the reaction of a man who was then 50 years old. He realized that there was, in general, nothing for him to hope for and that the rest of his life would be spent under the same conditions as before the war, not at all the way people had dreamed of after the Victory. In my opinion, the spirit of the people itself suffered greatly from this. Maybe the people never whispered about anything, since it was dangerous to express oneself then, but in many ways they understood and, it seems to me, began to lose their hope for changes. This was a harbinger of crisis. In 1947-1948, the "Cold War" began. Soon people began to fear seriously that a new world war

would flare up. Until the day of Stalin's death, the situation continued to intensify and worsen.

In January 1953, a group of doctors was accused of murdering a number of Soviet leaders. A rapid propaganda campaign was waged against physicians for almost 2 months. The situation, it seemed, might lead to a new wave of terror, maybe to a repetition of 1937. Only Stalin's death put an end to it. Immediately, everyone felt as though a new stage had begun in the country's history. Two weeks after the last frenzied splash of the cult at Stalin's funeral, his name suddenly began disappearing from the pages of the press. The first, even pre-Khrushchev "thaw" had begun, related to Malenkov's activity. In April 1953, Beriya's department itself admitted that the case of the doctors had been contrived and that the Soviet people could now live peacefully and feel safe. This meant that a tremendous danger really had hung over them for a long time. It still remains for us historians to state the whole truth about these last horrible years of tyranny and everything that happened then, about the country's new historical opportunity that appeared immediately after Stalin's death. True, at first, some confusion arose and there was a struggle among Stalin's inheritors, ending with the fall of Beriya. The Khrushchev period itself really only began in 1955, when Malenkov was forced to leave the post of chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

In general, Malenkov seems like a very interesting figure to me. It is a shame that historians still neglect the study of his rather brief period of power. In my opinion, Malenkov was a possible predecessor to those who are now trying, especially in economics, to demarcate the functions of the party, state bodies, and the government. Let me explain why. As it seems to me, Khrushchev was a party leader to the core, but Malenkov at a certain stage began to support an expansion of the government's role. Incidentally, even Stalin, although he headed the party Central Committee until the end of his life, often relied on state power. This is understandable if we take into account that he considered himself, in the first place, a leader of a strong centralized state. Yet Malenkov, over a number of years, was nonetheless his closest assistant. In some ways, I assume, he was even closer than Khrushchev or Molotov. Stalin's ideas were to some extent transferred to Malenkov.

I believe that the second historical opportunity for the Soviet Union in the postwar years appeared at precisely this time, when Malenkov was in power. I remember his speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet Session in August 1953. Malenkov declared that the time had come to undertake the development of light industry with the same force, by which heavy was developed in the 1930s. In this statement, I see the first promise of the possibility for reform. Yet, Malenkov was removed in early 1955, PRAVDA accused him of deviating from the time-tested postulate of priority of heavy industry over light. Malenkov's tragic weakness, it seems to me, was his past connection to Beriya. In all likelihood, this predetermined his defeat. He left, as he should have, but at the

same time yet another historical chance was overlooked, which might have brought the country closer to reform.

[Bushuyev] In your works on Soviet history, how do you explain the reasons for the relative ease with which, right after the 20th Congress that began the de-Stalinization, the turn-around happened in the mid-and late 1960s and, under Brezhnev, the trend toward re-Stalinization appeared?

[Tucker] It seems to me, one reason, and not the least one, lies in the fact that Khrushchev basically relied on people of his own generation and those only slightly younger than he. In 1956, Khrushchev himself was already 62 years old, while Brezhnev was 50. However, we must not forget how people like Brezhnev were shaped, how they came to power. After all, he was a typical, Stalinist worker promoted to an administrative post, a representative of that stratum of people who, still being quite young in the 1930s, moved up the ladder, taking the place of repressed party members and old bolsheviks. You could call them the children of terror. This entire generation of the party nomenclature was brought up and promoted by Stalin, and owed him alone for everything.

From the viewpoint of these people, who made up the overwhelming majority of the upper ruling stratum in the early 1960s, Khrushchev's reform policy concealed tremendous dangers. First, it excited the minds of the younger generation and the intelligentsia and caused faith in the infallibility of Stalinist procedures to waver. A start had been made at glasnost. People yearned to discover the whole truth about what in reality had happened in the country in the 3 decades since Lenin's death. Second, it was already obvious that Khrushchev's transformations in the economy—the corn campaign, development of the virgin lands, and the creation of the councils of the national economy—were not bringing the fruits that he had promised people. Disillusionment was growing throughout the country. This worked in favor of those for whom Khrushchev was inconvenient.

Also, the fact that Khrushchev was somewhat isolated, in the position of a lone reformer, deprived of mass support, facilitated his removal. Of course, he had many supporters among the younger, more educated people in the country, but at that time they were still far from the levers of power and were unable to act in his defense.

After Khrushchev's elimination from the political arena, the country's leadership ended up in the hands of the conservatives. I do not think it is a question of a restoration of the Stalinist system, which always had an inherently terroristic nature. It seems to me that Brezhnev's system was not like that. Severity was displayed only with regard to dissidents, to those who held independent views or convictions. Their situation was extremely serious. However, for an ordinary person who did not aspire to think differently or who only expressed himself freely at home, Brezhnev's rule was not a period

of terror. Rather, it could be called a period of Neo-Stalinism, or rather, Soviet conservatism of a Stalinist persuasion. The foundations of the system were preserved, but reasonable changes and reforms were halted or reduced to naught. For example, nothing came of Kosygin's reform attempts.

The stagnant years passed one after another, and new generations of Soviets grew up. Of course, it is sad that many of them, sensing the gap between that which they read in the newspapers, magazines and books, and that which they saw everyday with their own eyes, gradually lost faith and many of their ideals. Yet, after all, if we proceed from the ideas of N. Berdyayev, the Russian people are believers who cannot live without faith. Since ever more doubts had arisen in the officially proclaimed ideals, many began looking for different sources of faith. Attempts were made to develop a new version of Marxism, free of Stalinist deposits. Solzhenitsyn and people like him in spirit held to their own line in the search for ideals. Academician Sakharov called on the world to recognize the danger which threatens it and is constantly growing.

One of the specific features of the Brezhnev period (in addition to the profound phenomena of an aggravated crisis of the system and the loss of a great deal of faith in official ideals) is the increase of the country's military might. Khrushchev, despite all his shortcomings, nonetheless tried to move the economy's center of gravity toward the satisfaction of consumer needs. In my opinion, his enthusiasm for corn, development of the virgin lands and his attention to the production of food were related to this. Brezhnev's conservatism put the main emphasis on all sorts of foreign policy actions, often adventuristic in nature, and on increasing military might, which was called on to ensure the parity of the two superpowers. On the one hand, this intensified the economic problems of the USSR and promoted an increase in crisis phenomena. On the other, such a policy was perceived in the West as a sign that party leaders of the old temperament, who wanted to export revolution, had come to power in the Soviet Union. There are forces in the West for which it is advantageous for power in the USSR to be in the hands of precisely such leaders. This serves as justification for their own military policy, the policy of the military industrial complex. So, the forces that held power in your country in Brezhnev's time and the Western military-industrial complex assisted each other somewhat.

Of course, I cannot form a definite opinion on a person whom I did not know personally, but to me, in any case, Brezhnev did not always seem like a true communist, a real believer in revolution. Even though at official ceremonies he never neglected the opportunity to call himself a true son of the Communist Party, a supporter of the work of the revolution, I think he was nonetheless not a genuine revolutionary. Rather, he should be called a genuine conservative, a Soviet-type conservative. Nonetheless, it was advantageous for some people in the

West to portray him as a dangerous communist revolutionary, prey to the very same imperial ambitions. The West responded to the growth in the USSR's military power and the triumph of Soviet troops in Afghanistan by cultivating its own military might. As a result, matters grew worse and worse, international relations constantly were aggravated, and an ever greater threat hung over mankind.

I want once again to stress: precisely Academician Sakharov, back in 1968, drew attention for the first time to this ill-starred process, to the fact that the situation in the world is becoming ever more threatening, and arms—ever more destructive. He foresaw a possibility of achieving disarmament and even more than disarmament: cooperation between the superpowers in the name of saving mankind. However, the most dangerous trend was halted only after Brezhnev's death, and at that not immediately, at the cost of enormous efforts.

[Bushuyev] In light of knowledge about the Soviet Union's historical past, what to you seem like possible ways for the further development of our country and what dangers may lie in wait for Soviet society along these paths?

[Tucker] A new leader has appeared in the Soviet Union and a start has been made to the most important changes, long-ago imminent, capable of radically changing the face of the country and justifying the hopes of its people. I think the most positive thing right now is the process of forming a new political system. It seems to me, a switch of tremendous historical importance is being made, from a party state to a governmental state. I am not only talking about the new parliamentary system that is developing within the framework of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Congress of People's Deputies and the republic soviets, built on the basis of alternative choices. I am also referring to the conversion to presidential rule. In my view, this is a very healthy process. Many of the problems which have appeared recently, and which have led to sharp, critical situations in a number of republics, as well as in the economy, were caused at least in part by the slow rates of transformation.

Of course, this is only my hypothesis, but it seems that the slowness to a significant extent gave rise to the conservatism of certain circles in the higher echelons of party power. I think presidential rule will open up possibilities for a more rapid implementation of the radical economic reform. In my view, this reform is vitally necessary. I am no economist, and it is quite beyond me to profoundly analyze economic problems, but right now literally everyone is beginning to realize how much the country needs this reform. I hope that now, under conditions of presidential rule, political decision-making will proceed precisely from the Presidential Council, and that Gorbachev will have sufficient support there such that decisions can be made effectively without red tape and put into practice. I am sure that in the coming months we will witness a more decisive

course toward radical economic transformation. Although the reform will not be easy for many citizens and for the administrative apparatus in some ways, it will most likely improve the country's economic situation. Then, people will be able to think more calmly about both the future of the country, as well as their own history. Many of today's extremes and emotions, sometimes tempestuously displayed, will simply disappear.

As far as the dangers lurking along the path of perestroika are concerned, I am, after all, only a visitor to the USSR. Although recently I have been able to visit your country every year, I nonetheless do not live in Soviet society and I watch the events and processes developing here from without, not from within. Therefore, it is hard for me thoroughly to answer to this question, which is exceptionally important for you and for the whole world. Nonetheless, it seems to me, theoretically there is still a certain danger of reviving Neo-Stalinism, a kind of backsliding in the spirit of Nina Andreyeva. That is why the steps being taken now to build and strengthen a rule-of-law state, to intensify democratization and accelerate the economic reform are so important.

From the viewpoint of the interests of both your country and the entire world, it seems, the success of perestroika is all-important. After all, perestroika also directly relates to the new thinking in international affairs, to USSR foreign policy. Assertion of the new thinking, with its stress on common human values, on recognizing our world as one common, complex unit, opens up the only way to save mankind from the dangers looming over it in connection with the arms race, with the worsening world ecological situation. It is the only way to establish cooperation between the East and the West, especially between the USSR and the U.S., in the name of eliminating the threat to the very bases of man's existence on this planet. So it is that the decisions which the Soviet leadership, headed by President Gorbachev, is making right now have great significance for all of us, for everyone living on Earth. That is why I wish much success to both the new thinking and perestroika.

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ECONOMIC POLICY

The Way to a Regulated Market

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[Article by Vladimir Kollontay, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] Five years of perestroika have introduced many new things in the old arguments about planning and the market. There is noticeably more both realism and responsibility in them. The state program for conversion to a regulated market economy is already putting much of what was said in discussions into a practical plane.

The ideas of reform are starting to penetrate into the deep layers of social awareness, directly affecting the vital interests of Soviet people. The problems of balancing the consumer market and correlating the population's incomes and prices have taken first priority.

Under these conditions, the discussion of the market is going beyond the framework of discourses among specialists or even of parliamentary debates, and is acquiring the status of a genuine social dialogue. We are all interested in its results and, consequently, in clear concepts both of the specific nature of the market in a contemporary society, as well as of the ways and problems of forming it in our country.

The market as a self-sufficient, automatically acting, self-regulating mechanism is an abstraction, to a certain extent reflecting the realities in the economies of certain states at the end of the last century. The contemporary market is an element of a different, far more complex system of economic management, in which constantly changing market laws, numerous regulating institutions (primarily state) and the condition of mass consciousness (culture, ideology, sense of justice, etc.) interact closely.

The establishment of markets and economic mechanisms in non-socialist countries happened in various ways. Conventionally, three basic models for this process can be singled out. It remains for the USSR and allied states to work out and implement in practice a fourth model for converting from a command-administrative system.

The first model is typical of countries found at each specific historical stage in the vanguard of scientific and technical progress, which independently develop new forms and methods of production. Historically, this group has included England, Holland and the United States. The combination of economic might with a colonial policy opened extensive economic prospects for them, access to abundant resources, and greater possibilities for extensive development (be it at the expense of colonies or by expanding their own territory). For this model, the gradual evolution of a number of small, scattered economies into more complex structures and the social division of labor, mediated and regulated predominantly by the market, are typical. Numerous social institutions, legal norms, and state establishments ensuring conditions for full-fledged market relations and at the same time amortizing their negative social consequences were formed and improved in parallel with this. With the growth of exploitation, the workers movement achieved the passing of laws on protecting labor, restricting the length of workdays, minimum wages, etc. The growth of concentration and monopolization of industry forced the passing of anti-trust legislation and other measures to stimulate competition. The evolutionary development of the market was accompanied by

an expansion of democratic freedoms and the establishment of institutions for political pluralism, ensuring definite consideration for the interests of various social groups.

A distinguishing feature of this model is the decisive role of market competition in the formation of economic structures and in ensuring the current profitability of economic units. Ideologically, the basic emphasis is placed on free competition in the economy and spontaneous market regulation; any form of institutional interference and state regulation is considered undesirable and is restrained as much as possible. The functioning of this model is facilitated by the fact that scientifically, technically and industrially advanced countries in many ways shape the world economy and have the opportunity at the expense of it to resolve or somewhat lessen a large part of their own socioeconomic problems.

The second model was mainly characteristic of relatively early stages of economic development of politically independent states (Germany, Japan, Italy, and Russia in part before 1917), which began somewhat late, although not very late, to create their own industry and therefore were doomed to assert their positions in the world economy and world community using other, predominantly non-market, often not even economic methods.

As a rule, the more recent formation of a unified national state, as well as strong nationalistic and often militaristic aspirations, have played a large role in the development of this model. The concept of the "corporate" state, according to which the latter is called on to determine the basic goals and ideals of social development, as well as to ensure the consensus of the main social groups and strata, has become widespread in this regard. Economic activity is based on private ownership and a certain maturity of market relations; however, it is strictly subordinate not only to the pursuit of profit, but also to more general national tasks. Correspondingly, limited, subordinate significance is given to economic efficiency, competition and the market. Various types of monopoly and protectionism become widespread. The state ends up being the guiding influence on the basic directions of economic development; solution of current economic problems is turned over to special "corporate" institutions in which government agencies are present to various extents. The state participates most directly in establishing individual, especially military, sectors. Entrepreneurial activity is strongly supported by subsidies, tax privileges and state orders. Often, not purely market relations, but informal ties between state institutions and private enterprises, and indirect methods of state interference in economic activity predominate. An important feature of this model is the stress on military forms for improving one's international position and relatively little concern for low economic efficiency.

World War II, essentially, put an end to the existence of this model of economic and market mechanism. (If we do not consider separate relapses in the developing world.) In the first postwar years, the U.S., hoping to

definitively keep down its rivals, actively strived for fragmentation of the industrial apparatus of Germany and Japan, for disbanding former monopoly associations, and for political decentralization. At the same time, they created conditions for the more active functioning market mechanisms in these countries, conducting a serious monetary reform, having laid the foundations for anti-trust legislation, etc. (calculated to expand sales markets for American industry). Precisely these transformations in many ways stipulated the subsequent economic successes of the states destroyed during World War II, which now have become generally recognized leaders in the world economy.

The third model for establishing an economic mechanism on a market basis summarizes the experience of developing countries. In the era of colonialism, their economies were forcibly dragged into the international division of labor and the world market. As a rule, market relations were introduced from without by forming separate enclaves and generating one-sided, dependent development. With the gain of political independence in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, energetic forces were directed at acquiring economic independence and creating their own production base, and at improving world economic positions. In this regard, the emancipated states had to fully encounter the reverse aspect of the action of market laws under conditions of backward, unproductive economies. Sharp contradictions appeared in virtually all of them between their own real needs and priorities of socioeconomic development, on the one hand, and the inner logic of the market mechanism, intensified by the imperatives of the world capitalist economy, on the other.

The attempts by states which have tried to free themselves in order to form internal markets, protectively crowding out foreign goods and sometimes capital, were unable to lead to anything, particularly because a foundation for mutually supplementary internal economic ties was almost absent. Although in some of these countries, again with the active participation of the state, separate sectors of industry were created, including export-oriented sectors, they were and are forced to encounter great difficulties, since contemporary production forces require the mobilization of ever larger accumulations, the establishment of an infrastructure network, and development of advanced technologies. Due to the limited nature of resources, a significant share of the population, especially in large countries, remains uninvolved in economic development, doomed to poverty and lack of rights, which generates an especially complex set of social and economic problems. Under such conditions, the market requires broad-scale and active corrective interference on the part of the state.

If we summarize the historical experience of shaping a market and economic mechanisms in the Western and developing countries, a conclusion suggests itself: this is a long process, in the course of which changes constantly occur in all basic spheres of social life. As a result of

profound differences in historical, natural, sociopolitical, economic, cultural, national and other conditions, the specific markets and economic mechanisms which take shape in different countries are distinguished by **great diversity** (not even to mention their nonconformity to the simplified abstract schemes of economists). The systems of motivation, efficiency criteria, production and organizational-administrative structures, economic proportions, levels of technical equipment and labor productivity, and many other parameters created by the market are far from identical. For instance, great differences are observed in the nature (and socioeconomic consequences) of the functioning of a market in a postindustrial society or in the developing world, in countries with a fairer distribution of incomes or in countries with large property disparities, under the conditions of a highly developed bank and credit system or with the presence of extensive budget financing. The market in the FRG, Switzerland, and countries with a high sense of justice is one matter, and it is another in the neighboring Mediterranean states. Deep-rooted traditions of the labor ethic in Japan for a long time made it possible to the least degree to resort to legal norms for ensuring economic obligations, than, for instance, in the United States. Various variants of state economic policy also predetermine the inevitability of appearance of a number of different kinds of market. All this indicates that the success of economic reform in the USSR in many ways depends on a **detailed definition of a truly possible and desirable model** for a regulated market economy under our specific conditions.

Competition is always the foundation of a market. However, depending on the historical context, its nature changes. In the early stages, the market was characterized by the free competition of numerous, weakly interrelated producers, by the interaction of spontaneously generated supply and demand. Today, the situation is qualitatively different. Monopolization of the economy and the improvement of systems for state and inter-state regulation mean that **oligopolitical** competition, in which each sector is ruled by two to four large associations that compete with each other, has taken shape and prevails in the economies of industrially developed states. In the first stage of establishing such competition structures, sectorial associations of single-type enterprises (mainly for the purpose of monopolizing separate parts of the industry and inflating prices and profits) were typical. Later, different financial groups, the main motive for the formation of which was an aspiration to control finance and profit companies, became widespread. Recently, the oligopolitical associations are forming ever more often on the basis of production and technological ties. The experience of the Japanese "kairesu" corporations, which group together mutually complementary enterprises of different sectors, which jointly produce a large assortment of finished products, is of special interest. Such associations constantly compete among themselves, and thus in many ways eliminate the threat of monopolistic decay. At the same time, having enormous resources at their disposal, they are capable of big

economic maneuvers. They can also rapidly implement a structural rebuilding of production, arrange the output of new production, solve the social problems of relocating and retraining the work force, lessen the consequences of unemployment, and resolve the destiny of unprofitable enterprises in a timely manner, without excessive losses. Precisely these advantages have played a large role in strengthening the contemporary positions of Japanese companies in the world economy.

Oligopolitical competition is noticeably changing the modern market. Small, scattered producers have to accept market conditions as an objective law; the oligopolitical associations have many possibilities for influencing the structure and form of market relations, changing the nature of the social division of labor and their own place within it.

Great changes in the modern economic mechanism have been caused by scientific and technical progress, the internationalization of economic life and the aggravation of global problems. The previous possibilities for extensive growth at the expense of involving new territories and resources in economic circulation are virtually exhausted. In the leading countries of the West, the conversion to a new type of development is being observed ever more clearly: more economical with regard to the material factors of production and more oriented toward the forced application of its creative elements: science, advanced technology, inventions, services. On the whole, this type of economic activity ensures higher labor productivity and sharply changes the correlation of forces in the economy. Correspondingly, new, serious changes are occurring in the characteristics of the contemporary market.

Differentiation of both demand, as well as supply of the majority of types of production and services in terms of their quality is increasing sharply. Substantially greater attention is being devoted to the specific consumer properties of output. Raising quality promises many advantages due to longer duration and reliability, not to mention the savings of raw material, fuel and other outlays. Whereas previously the main stress was placed on reducing expenses, even at the price of a certain worsening in quality (large-scale standardized production was the clearest expression of this trend), right now qualitative indicators are acquiring ever greater weight. A temporary increase in production costs is seen as a normal phenomenon in this regard.

As a result of the complication of the nature of production, quality itself (especially of complex technical goods, software, etc.) is extremely difficult to subject to external control and increasingly depends on the skill, conscientiousness and responsibility of the producer, on the human factor. At the same time, not only in the services sphere, but also directly in industry the number of producers who go to the market not with a prepared product for some unknown buyer, but with their own ability to qualitatively fulfill an order, to provide a product or service efficiently in accordance with the

specifications given by a specific consumer, is growing quickly. The significance of a company's reputation, the responsibility of the producer, and his ability to ensure production flexibility and maneuverability is growing.

With the increase in the social division of labor and specialization of economic units, the question of the forms and methods for their most rational connection becomes ever sharper. The stability of ties, dictated by production and technological changes, ever more often force us to deviate from traditional market forms of contacts (with their instability and unpredictability) and to find new types of interrelations, more fully meeting contemporary requirements. Under these conditions (especially in the production of means of production) various types of cooperative, contract, subcontract and other forms of interrelations are becoming ever more widespread. Even in the production of consumer items, marketing, analysis of consumer demand, and other innovations are changing the traditional spontaneous nature of the market.

The most important element of the contemporary economic mechanism in the West is the economic activity of the state. The specific orientation and scale of state regulation are determined in each country in the course of a complex ideological, political and class struggle. However, the scales of this influence are great everywhere. The state has at its disposal a significant arsenal of means for regulating the socioeconomic processes, including administrative as well as purely economic measures. For instance, it is indicative that in the FRG, famed for its adherence to free market principles, specialists have counted several thousand channels—subsidies, tax privileges, state orders, etc.—through which the state influences the activity of enterprises.

On the whole, one can say that at present the first-priority task of state regulation is not the expansion of the mass market for large-series standardized production, but a forced, comprehensive rationalization of the industrial apparatus, an increase in competitiveness and efficiency. The state surrenders many functions related to forming the economic structure to private enterprises and the market mechanism. "Budget-intensive" methods of state interference are used less broadly, but to make up for this, also more purposefully. The functions of the state in improving conditions for the development of industry are growing and changing form. Great stress is placed on the state protection of qualitative parameters for the society's activity: ensuring the observance of contract obligations, raising responsibility for the conformity of quality of output to declared characteristics, and setting stricter norms (standards) for protecting the surrounding environment or for product safety, for the health of the population. The range of actions to strengthen the world economic positions of various countries is expanding.

Maximum flexibility and maneuverability are required of economic mechanisms under conditions of tempestuous scientific and technical progress. The entire decision-making process both at the level of big corporations, as well as in the development of state economic policy, is being seriously reviewed. Ever less attention is devoted to drawing up detailed long-term plans and programs. To make up for this, special significance is given to the early exposure of imminent problems and difficulties and to the maximally rapid correction of decisions. The information and analytical base for state economic and social policy is being reinforced; a comprehensive analysis of possible consequences taking into account the positions of all interested parties precedes the application of one or another measure. On the whole, concerning state regulation, one can say that the "surgeon's scalpel" is ever more often replaced by the "skilled injection." Against this background, our customary antediluvian command-administrative methods (of the "allow" or "prohibit" type) seem hopelessly obsolete.

It seems, the changes in the structure of contemporary economic regulation in Western countries are leading to the fact that the element of spontaneity has noticeably decreased and the factor of conscious influence on economic processes is growing. Each entrepreneur in his decisions today relies not only on spontaneous prices and other market signals, but also on the abundant flow of comprehensive information of an extra-market nature, on the services of a widespread, highly skilled apparatus of various consulting companies and institutions, which enables him not only to assess the situation that is taking shape and the market prospects in a new way, but also to transform its structure. State regulation also has a noticeable influence on the decisions which are made, substantially modifying the nature of activity of all economic units. Under these conditions, one can speak of a self-regulating market with one big stipulation—the entire course of economic development to an ever greater degree depends on the quality of economic analysis, reliability of the decision-making mechanism, and competence and skill of management at all levels.

The formation of a market in the Soviet Union is occurring under special, historically unprecedented conditions. For a long time, commodity-monetary relations and the forms of ownership corresponding to them were rejected in principle, and even now are somewhat denied. Moreover, the enormous size of the country, as well as the policy of economic autarchy which was implemented for decades, meant that the national economy for more than half a century was almost completely isolated from the pulse of the world market. All this predetermined the low economic efficiency of the economic structures that were formed, their technical backwardness, and the presence of numerous disproportions. At the same time, a high level of social division of labor and the complete dependency of all economic life on interconnections among a number of high specialized enterprises were characteristic of the

USSR economy. However, these connections to this day are mainly mediated not by a market but, essentially, by administrative commands.

We should point out yet another specific feature of our country. The formation of nationwide markets in other states began with significant sectors of a subsistence or semi-subsistence economy. This not only meant that a definite part of the population could independently support itself and that transformations in industry were supplemented by a gradual transformation of agriculture (be it according to the "American," "Prussian" or other path). In the first stages of the formation of a market in capitalist countries, the presence of subsistence and semi-subsistence agriculture served as a buffer, easing the many contradictions of this process: the unemployed could for a while return to their relatives in the countryside, shortages of commodity foodstuffs could partially be compensated for by the semi-subsistence sector, etc. In our country, this "social amortizer" was destroyed by all the previous developments.

Finally, let us emphasize that it is a question of establishing a large-scale (in terms of territory, population, etc.) market with enormous intervals in the levels of economic development, in labor productivity, in economic, technical and labor potential, in distribution of incomes, and in other indicators. All this sharply complicates the problems facing our society.

As world experience shows, given the current level of production forces, the market and economic mechanism may constructively function only within the integral context of well-considered and reciprocally coordinated juridical standards, competent and efficacious state regulation, and a definite status of social consciousness, morality, culture and ideology. The formation of a market and modern economic mechanism under our conditions requires the most rapid possible creation of this entire context. Uncoordinated measures may lead to unexpected and undesirable results. Moreover, the absence of any one of the necessary elements could easily entail serious consequences.

Our country is undergoing a stage of tempestuous legislation. This unquestionably is necessary and important, since no market whatsoever or economic mechanism can exist without a legal foundation. However, it is necessary to realize the limits of the effectiveness of legislative activity. It would be extremely naive to assume that decisions made in the legislative bodies and reflecting one or another correlation of sociopolitical forces will always conform to the economically most rational approaches. Moreover, one must constantly encounter examples of failure to fulfill quite clearly formulated norms; what else can be expected from compromised, intentionally vague formulations?

Yet, mainly, many of the problems facing us do not lend themselves to purely juridical solutions. Given the high concentration and specialization of industry existing in the country, it is impossible to break the diktat of the

producer through anti-monopoly laws alone; serious transformations are needed in the production and organizational-administrative structures. New accents are needed in economic, legislative, ideological and political work. To this day, the supporters of the new economic mechanism have directed their basic efforts at proving its advantages and clearing the way for new forms of economic management. This activity has encountered and encounters not only consistent resistance from the command-administrative system, but also passive resistance from a large part of the population. In this regard, some are motivated by deep-rooted social parasitism, by a lack of desire to change a customary way of life, and by simplified ideological stereotypes and cliches. Others proceed from entirely explainable fears concerning the possible negative consequences of a market: growth of inflation, unemployment, bankruptcy. Such a situation conceals a serious threat of twisted deformation of the market, a growth of uncertainty and the corresponding restraint of long-term capital investments in industry (without which it is impossible to overcome the commodity deficit and growth of prices), and the concentration of entrepreneurial activity in quick-return, high-profit, speculative operations.

Under this circumstance, along with serious efforts to overcome former one-sided negative concepts about the market and to show its potential possibilities, it is extremely important to develop, with the broad participation of society, a serious and objective discussion of all possible consequences of introducing the market mechanism and to develop a detailed and convincing concept for overcoming them on the principles of social justice. In conversion to the new economic mechanism, active social policy cannot be limited by allocations for housing construction, health care, education, support of pensioners and the poor; perhaps, its central task should be the socially fair distribution of the burdens of leaving the current crisis and converting to a new economic mechanism. This requires a careful and open assessment of the scales of developing economic processes and their expected influence on one or another social strata. In addition, it is necessary to more decisively resort to specific steps, capable even in the early stages of lessening the consequences of the functioning of the market. This is the creation of possibilities for alternative employment (individual farms, cooperatives, contract relations, leasing). This is also the review of economic priorities, presuming the large redistribution of investments in favor of sectors which produce consumer goods (including within the framework of converting the defense industry). Finally, this is the improvement of state finances.

An important element in preparing socially acceptable conditions for the formation of a new economic mechanism should be the restoration of the population's trust in the economic activity of the government, the citizens' certainty based on their own experience that the new economic mechanism takes their interests into account. Without this, an unstable market, giving rise to doubts in

the future, inevitably will not strengthen, but deform the economic development of the country; it cannot be a basis for substantial expansion of long-term capital investments and of industry.

The question of limits on the action of the market is extremely topical. In Western countries, it was long ago realized that, like a plasma, it concentrates tremendous energy (both creative, as well as destructive), which, if not restrained in definite limits, could destroy spheres vitally important to society. It is no accident that the financing of basic science, culture, and education there is implemented by special funds and associations, not pursuing the goal of extracting profits. The problem of limits to commercial market activity is too serious in order to define it in just one glance. We need a well-considered and detailed demarcation of the sectors, financed out of the budget (with its inherent social dependency in both the good and the bad sense), as well as those where market laws and commercial risk rule (with their stresses, bankruptcies and elevated incomes). Moreover, this enables people with different lifestyles and psychological make-up to more easily find their place in our society.

Conversion to the new economic mechanism, as world experience once again indicates, cannot be equal in all spheres of the economy. Apparently, it should occur most rapidly in agriculture, construction and trade. In industry this process will inevitably take a long time and require several stages and serious transformations of production and organizational-administrative structures. At the present time, they have an inherent state and departmental, sectorial nature. Historically, this was justified at the time when the new sectors were established, but today it no longer conforms the nature of the most important production and technological relations. Attempts to create alternative structures are running into the most active resistance of the command-administrative system, unprepared to undergo serious transformations. With an absence of clarity in regard to future structures (and of a firm will to convert to them), perestroika is being implemented predominantly by way of granting random, uncoordinated privileges to one or another form of economic management, while preserving unjustified, arbitrary restrictions on other aspects of their activity. Attempts to burst out of the suffocating embraces of the departmental system are giving rise to a number of new organizational-administrative formations, the profitability of which comes not so much from their internal rationality, as from the irrationality of the entire surrounding situation. While attracting (let us emphasize this, predominantly on a casual-random basis) significant material, financial and labor resources, these new structures "procure" separate, small production "links" which had functioned previously. The collapse of old structures is ever more obviously outdistancing the establishment of new ones. Under these conditions, the only way out of the situation that has been created lies in the most rapid real (and not only legislative) equalization of conditions for taxation,

wages, material and technical supply (while it continues to exist) and all other most important parameters in the activity of enterprises, regardless of the form of ownership.

For a long time, it was thought that the most important condition for ensuring social justice was the elimination of private and assertion of public ownership, which, as a rule, was identified with state ownership. Such an approach appeared quite legitimately in an era when the private owner could dispose of his property virtually uncontrolled, and the ruling economic mechanism was a spontaneous market. More than 70 years of experience in our country, however, has graphically shown that state ownership does not ensure automatically either material well-being or social equality. A conclusion unwittingly suggests itself: ownership, although an important component part of any economic mechanism, in and of itself is incapable of predetermining all aspects of social life. Moreover, the long monopoly rule of one type of ownership may have serious negative consequences for a society; uncontrolled state enterprises or departments may inflict far more harm on it and create greater social injustice, than any democratically regulated private enterprise or market. The condition of the surrounding environment in the USSR, of the social protection of the population, not to mention the degree of satisfaction of consumer demand, convincingly attest to this.

The most rapid establishment of a high-quality information and analytical base has tremendous significance for establishing market relations in our society. Glasnost, broad access to statistical and economic information and a well-developed network for socioeconomic analysis are becoming mandatory conditions for the success of economic restructuring. Today, many indicators are concealed or, even worse, simply lacking, without which the functioning of a market economy is in principle impossible. This relates primarily to monetary circulation, to the volumes and forms of credit, and to the scales of the shadow economy.

A simplified interpretation of the market is fraught with dangerous delusions. Among philistines, as a rule, it creates an image somewhere between an Eastern bazaar and a railway station market. For some scientists and public leaders, there is the temptation of easy, "Lysenkoist" solutions—grant freedom of action to the producers, remove restrictions from trade and economic activity and, they say, everything will solve itself and be self-regulating. Today, a somewhat more complex task faces us, and the government program of gradual conversion to a regulated market economy is aimed at this. It is necessary to assist in the formation of the market and in developing new forms of economic activity.

For this (along with the above-mentioned changes in the forms of ownership and in production relations), we still need to lay the foundations for private economic law, to draft guarantees of the fulfillment of economic obligations, to create an active banking and credit system, to form competent state services for tax, labor, ecological

and other control, to balance the budget, to restrict emission, and to work out a system of measures for social protection. Mainly, we must re-orient the entire socioeconomic activity of the state from fulfilling plans and the maximum filling of the treasury, to the task of comprehensive stimulation of economic activity of all links of the economy.

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The Economy of Disarmament Is a Hard Business

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[Text] People here are no longer simply arguing about conversion, they are joking about it, although with a hint of bitterness. For instance, do Soviet televisions explode for peaceful purposes or for purposes of perfecting military equipment? This is not at all funny, if you take into account that all televisions, and along with them video recorders, almost all radio devices, refrigerators, washing machines and many other things, so needed by the broad user, are being produced by the defense enterprises. This can be assessed as the creativity of "defense workers," which under our specific conditions bears not so much the burden of defense-industrial concerns, but also the brunt of society's growing civil needs. Possibly, as evidence of the deformation of the economic structure, the main property of which was total monopolization of production of large groups of science-intensive goods with all that that entails to classical monopoly (poor quality, chronic shortages, high prices, diktat of the producer).

Our domestic variant of this monopoly adds to this an unjustified (in the case of civil industry, secrecy, absence of parliamentary and generally of any extra-departmental control whatsoever over this sphere of activity, and original "second-class nature" of civil production in competition with military. So it was in the "pre-conversion" epoch. What has changed today, when the conversion of military production has begun to really lay claim to the role of an economic component of disarmament and even of one of the most important instruments of perestroika of the entire economic system?

The Magic of "Big" Figures and Reality

The idea of the necessity of a large-scale conversion was born out of a realization of the excessiveness and irrationality of military preparations of the previous level under conditions of "diminishing" militarization and change in the role of the armed forces in policy and in ensuring reliable security. Military industry is sufficient only for the reasonable needs of defense, and nothing

more. All the rest, no matter how [sad, regrettable] the forces and resources expanded in the long dragged-out epoch of the "cold war" was, is subject to conversion, i.e., to consistent transfer of resources, production capacities and people from the military into the civil sphere. Throughout the world, people interpret conversion thus, justifiably counting on peaceful dividends of disarmament. We have also interpreted it thus, having enthusiastically undertaken to count the emancipated resources and redistribute them in favor of the most acute social and economic needs of society.

However, this has not happened. Freedom from part of the burden of military rivalry has not become a Klondyke, from which it would be possible to extract money and resources for solving the country's financial problems, for saturating the consumer market and implementing the long-awaited scientific and technical breakthrough. One of the reasons is the highly modest sizes of the proposed reductions. "The reasonable and sufficient" level of military industry was defined at 80.5 percent of the [little known to anyone] volume of production of armaments and military equipment in 1988. One would hope that a careful assessment of the real security threat, course and prospects for talks on restricting and reducing arms preceded this, and that military doctrine was brought into accordance precisely with these assessments and with the possibilities of an exhausted economy for satisfying reasonable military needs. One would also hope that the amounts of "sufficiency" for defense industry, proposed to us, were oriented toward convincing calculations of alternative variants, coordinated with different scenarios for the development of the world political situation and the dynamics of economic growth.

The study of even the scant information which is accessible to public attention indicates: rumors of a "collapse" of the defense industry and science as a result of conversion are strong exaggerated. If such a danger even exists, it is only due to the sorry state of the entire economy, from the problems of which not even the defense sector can entirely fence itself off. The nearly 20 percent reduction in production here turns into an annual reduction in the level of purchases of arms and military equipment by no more than 1.5-1.6 billion rubles (allocations on this item of the military budget of 31 billion rubles were planned for 1990, which is lower than the level for the previous year by 4.8 percent, or 1.577 billion rubles).

I would very much like to write that this 1.5 billion is being freed from the defense complex and will be used in civil sectors. However, let us be cautious: it is more correct to believe that this money is not being spent on military needs and may be included in the category of "preventative outlays," since in our "surprising" economy, which has for a long time disdained the laws of commodity production, money ceased to be a universal equivalent, and that is why it cannot be directly transferred from the military budget for the needs, for instance, of health care or education. Only material

resources have real value, a part of which, we would hope, in the current year will not fall into the "black hole" of military industry and will remain in the economy in the form of unexpended metal, energy, and man hours amounting to 1.5 billion rubles. It is clear that they do not make the weather and can in no way be an economic foundation for the development of the reform. It is too bad, since history rarely grants such great chances for a significant maneuvering of resources and for establishing a long-awaited priority of civil production and civil needs in the economy.

The second circumstance, stipulating the low economic effectiveness of the measures undertaken in the area of disarmament, is related to our eternal wastefulness, our inability to successfully put the existing economic mechanism in order using the granted possibilities for switching resources and to effectively manage this process. Apparently, for a long time we will have to pay for the uncommon carelessness and primitively simplistic approach to conversion in the initial stage of its implementation, which has already turned into great losses for enterprises and, in the final account, for all society.

Among the dangerous myths which accompany utopian dreams of an economic miracle on the basis of swapping swords for plows, one of the most persistent has turned out to be the concept that the socialist difficulties in conversion are incomparably easier than capitalist: we need only plan civil state orders instead of military, and the whole problem will be solved. Having convinced both ourselves and the world community, troubled by the possible negative consequences of disarmament, that "for socialist countries conversion is no problem (i.e., the possibility of the appearance of any difficulties whatsoever in converting military sectors to civil production is ruled out)"¹, today we have turned out to be under a heavy double burden of concerns related to the practical steps in this direction. These are both the objective difficulties of a complex structural perestroika of the economy under conditions of a profound economic crisis, as well as the "specific" obstacles caused by incompetent management, low production and economic culture, ill-considered decisions and, finally, the high level of inertia in the defense sector.

It is common knowledge that any large structural shifts are most painful under conditions of dynamic growth of the economy. Alas, we should never expect a turn from a decline to stable growth for implementation of conversion, and the prospect itself of such development is questionable without radical demilitarization of our economy. Thus, conversion is becoming part of the overall problem of economic reform and shares with it all the difficulties of a structural break.

It is commonly thought that the military industry in the USSR is the most developed and organized part of the economy. Possibly, this also applies in regard to the technical level and the equality of labor resources employed in it. However, as far as the economic aspect

of organization of the military industrial sphere is concerned, it is more correct to speak of backwardness, which displays itself in the low efficiency of production, wastefulness, lack of development of advanced economic organizational forms, i.e., in everything that is a legacy of the administrative-command economy, of which the defense sectors have become an extreme manifestation. That is also why the re-orientation of small-series, often unique production with highly specialized equipment from the military to the mass civil consumer is occurring with such difficulty. This new consumer is interested in the minimization of costs, energy- and resource-conservation, and in the assiduous accounting of costs, gains, and profit, about which the defense sectors until recently had virtually no concern.

What Is Happening?

Even a fleeting list of the inevitable difficulties of conversion is sufficient to realize: this is a very complex problem, regardless of which country must solve it. Success is possible only in event of well-timed planning, sensible organization, detailed and multi-variant economic calculations in each specific case, since there are no universal answers for all sectors included in the defense complex. However, we have decided to implement conversion using the method of a cavalier attack. Only a month before its start, we have announced to a number of defense enterprises the reduction of military orders and a corresponding cultivation of plan assignments for the production of civil equipment.

The [nomenclature] of the latter was also determined by someone's domineering will, being guided by [more than?] a strange extra-economic logic, unsupported either by forecasting calculations, or by a real assessment of the possibilities and needs, or even simply by common sense. Really, conversion is accompanied by a sufficient quantity of objective difficulties, that we must supplement them by creating artificial ones? It is impossible to justify thrusting technically and technologically incompatible production on enterprises, the establishment of production which "ate" more than 7 billion rubles of state budget funds in only 2 years and inevitably just as much of the enterprise's own resources, through any extraordinary nature whatsoever of the situation.

Will the groans of leaders of defense enterprises, already accused of [gruppovshchina], "egotistically" dreaming of creating not machines for the production of macaroni at an aviation enterprise, but civil airplanes and helicopters, and at the opto-mechanical plant—not "a ???-machine with an optical sight," but film, photo, video and copying equipment? The optimum choice of the so-called alternative production throughout the world is considered the main task and basic difficulty of conversion, since there are very few variants of technologically compatible and economically profitable nonmilitary production. Of course, in individual cases it is also advantageous to produce non-profile production, especially if the [waste products] of basic production go into it or if the state stimulates the production of priority

goods for society through taxes, credits, amortization privileges and other economic levers. However, this should be the exception, rather than the rule, since otherwise the goals of rapid saturation of the market will not be achieved. Moreover, the scientific and technical and production base for civil science-intensive production, toward raising the level of which conversion basically should be oriented, will be destroyed.

The method for determining the depth of conversion—the amounts of reductions of military output at the enterprises participating in it (according to official data, there are about 400 of them, not counting 100 outside the defense complex which produce output for the army), also evokes doubt. Only an insignificant share of them are converting entirely to civil tracks and have an opportunity to change the entire production program, to resolve the destiny of basic inventories (re-profiling, sale, liquidation and purchase of new inventory), to seriously re-train workers and, mainly, leaders of enterprises. For the rest, the reduction of military orders was carried out according to the principle of "[all sisters for the ?ear-rings]." Yet, what does a 90 percent reduction of the previous defense output and, essentially, a freezing of the remaining 10 mean for the plant? For them the plan for consumer goods—cheaper, more labor-intensive and not really so easy to perform—is an additional headache, since it is not supported either by the freeing of production capacities, or by material resources, or by knowledge of the central market or the possibilities of potential purchasers of the new non-military product to finance its development and production. It is impossible to call this process conversion, since its main condition—the freeing of resources from the military sphere and their use for civil industry—is not observed. Therefore, the resistance of enterprises to such "conversion," which for the time being will lead to profit losses and to complex social consequences, is not surprising.

Yet another "extenuating" circumstance: it was long ago noted that large reforms in Russia are implemented basically by their opponents, which in many ways determines the destiny of the planned transformations. Alas, this tradition is preserved even today. Goskomtsen is composing the reform of prices, Gosplan is restructuring planning, and the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission on Military and Industrial Matters and the Gosplan Defense Department are carrying out the dismantling of the defense industry. Yet, these are precisely those organizations, primarily concerned about providing the army with arms and military equipment and which has become accustomed to producing weapons "in case there is a war" with the entire world surrounding us. Studies and "independent" expert analysis of the decisions in conversion should be carried out by the Central Scientific Research Institute for the Economy and Conversion of Military Industries, once again created under a military-industrial commission. Parliamentary control is planned to be implemented by the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Matters of Defense and State Security, made up of seven members of the military, 19

representatives of the military industry, two workers of the Committee for State Security and five obkom secretaries. They are probably all good people, but for them destroying part of the military machine is equivalent to a knife at the heart, even if this over-loaded machine has led our national economy into a quagmire of economic crisis. Obviously, it is hard for the military-industrial complex, in a conflict of state, departmental, entrepreneurial and nationwide interests, which accompany conversions, to consistently hold to the side of the latter. Moreover, the organizations managing the defense industry, even without conversion, have many concerns under conditions of conversion of military industry to cost-accounting (true, it is not well understood what this means: a market, real prices, competitive contracts or simply a fashionable slogan?). The prospects for conversion to the new principles of military construction are raising demands for quality and reliability of equipment, the search for less expensive and more effective defensive means. How is one to think about the quality of televisions and making them less expensive, and how is one to undertake competitive struggle with civil science-intensive industry if, of course, such is found beyond the limits of the defense complex.

So, conversion is not simple. A statistical report on the economic results of 1989 impartially attests: the state-wide program for development of machine building is not being fulfilled. The ministries of the aviation, defense, and radio and communications industries has not coped with the plans to produce televisions, refrigerators, radio devices, tape recorders, sewing and washing machines, vacuum cleaners and bicycles. An absolute decline in the volumes of output of production has occurred in certain commodity groups, included in the zone of responsibility of the defense complex. The program for the production of technological equipment for the APK has not been implemented, and neither the quality, nor the fantastic prices of the new equipment are satisfactory. Of the 585 types of new equipment entrusted to the defense sectors (in a 2-year time period) only 23 have been mastered in the 9 months of 1989.

Against this background, the bold and extraordinarily optimistic promises to double the overall volume of civil production in the defense industry by 1995 as compared to pre-conversion 1988, bringing it to 110 billion rubles, are surprising at the least. Judging by the official statistics, this exceeds the annual purchases of arms and military equipment, which usually corresponds to the volume of military production, by a factor of more than three. How can conversion be a transfer of resources from the defense sector, and at whose expense will these volumes be developed?

The State Program in Departmental Captivity

There is no number in our history for multi-sectorial, comprehensive, promising and other state programs for development and growth. In practice, they all died in the cradle, regardless of innumerable (and sometimes highly sensible) corrections and weakening in favor of

decreasing ambitions and coming closer to real life. I fear, the recently drafted State Program for Converting the Defense Industry will also share their fate. Its authors claim that the "program is enrolled in the overall global concept of the structural rebuilding of the Soviet economy," and that "a planned economy is sufficiently well-suited to such processes" (referring to the centralized regulation of the course of conversion), and financial sources for investment outlays for the conversion will be "a reduction in the construction of military projects, as well as conservation of a large number of prestigious capital-intensive building sites." In such a case, the cost of the previously planned military projects (construction of 300 of them is being conserved) and of prestige (?) construction sites is terrible for our global structural rebuilding and simply [is striking, defeats], since the program requires enormous outlays: 41.5 billion rubles of state capital investments for the re-profiling and new construction; 40.5 billion rubles of state budget allocations for scientific research and development work, as well as significant hard currency resources.

Study of the program shows that there are two processes within it, often not depending on each other: strictly conversion along with re-profiling of production by the transfer of technologies and materials, by economic and social measures to adapt the military economy to peaceful activity, and an extensive program for development the production of consumer goods and other civil production within the framework of the defense complex. Conversion is spoken of modestly: really, the volumes of the reductions are not great, the restructuring of production requires outlays, the economic efficiency of conversion is also lower than expected, and it will not appear immediately, but after the mastery of new production for the mass market.

Here, it is worth dwelling in more detail on the second process. Large investment injections into "defense" for purposes of cultivating the production of consumer goods is an ages-old practice of our economic management. It is as though no one has revoked the so-called Comprehensive Program for Development of Consumer Goods and the Service Sphere, planned for 1986-2000, which even without conversion proposed significant capital investments in the military sectors and the development of the production of televisions, refrigerators, tape recorders, and so forth. The fate of the previous program is still unknown, but a new one has arrived to replace it today, promising additional money and resources and a commodity abundance in the future.

In previous years, few would have noticed the cunning planning: well, one thinks, it is yet another unfulfilled "state-wide, comprehensive, intersectorial program." However, this is the point, the unsuccessful maneuvering of resources within the framework of a State Program for Conversion of the Defense Industry may doom to failure the entire economic reform and discredit the idea of an effective disarmament economy. There are serious grounds for this fear. The main one is the obvious

contradiction of the principles and concept of the suggested program to the philosophy of converting to market relations and to the needs of the economy's profound structural rebuilding. It would still be possible to understand, if only the production of arms and military equipment with its strict centralization and special [regime of control]², and only then, when we had received convincing proof that industry will not exceed the framework of a reasonable and acceptable level under our conditions.

However, the program is aimed at preserving the abnormal situation in which virtually all, essentially, civic science-intensive production is concentrated and continues to be developed within the framework of the defense complex. What kind of dismantling of the administrative-command system can it be a question of, if a significant share of civil economy will as before be subordinate to obsolete systems of centralized planning, to sectorial ??? for the distribution of capital investments and the system for the funding of resources? How will an anti-monopoly program be implemented, if the share of monopoly industry in our machine-building complex reaches 80 percent in terms of production volume and 77 percent—in terms of the number of enterprises?

Special hopes were placed on conversion, and not only due to the freed material and intellectual resources. We counted, and quite justifiably, on the fact that demonopolization of advanced sectors of industry, and essentially the creation of a number of civil science-intensive industries anew outside of the defense complex on the basis of free technological exchange with military industry will become a positive impetus for profound structural perestroika. The part of military production being converted, aimed at civil consumption, will be a fertile field for the growth and development of new organizational and economic market forms.

The program cancels out these hopes, leaving the "market" and "structural perestroika" only for light and the food industries. Moreover, large goal-oriented investments, oriented in the direction, opposite to the logic of the basic concept of economic and industrial policy, inevitably will entail new structural deformations. Obviously, without violating the super-monopoly of the military-industrial complex in the distribution of scarce resources, in possession of advanced technologies and scientific and technical achievements, as well as in the production of the most high-priority civil science-intensive goods for society, the introduction of market relations may become [the next, a regular] socio-economic utopia.

From Foreign Experience

The temptation is great to give a rapid prescription, proceeding from world practice in large structural shifts and experience in implementing specific projects for converting military industry. The more so, since recent years have been exceptionally lavish in various publications on this problem. There are no doubts that we must

carefully study this experience, if we intend to live according to the laws of a regulated market economy. It is also understandable that conversion of the defense industry of countries with a developed military economy inevitably acquires certain universal features, especially if we consider that in many countries military business operates according to the principles not so much of market, as of administrative economic management. Nonetheless, let us restrain ourselves from direct analogies and burrowings, since a too diverse production and economic culture lies at the foundation of making decisions on a problem such as conversion. The main thing, perhaps, is the fact that in not one developed country of the world do the reduction in the level of military preparations and a transfer of resources into the civil economy play so significant and even dramatic a role in economic and political life, as here, since nowhere has an economy been subjected to such a lengthy and serious [violence] on the part of obviously exaggerated military needs and unskilled, arbitrary management. Therefore, not so much specific measures for adapting economies to the reduction of military expenditures, as the overall principle of conversion policy, proceeding more from common sense, rationality and long years of experience in assiduous management, will turn out to be more useful for us in foreign experience.

One of these principles is a warning against a superficial, simplified approach to the problem. Any structural break, one of the specific forms of which is conversion, is painful for the economy, requires additional expenditures and a definite amount of time in order for the new industry to begin to work efficiently. Foreign research and conversion shows that new non-military products can conquer the market and begin to bring a profit about almost 10 years after the start of conversion. We should determine its results and the measure of economic expediency in the mid- and long-term prospective. Yet, in the short-term—the [nonwasting] of money and resources on unproductive military consumption will be an unquestionable gain.

It is thought that the difficulties of conversion can be related, first, to the overall condition of the economy. Therefore, the more dynamically an economy is developing, the easier it adapts to a change of structure and of volume of state demand. State aid in conversion can, in this regard, be restricted to the passing of measures which contribute to the growth of business activity in the country, and to the inclusion of conversion in the overall logic and concept of the economic policy.

Second, the military market creates significant obstacles, and not only in the area of resistance of the military-industrial complex. As a rule, the laws of military business, even if predominantly private companies participate in it, diverge greatly from the principles of the commercial market. Privileges in the supply of raw materials and materials and in the use of the most highly skilled specialists, the compensation of any expenses, including unjustifiably inflated ones, the guaranteed sale of production and profit incommensurate as compared

to the efforts expended, a high level of monopolization and concentration of production—all this during conversion from military to civil production requires a break and tormenting adaptation to strict conditions of the commercial market. In connection with this, the reform of the military industry, being carried out in a number of Western countries, aimed at reducing the level of privileges, at a more extensive introduction of competitive contracts and the principle of forced prices for military production deserves attention. These measures not only raise the economic efficiency of military industry, but also bring closer together the conditions of the military and commercial markets, thus facilitating the adaptation of military production to civil needs.

The following useful principle concerns the establishment of interconnection between the sharpness of problems which accompany the implementation of conversion, and the degree of dependency of an individual company, sector or region on military orders. Companies, working entirely for the ministries of defense, and regions with a high concentration of military industry suffer most of all in conversion to civil production. The strategy for preparing for conversion, therefore, should include steps to diversify, i.e., a consistent increase in the share of civil production in the companies' production program and in the industrial structure of regions. They usually implement such diversification either through acquisition of new companies, having experience and a material base for working in the civil market, or through the implementation of NIOKR in non-military fields, which gives an opportunity to create a new product for the civil market. Today, the general contractors for the Pentagon are reacting precisely thus to possible prospects of a significant reduction in the level of military orders in connection with plans for substantial reductions in military expenditures (by 200 billion dollars over 5 years), as a result of which the share of military expenditures in the gross national product should comprise only 4 percent.

Western scientists justifiably complain about the low economic yield of military NIOKR, secrecy barriers, and the awkward and expensive system for organizing the military economy. Nonetheless, it is thought that our expectations, related to conversion, would be closer to practical implementation, if we would manage to borrow even the mechanism for limiting secrecy of military and technical development work and experience in the subsequent transfer of it into the civil sphere, the principle of "preventative conversion" in the field of MILITARY-PURPOSE NIOKR (management of a military program in a company mandatorily includes the implementation of commercial possibilities for the system being developed), the best aspects of organization of state orders for military production, and especially, methods of parliamentary control over military and military-economic activity.

When it is a question directly of conversion in Western countries, usually the question of determining the optimum correlation of market methods for managing

and regulating conversion and of state interference in this process, of centralized measures and decisions which should be made directly at the level of the companies and local bodies of power, usually takes the center of discussions. Opinions on this subject are most diverse, but the following seem the most well-considered. Indeed, the state should be responsible for the conduct of conversion, since it is "to blame" for the fact that the plank of military preparations was raised to such a high level. However, excessive interference of state management in the economic mechanism of conversion is intolerable, since in such a case initiative is destroyed, and the military-industrial companies once again receive undeserved privileges. The conduct of conversion, above all, on the basis of market activity with the coordinating role of state agencies, which supply timely information and implement [indicative] planning, measures for social protection, as well as overall encouragement of business activity in the country with the help of a flexible tax policy are considered optimal. The main link of activity in conversion is the company itself or the enterprise which implements the planning, study and preparation of the new market, the selection of an alternative product, organization of sale, etc.

What Next?

Unfortunately, there is no ready-made, quick and, what is very important, inexpensive prescription, and, judging by everything, there cannot be one. Meanwhile, we can only say for certain what must not be done: we should not pass the above-mentioned program, since this will lead only to a worsening of the situation. It is not worth thrusting technologically and economically worse production on enterprises, and if a better solution is not found for them, to simply eliminate an enterprise, which at least protects us from new losses. We should not develop "conversion," oriented toward the export of arms, otherwise a vicious circle is created: in selling arms to developing countries, we with our own hands are increasing the danger of confrontation, the result of which may be only a new [vitok] in the arms race and new military expenditures. It also does not do to develop a concept and practical recommendations on conversion, the more so to hold parliamentary debates on the problem, using scattered, contradictory information, more closely resembling conjectures than official state statistics. It is time to reject the orientation of conversion toward solving the financing and budget problems and the immediate tasks of saturating the consumer market. Mainly, we must not entrust the solution of such a complex and important national economic task to the leaders at a departmental level, since the gap between the new political, and now already economic thinking and the old approaches to solving military and military-economic problems continues to increase catastrophically.

I would very much like to see a rational conversion, wisely planned, conforming to the goals and methods of economic reform and to the tasks of the structural perestroika and demonopolization of the economy,

having really placed the engine of scientific and technical progress in the civil sector. The time is ripe to review the priorities of conversion, established without proper economic substantiation, nonetheless believing that the main thing in it is the creation virtually anew of high-technology, science-intensive civil production outside of the defense complex, the establishment of an equal partnership between military and civil sectors of the economy with the priority of the latter in the supply of raw materials, materials, in investment policy, and in the distribution of skilled labor resources.

It is very important that the industries being converted become a central link in the development of the new organizational and economic forms, for instance, in the form of independent daughter companies with an expanded market infrastructure resembling wholesale enterprises, commercial and intermediary centers, and commodity exchanges. Small forms of business and various methods for cooperating with existing civil enterprises are promising. We also need to create an effective mechanism for the transfer of the results of scientific and technical development work, implemented at the expense of state money, to civil production.

In other words, we need a different concept of conversion, based on a careful inventory of our military industry and comprehensive analysis of its profound economic ties right up to the [extracting?] sectors of the economy. For this, substantiated calculations, correction of the priority directions of conversion, and economic stimulation of the activity of completely independent enterprises of the defense complex are necessary. Otherwise, the chance to make the disarmament economy efficient and effective will be neglected. I do not even want to think about the political consequences of such a development of events.

Footnotes

1. KOMMUNIST No 9.

2. Reply of the Soviet government to the inquiry of the Secretary of the U.N. on the economic and social consequences of disarmament. U.N. Document E/3593/ Add. 1, 1962, p. 324.

3. Defense spheres have already gotten onto the 'black list' of those enterprises where leasing is not permitted, so that the very first and most modest of market mechanisms tried by the Military Industrial Complex turns out to be 'illegal.'

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CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

The Soviet-Albanian Conflict; The Way it Happened

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[Article by Leonid Reshetnikov, candidate of historical sciences, and Nina Smirnova, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] On 4 February 1924 the Albanian Parliament honored V.I. Lenin's memory as the defender of the lofty principles of humaneness and of Albanian interests. At that time the newspaper POLITIKA wrote: "Lenin broke the steel safes of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published and thus voided the secret treaties, one of which was the 1915 Treaty of London which, which had split Albania. Without Lenin, there would have been no force in the world to void this treaty. Therefore, the foundations of our state were laid as of that time by Lenin."

The first democratic government in the country's history, headed by Bishop Fan Noli, which came to power in June of that same year as a result of a revolutionary coup d'etat, dared officially to extend diplomatic recognition to the USSR but paid for this action. It was overthrown by the forces of domestic and foreign reaction.

In November 1927, the Congress of Friends of the Soviet Union, to which Fan Noli was invited, was held in Moscow. What the Albanian leader saw in the Soviet Union restored his confidence in the rightness of the cause for which he fought. Fan Noli became convinced that the way to solve social problems in Albania was by interpreting and applying the experience of the Land of the Soviets. His encounter with the new world provoked his enthusiasm: "I am enchanted by having personally seen the first worker-peasant state, which has a great future and which is the prototype of future similar worker-peasant republics."

In World War II, the Soviet and Albanian peoples fought in the same ranks of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. Albanian partisans and fighters of the People's Liberation Army assumed courageously and selflessly the entire burden of the struggle against the Italian and German occupation. It was precisely at that time that friendly relations were established and strengthened between the USSR and Albania, relations which remained until the end of the 1950s. Although no single Red Army soldier entered Albania, which freed itself from the occupation with its own forces, the clear understanding that without the defeat of fascism in the Eastern front the victory of the people on 29 November 1944 would have been impossible, existed then as it does today.

The first 15 postwar years in laying the foundations of socialism on Albanian soil were characterized by close

cooperation between the two countries. At that time it was not described as mutually profitable, nor could it be such. That small and economically weak state, located on the extreme Southwestern point of the socialist world, needed aid and such aid was provided by the Soviet Union. At the peak of the cold war and the sharp conflict with Yugoslavia, unhesitatingly Albania took the side of the USSR. This greatly worsened its foreign political situation. Having no air force and navy and refused UN membership, it could function in the international arena only through the intermediacy of the Soviet Union. Initially, even with CEMA countries, which accepted it as member of CEMA in February 1949, relations were maintained again through Soviet foreign economic agencies.

The USSR was also Albania's main economic partner. Despite the destructive war it had waged, it nonetheless provided from its own budget funds for the restoration and building of Albanian industrial enterprises and cultural projects, supplying the country with agricultural machinery, transportation facilities, mining equipment and seeds. Hundreds of Soviet specialists worked in the Albanian national economy and thousands of Albanians trained in our country. The documents of the Third APT [Albanian Labor Party], which took place in 1956, noted that "the inviolable friendship which links our people with the peoples of the Soviet Union, the love for and loyalty of the Albanian people to the Soviet people and the CPSU, to which we owe our life, freedom, independence and the building of socialism" are the sources of the country's historical gains.

The resolutions of the party forum reflected the actual picture of bilateral friendly relations which helped Albania to organize its national economy, strengthen its governmental system, develop culture and improve the well-being of the working people. Significant successes were achieved also in solving foreign policy problems. In the summer of 1959 the Soviet and Albanian governments launched an initiative which remains relevant to this day: turn the Balkan and Adriatic areas into zones free from nuclear and missile weapons.

No indication whatsoever existed that stormy clouds would appear on the Soviet-Albanian horizon. One year passed, however, and internal party differences became apparent. The following year they shifted to intergovernmental relations and, 6 months after that, came the break. How did this become possible? Why is it that in a period of 18 months to 2 years a building of friendship, the foundations of which had taken decades to lay, was destroyed?

There was nothing amazing or unnatural in the fact that on some political problems differences between the ruling parties of the two socialist countries showed up. They were based on the different forms of building socialism, and differences in traditions and national mentality. However, the problem was how to prevent differences and discord to lead to conflict situations and clashes. What to do so that, while developing equal and

mutually profitable cooperation, also to develop a mechanism for the coordination and taking disparate interests into account? Unfortunately, this did not take place in the practice of Soviet-Albanian relations.

Could the events of 1960-1961 have been prevented? Unquestionably, yes. The Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict, which exposed the total futility of the administrative-command style which had been established in our party and country under the conditions of the cult of Stalin's personality, taught a bitter lesson. N.S. Khrushchev, who headed the Soviet government delegation in May 1955, stated on his arrival in Yugoslavia: "We sincerely regret what took place and firmly sweep off all the accretions of that period." Nonetheless, the lessons of the conflict between the CPSU and the League of Yugoslav Communists were not studied in their entirety. Several years after taking the first daring step for conciliation with the Yugoslavs, Khrushchev applied heavy pressure on the Albanian leadership which disagreed with a number of aspects of the course charted by our party. The official Albanian interpretation of the break inserted in the statement of the Soviet leader the words: "We shall deal with you the way we dealt with Yugoslavia." We do not know whether this was a factual statement. However, the fact that Stalin's error was repeated, in a harsher way, is unquestionable.

It is usually considered that Soviet-Albanian interparty differences began as a result of the Albanian rejection of the criticism of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress. This is not entirely accurate. The accountability report of the Albanian Labor Party Central Committee submitted to the Third Congress showed complete approval of the line taken by the Soviet communists in eliminating the cult of Stalin's personality. It is true that the further development of this viewpoint did not occur and as time passed many of the pre-congress views were restored. Furthermore, at its Fifth Congress, the APT demanded, as one of the preliminary conditions for normalizing bilateral relations, the full and not the "equivocal rehabilitation of Stalin." Nonetheless, in our view this was not the main reason for the conflict between the two parties. Furthermore, practical experience indicated that the attitude toward this problem greatly varied in the individual countries (in Mongolia the question of removing monuments to Stalin was raised only last year). This had not prevented them from not only maintaining normal diplomatic relations with the USSR but also developing cooperation in all areas.

The differences between the Albanian Labor Party and the CPSU, triggered by their separate assessments of what was taking place in Yugoslavia and around it, were more substantial. Throughout the life of the two countries, Albanian-Yugoslav political relations had remained stressed because of the status of the Albanian ethnic minority in Yugoslavia. It was only in World War II, when common antifascist liberation objectives had bound the fighters for freedom with the ties of international solidarity and an awareness had developed of the commonality of tasks which were to be resolved in the

course of the people's revolutions, had there been a shift toward mutual understanding. Soon afterwards, however, differences concerning problems of economic cooperation, which became aggravated in 1947, support of K. Dzodze, member of the APT Central Committee Politburo, by the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party, as against E. Hoxha, the solidarity expressed by Tirana with the Soviet leadership in its conflict with Tito and agreement with the Informburo resolution concerning the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, led to a drastic worsening of Albanian-Yugoslav contacts. Nonetheless, neither side could even conceive of breaking relations in general. The sharp turn taken by Soviet-Yugoslav relations in 1955 was largely unexpected by the Albanians. There was, above all, a lack of understanding of the development of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which was considered by Albania as its ideological opposite. In the USSR as well the nature and reasons for Albanian-Yugoslav differences were not accurately understood.

On the basis of the concept which prevailed at that time regarding the leading role of the CPSU in the international labor and communist movements or, more accurately, the paternalistic approach to other parties, particularly small ones, N.S. Khrushchev and his circle began to "prompt" the Albanian leadership about to how to behave with Yugoslavia, what concessions to make, who to reaccept within the APT, who to rehabilitate, and who among the political refugees to be allowed to return to Albania. Taking into consideration the complexity and confusion of the situation, all of this could not fail to create a certain irritation in Albania and spoil the atmosphere of trust which characterized the bilateral interaction. Fears also appeared in connection with a possible direct Moscow intervention in solving personnel problems on the higher echelon of the Albanian political leadership. Added to all this were the periodically appearing difficulties in economic cooperation, and cases of neglecting Albanian interests by official Soviet personalities in considerations of problems of international policy. Initially, everything looked satisfactory on the surface, as confirmed by the visit which a Soviet party-governmental delegation paid to Tirana in the summer of 1959.

By the end of the 1950s differences appeared in the ranks of the international labor and communist movements. Having experienced the consequences of Moscow's arbitrary interpretation of the right of each party to have its own views, sovereignty and independence, the APT began to express its solidarity with the separate line pursued by the Chinese Communist Party, which, unlike the Soviet side, had demonstrated greater understanding of Albanian problems.

However, prior to the Bucharest Conference of Heads of Communist and Worker Parties of June 1960, who had attended the Third Congress of the Romanian Labor Party, the Albanians had not expressed their open disagreement with the positions held by their allies. In Bucharest, the APT delegation rejected the suggestion of

collective condemnation of the CPC. Available information leads to the conclusion that it was after that, that power methods used to influence Albania became predominant in the then policy pursued by Moscow. Not taking daring at that time openly to oppose the largest party of the Orient, N.S. Khrushchev decided to do this indirectly by "punishing" refractory Albania. Its request for additional grain sales, which the country urgently needed because of a poor harvest, was met with delays and not in full. Tirana was forced to turn for help to France. Albanian requests for Soviet tractors were not honored. These actions yielded negative results and resulted in open confrontation.

At the conference of the 81 communist and worker parties, which was held in Moscow in November 1960, E. Hoxha presented an expanded description of the views held by the APT on peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems, the forms of transition to socialism and the criticism of Stalin. The CPSU delegation and the majority of representatives of the other parties disagreed with these views. This independent Albanian opinion, different from the views of the other parties, and thus triggering ideological differences, was interpreted as a betrayal, as a step deserving harsh penalties. This was followed by Soviet annulment of already agreed upon loans for the Third 5-Year Plan (1961-1965), a demand for the prepayment of loans, recall of specialists working in the Albanian national economy, and loss by Albanian students of the right to continue their training in Soviet educational institutions.

Yielding to the pressure of the Khrushchev leadership, as early as the start of 1961 all socialist countries other than Hungary froze their credits previously granted to Albania and took the line of limiting economic cooperation.

Characteristically, these events remained virtually unmentioned by the mass information media of the USSR, Albania, the members of the socialist community and the West. In Albania information on differences with the Soviet Union was disseminated among the population essentially through the channels of internal party propaganda.

Unfriendly acts toward diplomatic and other representatives of the USSR in Tirana began to be noted for the first time in many years. In the first half of 1961 a tense situation developed in the Vlore Naval Base and aboard some submarines training joint Soviet-Albanian crews. The Soviet seamen were forced to operate in an atmosphere of suspicion, petty fault-findings and constant checks. The CPSU Central Committee went so far as to address them with a special letter asking them worthily to perform their official duties under the difficult situation which was developing. By May 1961 it was decided that retaining a naval base in Vlore was inexpedient, and on 4 June 1961 the ships under the command of Admiral V.A. Kasatonov left Albanian waters. Several hours prior

to this, the Soviet personnel in two mixed-crew submarines had been expelled. The submarines were incorporated in the Albanian Navy.

The closing down of the Vlore Base stressed the atmosphere in Soviet-Albanian relations to the breaking point. All efforts on both sides, in the course of meetings on different levels before and, particularly, after 4 June 1961 somehow to change the situation for the better, failed and some of them, above all those involving the participation of the former Soviet leader, aggravated the conflict even further. The question was not only one of his impulsiveness and lack of restraint. The very approach to conciliation proved erroneous. The efforts were focused not on the search for compromise but on determining which party was guiltier. The Soviet side tried to force the Albanians to acknowledge their errors while denying its own guilt. Unwittingly, in this connection we recall the words of that same N.S. Khrushchev, addressed to the Yugoslavs in 1955: "Let us not seek culprits but the possibility for normalizing relations."

In October 1961, at the 22nd CPSU Congress, the speeches of the delegates and guests from the Albanian Labor Party were sharply condemned in the accountability report. Attacks of a personal nature against individual Albanian personalities were permitted. The concluding speech by the CPSU Central Committee first secretary was so rude in the part concerning Albania that the most "emotional" expressions had to be deleted from the minutes.

While the congress was still meeting, the APT Central Committee had refuted the accusations raised against the party and the line of its leadership. On 7 November 1961, at a solemn session in Tirana, honoring the 20th anniversary of the founding of the APT and the 44th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, E. Hoxha dedicated more than one-half of his report to assessing N.S. Khrushchev's personality, blaming him for creating a cult of his own person and for his unjustified claim to the role of architect of the victory over fascism, conciliation with Yugoslav revisionism and display of anti-Marxist views in general.

The further development of the conflict shifted to the area of intergovernmental relations. On 25 November 1961 N. Firyubin, deputy minister of foreign affairs, made two verbal statements to the Albanian Charge d'Affaires in the USSR, G. Mazi. The first informed him that the Soviet ambassador would be recalled; the second was a demand to stop the dissemination of the 20 October APT Central Committee statement, Hoxha's 7 November report and other materials "which were full of lies and disgusting slanders of our party and the Soviet government and the resolutions of the 22nd CPSU Congress."

On 3 December N. Firyubin made another verbal statement to G. Mazi on the decision of the Soviet government to recall the entire personnel of the Soviet Embassy and Commercial Mission in Albania and demanded

"that the entire personnel of the Albanian Embassy and the trade counselor in Moscow to leave the territory of the Soviet Union." In a note to the Soviet embassy in Tirana, dated 4 December, the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its "deep puzzlement and regret" of the Albanian government concerning the recall of the Soviet ambassador and its "amazement and most profound indignation" on the matter of expelling the Albanian ambassador. The note contained a firm protest and the actions of the Soviet side were characterized as totally unfair, groundless and in a state of crying contradictions with the principles of international law.

It was not without pressure applied by the USSR that the majority of European socialist countries adopted restrictive measures toward Albania. It is true that not one of them broke relations, limiting themselves to lowering the level of diplomatic representation.

In its 10 December editorial, ZERI I POPULLIT, the APT Central Committee organ, entitled "Unparalleled Act in Relations Between Socialist Countries," condemned the pressure methods applied on Albania by N. Khrushchev personally since the time of the Bucharest Conference of June 1960. The failure of the attempt to impose its views on the APT leadership, the article stated, led him to take the path of revenge. He "extended ideological differences to the area of governmental relations and began to behave toward the Albanian People's Republic as toward a hostile country." This, the newspaper wrote, is taking place while "N. Khrushchev is preaching quite noisily a policy of rapprochement and cooperation with all countries, even the most reactionary ones, which are pursuing a consistently hostile policy against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Through his actions against Albania he is trying to prove to others what would happen to them should they display independence and disagreement."

Albanian delegations visited the USSR in 1961 for the Fifth International Congress of Trade Unions, and in 1963 for the World Women's Congress. For a while the embassy premises in Moscow and Tirana were staffed by three members each, from the technical personnel. Later, on Albanian initiative, even they were recalled. The total break in relations became a fait accompli.

Although Albania's participation in CEMA was interrupted as well, bilateral economic relations with the European socialist countries continued. After the forces of the Warsaw Pact were sent to Czechoslovakia, Albania announced its withdrawal from that organization as well.

A blank period of reciprocal alienation developed. In our propaganda, following a sharp and mostly unobjective criticism of the Albanian leadership for the "sins" committed by Mao Zedong, a period of ignoring anything good or bad taking place in Albania began. Albanian propaganda was conducted differently. Over a number of years the following explanation of the event was being instilled in the minds of the people: the Soviet Union

had organized the blockade of Albania which was thus forced to build socialism essentially relying on its own forces. The USSR had acted unfairly toward a socialist country in a revisionist-capitalist surrounding; it was doing this because itself it was degenerating into a bourgeois-revisionist state, and then into a social-imperialist one, and so on, and so forth. The history of Soviet-Albanian relations was interpreted no less one-sidedly: it was claimed that until 1956 the Soviet government had pursued an internationalist line of friendship and fraternal cooperation, followed by a hostile anti-Albanian line aimed at converting Albania into a raw material appendage to the USSR and the CEMA members or, in a word, a "Khrushchevian" line.

From accusing the CPSU of indecision and, allegedly, fear of imperialism, Albanian propaganda turned to accusing the USSR of conspiring with American imperialism. Quite understandably, this line led nowhere. On the Soviet side as well, in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, no constructive and effective steps were taken to unravel the complex tangle of the conflict (assuming that anything of the sort could have been possible at all during that period, when many of those who had created that tangle in 1961 were still part of the leaderships in the two countries).

The situation changed in the spring of 1985. At the very same time new leaders became heads of the ruling parties in Albania and the USSR. A revolutionary process of renovation began in our country. The dynamism of Soviet foreign policy and the search for radical solutions in international affairs provided the opportunity to take a different look at the past and to interpret it critically. The inadmissibility of extending ideological differences to international relations became obvious. It took 30 years to reach this conclusion.

Today with increasing persistence reality calls for correcting a situation, unnatural in contemporary foreign policy, lack of normal diplomatic relations with a European country which is part of the SBSE process, the developing cooperation in the Balkans and the maintaining of active relations with Eastern European states. The USSR and Albania could establish mutually profitable economic interaction, and restore all the traditions of cultural and scientific contacts. To this effect, however, the first step should be to put an end to the past bilateral and unilateral decisions and actions which conflict not only with the interests of the two nations but also the standards of civilized intercourse between countries.

The new encouraging trends which have been noted in recent Albanian foreign policy indicate the resolve of the APT leadership to join in the process of deideologizing international relations and abandoning some stereotypes. Starting with January 1990, statements began to appear in the statements by Albanian officials on the possible resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR. In his speech at the 10th APT Central Committee Plenum, on 17 April, Ramiz Alija, chairman of the

Presidium of the National Assembly of the Albanian People's Socialist Republic and APT Central Committee first secretary, unequivocally called for initiating a dialogue. The Soviet Union responded favorably to the Albanian initiative. E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed readiness for a restoration and development of friendly relations with Albania on the basis of total equality and respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, noninterference in reciprocal internal affairs and mutual benefit.

As we were completing the gathering of data for this article, we came across an unpublished letter by K. Simonov addressed in April 1979 to one of the authors of the documentary movie about G.K. Zhukov. The writer reported that he had found among the notes on his talks with military leaders an excerpt about Albania. This excerpt, Simonov wrote, may be found pertinent, for we cannot forever delete any mention of Albania from writings! Here is what Georgiy Konstantinovich wrote: "I loved the country, the people and its armed forces.... I felt myself among brothers, for although separated by thousands of kilometers, we together with the Albanians, fought for freedom, for a new life and for socialism."

For the time being, not only distance but also the barriers separating us are great. However, it is already within our power to lift them and to remove the obstacles which prevent the normalizing of Soviet-Albanian relations.

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Civilized Trade Is Mutually Profitable

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[Article by Leonid Tsedilin, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] A component part of economic reform in the East European CEMA countries, which have started along the path of radical renovation of society, is the opening up of national economies to the influence of the world market, the diversification of foreign economic ties. The overall features of these processes have been determined clearly enough. In literally all East European states, the main direction of internationalization of the economy is to intensify cooperation with the West. The forms and methods of economic relations within the framework of CEMA are being criticized everywhere, and sometimes even the expediency of its further existence is questioned.

However, something else could not have been anticipated. The foundation of present-day cooperation in CEMA was set, as everyone knows, in the postwar years, when the countries joining it (then still popular democracies), due to a number of reasons copied not only the political structures of Stalinism, but also its economic

"experiments," including the practice of industrialization and collectivization. Similar mechanisms for economic management and closed national economic complexes, as independent as possible from the world economy, were created in them. Since that time, the small East European countries, for instance, have begun to develop their own full-cycle metallurgical industry, although not one of them has an adequate raw material base for this.

The division of labor among our countries which began taking shape at that time also pushed toward autarchy and the copying of the structure of the Soviet economy. Unfortunately, economists, both analysts and practical economists, were at that time able to see only the advantages of the specific features of international division of labor of the new type: independence from the fluctuations of the world market, conformity to a plan, and mutual profitability. However, that which was called reciprocal trade within the framework of the international socialist division of labor, essentially, from the very start was nothing other than exchange in kind. The small CEMA countries were successful in exchanging "soft" goods (i.e., goods that are not competitive on world markets) for "soft," and "hard" (salable for hard, freely convertible currency)—for "hard." At the same time, exchange between the USSR and the European CEMA countries was carried out by to a different formula: "raw materials for machines," when, essentially, a "hard" commodity is exchanged for a "soft" one. The proportions of this exchange were determined, naturally, not by the law of cost, but at a ministerial level, and were approved by the signatures of higher leaders. All this took the form of coordination of plans—the very same plans which were compiled arbitrarily, often violating economic laws, using distorted and even simply foolish price proportions. As a result, the CEMA market was such only in name, just as the collective currency—the transferable ruble—functioned only as a unit for calculation.

The independence of reciprocal CEMA trade from the fluctuations of world market prices in reality turned into an orientation toward the costs of production of monopoly enterprises, especially for ready-made items. The planned nature of exchange, i.e., its regulation by way of coordinating direct plans, in practice led to a gap between supply and demand. Scarcity became one of the main characteristics of this trade. The CEMA market was formed in practice in all commodities as a market of the seller, who dictated his conditions to the buyer, which were almost always the inverse of the situation on the world market.

The mutual profitability of commodity exchange among the CEMA countries could only be postulated and proven theoretically, since it rarely found application in practice. This is, above all, because it is quite hard to compare the proportions of reciprocal trade within the framework of CEMA to the proportions of commodity exchange on the world market.

Along with the principles of regulated "economic management" in reciprocal exchange, elements of "big politics" were also present. Moreover, in many ways they also predetermined the structure and volumes of reciprocal deliveries. The USSR for a long time has not been giving direct aid to its European partners in CEMA. However, in the course of more than 40 years of existence of this organization, it has delivered to them mainly raw and semi-fabricated materials, which could be easily turned into freely convertible currency (SKV) on the world market. In exchange it received ready-made items, in all parameters inferior to those which could have been acquired for this hard currency, for instance, on Western markets.

Paradoxical though it may be, essentially, the economy of not one of the CEMA member-countries gained from these transactions. The unilateral bond to the Soviet Union at the expense of receiving large-scale orders from it was, in the final account, a disservice to the small CEMA countries. The deliveries of raw materials, somewhat less expensive than those sold on the world market, may also have contributed (temporarily) to strengthening political regimes, but led to a future reduction in competitiveness, above all, in the processing industry and, as a result, to a decline in the trade prestige of one country or another. A quasi-market, a politicized structure without a firm economic basis, was formed within the framework of CEMA.

Unfortunately, it has not managed to rid itself of this legacy to this day.

How substantiated are the above conclusions? Let us consider a number of typical problems with cooperation in CEMA, as well as the possible consequences of switching it to different tracks, following the example of economic relations between the USSR and the GDR as they were before the conclusion of a state treaty between the GDR and the FRG to create a currency, economic and social union.

Since the early 1960s, the GDR has confidently held first place in the USSR's foreign trade circulation. Since the time of the republic's formation, our country has always been its biggest trade partner. In 1988, commodity circulation between the USSR and the GDR comprised 14.2 billion rubles, i.e., more than 10 percent of the overall volume of USSR foreign trade and 37 percent of the trade volume of the GDR.

Let us note: the fact that the small CEMA countries act as our main counter-agents is as well-known as it is customary. In addition to this, we have not yet fully realized that in foreign trade we are heavily oriented toward countries, which hold far from the most advanced positions in terms of scientific and technical level, with a narrow domestic market, to a region which provides less than 5 percent of the world industrial output. This circumstance alone makes it possible to

question the fact that predominantly economic interests lay at the foundation of economic cooperation with these countries.

The commodity content of mutual trade between the USSR and GDR is a classic model of the so-called structural barrier, long ago formed in our commodity exchange with CEMA countries. Thus, the share of unprocessed raw materials in the exports of the USSR to the GDR comprises up to 80 percent, while the share of machines since the mid-1970s traditionally has not exceeded 17 percent. At the same time, the basis of export by the GDR to the USSR is made up of machines and equipment: as a rule, more than 65 percent of the cost volume of Soviet imports from the GDR is spent on them.

The main positions for export by the Soviet Union to the GDR were always mineral raw materials and fuel, as well as wood, cotton and metal. The GDR is the largest foreign consumer of Soviet raw materials and semi-fabricated goods. Among all the trade partners of the Soviet Union, the republic holds first place in terms of the volumes of import of petroleum, paper, rolled iron and pipe, and is second in terms of nonferrous ore, cast iron, lumber and cotton, and ranks third in terms of imported gas. The cost of export of petroleum, gas and rolled metal, taken together, is more than one-half of the cost of all USSR exports to the GDR.

In themselves, the volumes of raw material deliveries gives grounds for examining at least three questions. First, is the domestic economy of a small East European country in a condition to consume all the raw materials coming from the USSR? Second, is the import of raw materials on such inspired scales stimulated by its relative accessibility and cheapness? Third, does the extraordinary energy- and material-intensiveness, encouraged by the less expensive nature of imported raw materials, act in favor of the economy of the consumer country?

In principle, the last of these questions is clear: excessive weight has never been useful for any organism whatsoever (or the economy, of course, of a living organism). It is hard to answer the first and second questions simply, due both to the shortage of open data, as well as to the complexity and contradictory nature of the object of research itself: the economic ties which took shape historically within the framework of CEMA. However, some phenomena and tendencies can be taken as a basis for analysis, as a result of which it is possible to come close to revealing the essence of the problem.

Thus, we should note that the USSR annually delivers a quantity of petroleum to the small CEMA countries which simply cannot be completely consumed within these countries. For instance, export to the GDR comprises more than 19 million tons of petroleum (including 17.1 million tons according to long-term agreement), but this is more than 1.2 tons per GDR citizen. (For comparison: in the USSR, after deliveries to the foreign market, 1.5 tons of petroleum per capita remains.)

Calculations based on existing data on the energy balance of the GDR enable us to conclude that in this very same country, only 11 million tons of petroleum are consumed. The majority of the petroleum products, obtained from the remaining part of petroleum received from the USSR, is exported to the developed capitalist countries. (During a favorable market period, up to 40 percent of the cost volume of GDR exports to the West is attributed to the share of petroleum products.) Such a phenomenon is no exception. In the structure of "hard" exports by almost all European CEMA countries, the products of primary processing of Soviet raw materials hold a very important place. Without them these states would hardly be able to achieve a more or less satisfactory balance of trade in freely convertible currency.

What do we receive in exchange for raw materials, and of what quality? To put it differently, how effective are our machine and technical imports from the GDR and from other countries of the European CEMA region?

In 1988, 18.6 percent of our entire import of equipment came from the GDR. The country ranks first among suppliers to the Soviet Union of agricultural machines and equipment (41.5 percent of the overall Soviet imports of such equipment), metal-cutting machine tools (23.4 percent), refrigeration and air conditioning equipment (55.4 percent), as well as equipment for petroleum processing, chemical, food and polygraphic industries, for instruments and laboratory equipment, pumps, road-building machines, ships and passenger rail cars.

It must be noted that certain types of equipment delivered to the USSR from the GDR also enjoy demand in the markets of Western countries. This concerns a number of models of NC machine tools, polygraphic and textile machines, instruments, and precision mechanical and optical items. Along with this, the USSR is hardly the only foreign consumer of many metal-intensive machines which are produced in the GDR (for instance, most types of agricultural equipment, lifting and transport equipment, ships, rail cars, etc.). It can be said that the orders by Soviet ministries and departments (at the expense of the state treasury) have made a strong impression on the development of machine building both in the GDR, as well as in the other European CEMA-member countries. These orders, with their obviously lower requirements with regard to quality and technical level of production, often have a decaying effect on the producers. Cases are known in which GDR enterprises, sending more than one-half of produced machine building output without particular problems to the Soviet Union (in accordance with long-term agreements), sells individual units and machines and equipment (and even this on special order) to developed capitalist countries with colossal difficulty.

However, even when a small CEMA country manages to enter Western markets with technical goods similar to those delivered to the USSR, the suggested price does not, as a rule, cover the outlays for their production.

Low exigency with regard to equipment received from European CEMA countries in many ways is explained by the spread among our foreign traders, economic managers and bureaucrats of a disdainful and condescending attitude toward the transferable ruble. Really, it is far easier for the enterprises of most small CEMA countries to get a transferable ruble than hard currency. However, for the Soviet economy the transferable ruble is not slightly cheaper than the foreign-currency ruble, since for obtaining both the one and the other it must deliver

enormous volumes of raw materials and semi-fabricated goods. Unfortunately, those who regard the transferable ruble as a far from first-class currency are often prepared repeatedly to overpay in it, for instance, for machine building output, and have no concept of the real cost proportions or of the true price of the machines being purchased. In order to clarify the essence of the problem, let us compare the estimated average prices for individual types of exported and imported goods in reciprocal exchange between the USSR and GDR (see Table 1):

Table 1. Average Price of Individual Goods Imported from GDR to USSR (According to Data for 1988)

	Price		
	In Transferable Rubles, Thousands	Re-Calculated for That Supplied from the USSR	
		Petroleum, in Tons	Light Automobiles, Per Item
Metal-Cutting Machine Tools	117.8	961	44
Spherical Mills	504.5	4,115	189
Pumps	3.3	27	1.2
Industrial Fittings (Per Ton)	2.5	20	1
Accounting Machines	5.6	46	2
Agricultural Combines	23.7	193	9
Mowing Machines	16.1	127	6
Passenger Rail Cars	196.7	1,604	74
Restaurant Rail Cars	567.7	4,638	213

(Source: "Vneshneekonomicheskiye Svyazi SSSR v 1988 Gody" [USSR Foreign Economic Relations in 1988]. Finansy i Statistika, Moscow, 1989, pp 127-135.)

These exchange proportions are distorted. If foreign trade calculations were made in freely convertible currency and

at current world prices, the proportions of the commodity exchange would be different.

For example, let us compare the average prices for the sale of similar goods to the GDR and to the FRG, based on available data from USSR foreign trade statistics (see Table 2):

Table 2.

Product	Price, Deliveries to the GDR in Transferable Rubles	Price, Deliveries to the FRG in Foreign-Currency Rubles
Petroleum, Per Ton	122.6	119.1
Paper, Per Ton	31.3	117.3
Sulfate Pulp, One Ton	33.5	34.5
Coal, Per Ton	42.7	23.6
Iron, Per Ton	75.9	61.1
Lumber, Per Ton	112.3	82.6
Cotton Fiber, Per Ton	129.8	89.9
Televisions, Per Item	85.7	49.5
Light Automobiles, Per Item	2,664	1,221

(Source: *ibid.*, pp 129-131, 170-172.)

It is obvious from the calculations that the price for many goods delivered to the FRG in foreign-currency rubles is lower than the sale prices to the GDR in transferable rubles. If, for example, we recalculate the volume of Soviet exports to the GDR from transferable into foreign-currency rubles, the difference is 35-40 percent.

However, it does not at all follow from this that in converting to calculations in freely convertible currency the Soviet Union will have to supply more of its own goods than before for imports received from CEMA countries. The point is that there is a highly tangible difference between the transferable rubles, in which calculations with CEMA partners are done, and foreign-currency rubles. A foreign-currency ruble is also a conventional unit, used in domestic foreign trade statistics, but it is backed by payment in real dollars, marks, pounds sterling or other hard currencies.

To evaluate the exports of the GDR to the USSR in freely convertible currency, using the same methodology, i.e., by comparing the sale prices of similar goods in the West and in the East, does not seem possible. This is not only because data on the cost and physical volume of deliveries is not included in GDR statistics. Such a comparison, even if it were possible, would give even more conditional results than the comparison of prices for goods exported from the USSR, since the majority of equipment produced in the small CEMA countries and delivered to the West differs considerably in terms of characteristics from that delivered to the USSR. Also, the conditions for calculations, as a rule, differ, which noticeably affects the price (in world trade, equipment is commonly sold through the granting of credit or other privileges).

However, it is possible to use a different method which, in my opinion, gives relatively satisfactory results, i.e., results approaching the real cost correlations. It is possible to estimate the volumes of deliveries exported from the GDR to the USSR in foreign currency, represented by statistics in transferable rubles, if we compare the domestic outlays in the GDR economy needed to obtain one transferable ruble or one FRG mark.

In the GDR, the official exchange rate for a transferable ruble is 4.67 marks. For most GDR industrial enterprises and combines which deliver their output to the USSR, it is less expensive to obtain a transferable ruble. The foreign trade price in GDR marks, i.e., the enterprise's receipts, payable to it according to this correlation, barely covers its expenses. Thus, according to the leaders of the "Umformtechnik-Erfurt" Combine (which produces metalworking press equipment), it was necessary in the early 1980s to spend 3.6-3.8 GDR marks on export to the USSR in order to obtain one transferable ruble. However, even if we consider that receipts from exports to the USSR only cover expenses for

production and other expenses, i.e., that the effectiveness of export comprises only 100 percent and one transferable ruble costs 4.67 GDR marks, then in 1988 goods were delivered from the GDR to the USSR, according to domestic estimates, amounting to 32.8 billion GDR marks (7.2 billion transferable rubles multiplied by 4.67).

However, what would the domestic price of this export have been, if the GDR had been paid not in transferable rubles but, for instance, in FRG marks? At the present time, when glasnost has been confirmed as a way of life in the GDR, besides everything else, they are learning what it really costs to get hard currency. The well-known economists, professors Krista Luft and Oygen Faude believe, for instance, that in order to earn 1 million FRG marks, at the present time it is necessary to produce and sell exported goods amounting to a sum on the average of 4.4 million GDR marks.

This means that in order to obtain imports from the USSR in a sum of 13.5-15 billion FRG marks (4.5-5 billion foreign-currency rubles), if paid in hard currency, one would have to spend not 32.8 billion marks, but 59-56 billion GDR marks, i.e., twice more. The difference is 26-33 billion GDR marks, or 3.3-4 billion U.S. dollars.

Approximately such a sum would have to be paid additionally by the GDR alone in 1988 for goods delivered from the USSR, if calculations were done in hard currency and the goods were sold at current world market prices.

USSR-GDR trade, and I would like to emphasize this once more, is seen by us only as a partial case, as a fragment of the overall situation in the CEMA market on the whole. According to calculations by Hungarian economists, for instance, in the event of conversion to calculations in SKV, Hungary would have trade liabilities with the USSR of 1.5 billion dollars. On the whole for 1988 alone (in all six East European CEMA countries), payment for imports from the USSR should have increased by roughly 12-15 billion dollars. On the one hand, this sum can be seen as a great support for the economies of these countries, and on the other, as a profit not obtained by the economy of the Soviet Union.

The given calculations provide grounds for assuming that, on conversion to payment of reciprocal deliveries in freely convertible currency, the Soviet side would be the winner. However, it would be wrong to believe that this type of calculation will be advantageous only for the USSR. This formulation of the matter does not take into account at least two important elements. First, it means acknowledging the present procedure for calculations as equally advantageous, when the Soviet Union receives only half or somewhat more than half the receipts that it might have had from selling its export commodities outside the CEMA market. Second, a gradual but decisive conversion to payment in SKV, although highly

painful for all CEMA countries, will unquestionably contribute to intensive growth in the competitiveness of their goods.

The introduction of calculations in SKV means that the country, having received this currency in payment for its export, naturally will not rush to spend it to acquire goods in the importer country. Of course, this will lead to a substantial reduction in reciprocal trade within the framework of CEMA but, unquestionably, it will also make this exchange healthier and make it possible to set it on a real economic footing.

In the event of conversion to calculations in SKV, many commodity flows in the foreign trade among CEMA partner-countries will, most likely, change direction, and some will vanish completely. From 50 to 70 percent of the overall foreign trade circulation of these countries will no longer have to go into reciprocal trade in CEMA. Evidently, the content of multilateral cooperation will also change: its main link will be shifted to the enterprise level. At the same time, we must not rule out the possibility that, at a macroeconomic level, the aspiration to balance deliveries and payments on a bilateral basis will become even stronger. At first glance, the anticipated foreign manifestations of conversion to calculations in SKV would hardly inspire optimism regarding prospects both for the CEMA market, as well as for the organization itself: trade will be displaced, commercial considerations will prevail instead of "mutual assistance," etc. However, the new approach, the idea of which was formulated at the 45th CEMA Session, nonetheless has advantages, since genuine economic interest will return in reciprocal trade among East European countries and the USSR, and the gap between the two levels of competition—"Western" and "Eastern"—will be eliminated. Enterprises working for the Soviet market will start receiving the very same guidelines and incentives from their partners, as from any other customer on the world market.

Conversion to the new procedure for calculations, if it is implemented consistently and without the appearance of some variant of the former clearing accounts in dollars instead of in transferable rubles, will unquestionably promote improvement both of cooperation in general, as well as of the economies of partner-countries. For example, the domestic use of imported energy sources will be cut back to reasonable limits, and the energy- and material-intensiveness of industry will decrease.

However, it would be unfair to demand that conversion to calculations in SKV occur at once in all CEMA countries and for the entire assortment of deliveries. Not one of the partner-countries' economies could endure this. In the end, the current mechanism for cooperation, which stipulates unequal exchange, is a continuation of the command-administrative system, which was not asserted through the free choice of the peoples of these countries. This is just as obvious as the fact that the peoples of our country have become hostages to the arbitrariness of their leaders. However, it would be

unfair to require our CEMA partners to pay the profit that we did not receive in previous years, just as it would be unfair to delay conversion to calculations in SKV, to put it off beyond the 5-year period that is now beginning.

For example, in trade with the GDR, in my opinion, conversion to market relations, i.e., to calculations in SKV at current world prices, should be implemented soon, above all taking into account the prospects and foreseeable consequences of the currency and financial union of the two German states. In this regard, in the course of a certain transitional period, trade through clearing is also possible, within the framework of which the Soviet side could acquire goods both in the GDR, as well as in the FRG. One way or another, economic ties between the USSR and GDR and the USSR-FRG should be transformed into Soviet-German economic relations. It is best from the very start to set their foundation on solid, reliable blocks. It would be expedient to use elements from present-day ties, such as a good knowledge of the needs of one's partners, already arranged transportation flows, the existing infrastructure, and finally, purely human contacts. In the near future, we should strive, without insisting on retaining the past gains and transient advantages of existing economic relations, to save and augment genuine values.

In facilitating the assimilation of new principles for cooperation in the European CEMA countries, it would also be possible to use price discounts (in hard currency) for Soviet export goods, to extensively apply the granting of privileged credits and other understood preferences, in no way camouflaged, which are accepted in a market economy.

As far as the non-European CEMA countries are concerned, the standard of living of whose population is lower than that for citizens of our country, as proposed by the USSR delegation to the 45th CEMA Session, conversion to the new methods of cooperation with them should occur using a more merciful procedure.

The principle question of our participation in the new mechanism for economic cooperation within CEMA is the rational use of Soviet raw material exports. Above all, it would follow, apparently, to try to soberly assess the prospects for improving our export structure. Even if we succeed in substantially raising the level of domestic machine building, the only stable source of hard currency receipts in the foreseeable future will remain deliveries of raw and semi-fabricated materials abroad. In addition to this, we cannot seriously assume that raw material export is a priori ineffective or generally disadvantageous. How we should sell raw materials and utilize the funds received is another matter. Raw materials, especially mineral, the reserves of which are essentially irreplaceable, should be regarded as national property. Therefore, they should be sold with the highest possible effectiveness, which can only be done when payment for raw materials is made in freely convertible currency. Sale by barter, i.e., in exchange for goods, should be done only if "hard" commodities are offered in exchange.

Deliveries of "foreign-currency" commodities, made in secret for the realization of sometimes questionable or vague political goals, are intolerable.

It seems to me that the state should be the basic retainer of the hard currency funds received from the export of raw materials and the products of their primary processing. From this, it follows that it would be expedient to grant the foreign-trade organizations which sell these commodities the status of state companies of Union or republic subordination. This type of state monopoly in foreign economic activity, in my opinion, must not only be kept, but also strengthened, since the income received from the sale of raw materials should in its overwhelming part, due to the specific nature of the commodity, belong to all of society, not to a specific extraction sector or its enterprises. The latter, however, do have a right to possess mandatory fixed deductions in hard currency, correlated to the volume of export sales of the corresponding type of raw material.

Receipts from the sale of raw and semi-fabricated materials could form a basis for the country's standardized currency fund (for the Union on the whole, and for individual republics). The influx of funds from the sale of ready-made items, naturally, will be on an order of magnitude lower compared to receipts from the export of raw materials. I assume that at present it would be worth leaving hard currency receipts virtually intact for the producers of ready-made, technically complex products salable for SKV. The share of deductions to the standardized currency fund should be greater, the more the hard currency receipt is predetermined by the "natural," not by the "human" factor. In other words, with an increased degree of processing, the share of hard currency funds left for the producer should also increase. Obviously, such a procedure must rule out the possibility of "giving" the entire hard currency profit to someone who sells titanium shovels. Ruinous fine sanctions should be applied against such exporters in the event of concealment by them of undeservedly received hard currency funds.

Formation of a standardized hard currency fund in itself, however, does not guarantee that funds received from the sale of raw materials will not be used just as ineffectively, as they are now. Therefore, it follows to fundamentally change the procedure itself for using state hard currency funds, or rather, for disposing of them.

The state's hard currency monopoly in its current form generates the ineffectiveness of hard currency outlays. This is because some privileged departments and their enterprises or organizations receive hard currency or "foreign-currency" commodities quite inexpensively and rather easily. Goods are acquired with the hard currency allocated to a sector, which are sold to the consumer for symbolic payment in rubles. The price in this regard depends not so much on the hard currency expenditures, as on the price for a similar Soviet item. Thus, the majority of types of machines and equipment, as well as food, is acquired abroad and sold within the

country. In this case, the foreign-currency ruble costs the domestic consumer 1-2 rubles on the average, or sometimes even less.

The foreign-currency ruble costs somewhat more for those who have received the right of independent access to the foreign market. However, participants in the hard currency auctions now being held by way of an experiment, at which more than 25 rubles are offered to the dollar (i.e., more than 30 domestic rubles for 1 foreign-currency ruble) pay the highest price for hard currency.

This is as regards legal entities. The direct consumers pay for hard currency goods both at paradoxically low prices (for example, when they buy bread baked from wheat purchased across the ocean) and at fantastically high prices (when they buy tights, costing no more than 50 cents in American department stores, for 6 rubles).

As a result, it is a matter of numerous unofficial exchange rates for hard currency (not to mention the most unofficial one, the "black market" exchange rate), which does not enable us to raise the effectiveness of foreign trade, since it is quite impossible to calculate it. Which, in fact, is more effective: buying a machine tool for 1,000 dollars and selling it to an enterprise for 1000 rubles or, for the same sum, acquiring several VCRs and selling them through the trade network? The answer is not as obvious as it seems.

I would like to share the position of B. Fedorov (KOMMUNIST, No 8, 1990) to the effect that currency funds should not be distributed among the ministries, but only sold (using standardized currency exchange rate coefficients) to all legal and civil entities without exception. Supply and demand could be fully regulated by centrally established exchange rates for currencies, such that the balance of the country's currency funds will always be positive. For purposes of preferential foreign-currency financing for certain generally significant projects and programs, it is possible in selling currency in specific transactions to establish reduced exchange rates compared to the usual rate. Such a procedure would make it possible to facilitate a conversion to convertibility of the ruble, would open up additional possibilities for financing foreign trips by our citizens and, mainly, would deaden the appetite of certain ministries and departments, which are unaccustomed to counting the state funds spent by them.

To this day, the principle by which the state, acting as the main exporter, is also obliged to be the biggest importer seems almost sacred to us. The more so, since the experience of newly-appeared businessmen from state industries and cooperatives with entering the international market has not, for the time being, been very successful.

However, I believe that their activity, if it does any harm, does incomparably less than that done by decisions made at the apparatus level concerning deliveries and purchases. Evidence of this are the very expensive sales of raw materials and the dead weight of imported

equipment. The need to buy foreign-currency funds at realistic exchange rates will force us to rid ourselves of indifference and rapidly master not only the arithmetic, but also the algebra of the foreign market.

The proposed measures, it seems to me, can be fully included in the concept of conversion to a market-type economy and can become a component part of the reform of prices and the currency and financial mechanism.

Summarizing the above, I would like to stress that our country's foreign trade faces serious trials. It can and should make a far more weighty contribution to improving the Soviet economy.

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BOOK REVIEWS, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, INFORMATION

'Mental Confusion' or 'Civil Valor:' Thoughts on Informals in Connection with A Book

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[Review by V. Mironov, candidate of historical sciences, of a collection of works: "*Neformaly: Sotsialnyye Initsiativy*" [The Informals: Social Initiatives]. Moskovskiy Rabochiy, Moscow, 1990, 240 pp]

[Text] The main thing that perestroyka has given in a period of 5 years is a radical change in the country's political climate, a renovation of the social atmosphere that we breathe. It has awakened broad strata of people, who previously existed in a state of lethargy, to active civil life. Diverse, powerful mass movements in which millions of people are involved have appeared on the political scene. The populace has begun to turn into a people. A genuine boom of self-organization has gripped the country: thousands of public clubs and associations, fronts and federations, and groups and committees have appeared. The depressed and monotonous political landscape has been miraculously transformed and, among other novelties, an exotic, to use Aristotle's words, political animal has appeared, the "informal."

The book under review ("*Neformaly: Sotsialnyye Initsiativy*" [The Informals: Social Initiatives]. Moskovskiy Rabochiy, Moscow, 1990, 240 pp) is devoted precisely to this powerful explosion of mass self-activity and activeness, which has received the capacious, although not entirely accurate name "informal movement." It is quite possible that it will become a sort of document source for future historians of perestroyka: the point is that many of its authors are activists and leaders of informal associations. Therefore, the collection is not simply a study, but also an opportunity for programmatic expression, a kind of manifesto of the informal movement and even an attempt to interpret it theoretically.

On the whole, the book presents a broad-scale, mixed and contradictory picture of the involvement of broad strata of people in politics from well-considered and objective positions. Everything is here: the Kuzbass and popular front strikes, the Democratic Union and student groups, the Inter-regional Deputy Group, and other groups and associations... Perhaps such breadth of material does not quite conform to the book's title: after all, the miners' strike or the Popular Front of, for instance, Estonia can hardly still be called informal movements. Apparently, the term "informal movement" itself, born in its day out of the opposition by the new mass activeness to the official political system, today does not fully reflect the essence of this phenomenon, which is rapidly becoming a legal part of our social scenery.

Who are they, the informals? In order to understand the nature of one or another movement, one should determine its goals, the make-up of its participants, the means of struggle that are used, and its place in the sociopolitical system. For the time being, the predominance of a kind of "inherent negativism," when people unite in a struggle against, rather than for something, is characteristic of almost all elements of the informal movement (as is obvious from the book). The informals are speaking out *against* the administrative-command system and the apparatus's domination. Another specific feature of their outlook is the obvious orientation (which, incidentally, comes from the above-mentioned) toward "power" problems, with the sufficiently secondary role of strictly socioeconomic requirements. The fact that powerful mobilizing slogans, such as the demand for social justice or regional cost-accounting, in many ways arithmetically interpreted, are treated more in a distribution sense, also relates to this.

In general, distribution relations dominate the "informal consciousness" and determine the nature of the main contradictions in society. Thus, an article by O. Rumyantsev (who became, incidentally, one of the leaders of the social democratic movement), which claims to be a philosophical substantiation of the informal movement, defines the main contradiction of real socialism as the contradiction between the system of "ideocratic centralized redistribution and the awakening civil society" (p 204).

Such fascination with distribution relations (and a form of ideology, transformed consciousness, is inherent in the informals) does not allow them, it seems, to see the more fundamental relations which are developing both strictly in production (appropriation), as well as in the sphere of power (compulsion, regulation). It is important to note that, being theoretically incorrect, the "redistribution model" sufficiently accurately reflects the sociopsychological moods in the informal movement. In fact, demands for changes in the distribution system predominate at a mass level, to the detriment of demands to transform ownership relations. The slogan "give us land (plants, laboratories, etc.) and free will, and we will do the rest ourselves" was only glimpsed once in the book, but also in the country the demand to transfer

the land to the peasants, the plants—to the workers, and the institutes—to the intelligentsia has by no means become a detonator for the mass movement. Therefore, it is natural that, although all these classes and social groups are represented in the informal movement, they are acting not from their own specific social and group interests, but as citizens.

In this regard, the theme of interrelations between informals and workers is of special interest. Several chapters on the miners' strikes, which stand on their own in the book, were devoted to this. From the "informal" point of view, the striking miners cannot be considered informals. However, the chapter on the Kuzbass is no accident. The point is that the overwhelming majority in the informal associations is made up of representatives of the middle strata and the intelligentsia, yet there are few who are strictly workers (not ITR [engineering and technical employees] or administrators of various levels). However, everyone realizes what gigantic strength the working class has. Hence the persistent attempts to assimilate the workers' environment, to influence the strike movement in one direction or another depending on one's own goals.

A predominantly instrumental approach toward the working class is inherent in many informals, including the progressively minded, as the materials of the book confirm. This, perhaps, is most telling in the primordial "intellectual" attitude toward the proletariat, which is in need of education, upbringing, leadership, etc.

The Kuzbass decisively refuted this opinion. Most likely, we have not yet fully realized the entire historical meaning of that which occurred in the country's coal basins in the summer of 1989. Of course, the strikes can be viewed in various ways, but it cannot be denied that the powerful triumph of the workers masses in politics essentially meant a revival of the workers movement, stifled during the years of Stalinism. First, the Kuzbass revealed the surprisingly high level of independence on the part of the miners, who did not allow themselves be distracted by any "experiments" whatsoever. Second, against the background of the numerous interethnic conflicts that had seized the country, the miners movement demonstrated traditional proletarian values (p 130), above all internationalism.

Finally, the workers revealed a phenomenal capacity for self-organization. The strike committees, born in the crucible of the miners' protests, are not simply bodies for the leadership of a strike. In terms of their sociopolitical nature, they can be seen as an offshoot of a unitarian grass-roots political organization for which the mass movement for perestroika is not enough and which, it seems, is capable of becoming a framework for profound democratization at the "capillary level" on the scale of the whole country.

The absence of such unitarian grass-roots bodies stipulated, evidently, the circumstance that the activeness of informals has unfolded predominantly in the form of

discussions, talks, seminars, acting out roles, etc., and their scales vary from student auditoriums and television debates involving several intellectuals to grandiose debate-rallies. Under these conditions, a purely intellectual form of association, the club, is the leading form. However, means of struggle such as direct action are also developing gradually. The book presents an accurate, in our opinion, typology of the informal movements in terms of organizations: a) clubs and associations, b) popular fronts, and c) political groups that claim the roles of parties.

On the whole, analysis of this collection lets us conclude that it is a question of a broad mass movement of a predominantly populist persuasion, i.e. an inter-class movement, developing not in the system of ownership relations, but above all in the sphere of power relations with a predominant emphasis on their distribution functions.

This populist nature forms the basis of many "childhood and other diseases of democracy," inherent in the informals. Several of their detachments are distinguished by intolerance and aggressiveness; new "supermen" or "masters of power" may appear in their "apparatus" depths. Populism is also an active catalyst for turning national feelings into militant nationalism, which is becoming an ideology for some informal associations.

However, regardless of all the costs and exaggerations, the appearance of informal movements is one of the most important symptoms of the rapid maturation of civil society in our country, which can fully develop only when an economic subject arises independently of the state. The statutes of almost all informals include the classic thesis of Marxism concerning a radical reduction in the state sphere and, in the future, dissolution of the state within society.

In the political regard, the informal movement is like an iceberg, the large part of which is the grass-roots activeness of the masses, while its small part consists of politicized groups that are kinds of proto-parties. However, this is an unusual iceberg: its big, massive part is obvious, while the small, politicized part is hidden. The point is that, for the time being, an insignificant number of these groups are openly striving to declare themselves parties. These include the so-called Democratic Union. The ideology and tactics of this association are criticized with full grounds in the collection. As a shortcoming of this criticism, let us note its somewhat simplified nature, and as a virtue, its true indication of the reactionary utopianism of the Democratic Union's program, which essentially demands erasing the last 72 years from the country's history.

On the whole, since the new mechanism for elections and congresses of people's deputies has started functioning, the informals are as though at a crossroads: either try to become parties and part of the parliamentary system, or remain grass-roots mass nonparliamentary movements. Obviously, a certain segment of the informals will take

one path, and another—the other. Which path will be the main one will depend in many ways on the other chief “hero” of the book, the CPSU. Essentially, the theme of relations between the informals and the CPSU and the related problem of a multiparty system is central throughout the collection.

In real life, there are no strict boundaries between parties and informals: many people in the CPSU participate in the informal movement, and among the informals communists are a sizable and influential force. Criticism of the today's situation in the party (of which there is a great deal in the book) both by the communists themselves, as well as by the socialist sector of the informal movement, coincides in principle: the party should cease to be the supporting element of state-administrative and economic structures, exploiting its political authority. The vanguard role of the Communist Party is justifiably seen not in the fact that it single-handedly controls the state or educates the masses, but in the fact that it has formed conditions for conversion to full self-management of the people. Due to the profound deformations that have struck the party, it will be unable to completely fulfill this role.

The book includes many disturbing facts which attest to the party's lag behind the processes of perestroika, to the inertia of the party apparatus, to the overflow of the grass-roots activeness of communists beyond the party framework, and to the low effectiveness of party journalism. Under these conditions, individual informal movements are outflanking the CPSU; the party has started to lose its hegemony in certain sectors of the mass movement. In the opinion of many of the book's authors, and one can agree with this, all this is “working” to turn the informal associations into parties, to reveal a “specifically Soviet multiparty system” (p 59). Moreover, as the book notes, a possible form for converting to a multiparty system could be the “self-division of the party,” i.e., the formation on the basis of the CPSU of several parties, like the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party.

Incidentally, a multiparty system could take shape not only “from below,” but also “from above:” through the formation of factions at the Congress of People's Deputies (for example, the Inter-regional Group). Under these conditions, in my opinion, the fascination with Western-type parliamentary systems on the part of several authors in the book is dangerous, for they do not take into account the fundamental differences of the system of the soviets from Western democracies.

Today, the question of a multiparty system is being actively debated in society. In the context of the debates that are unfolding, I would like to voice my own opinion. The principle of a multiparty system itself is yesterday's history in many ways (in the West, the traditional party form is undergoing an acute crisis), but also has little to do with the essence of democracy. After all, if by democracy we mean the real and direct participation of each person in solving all problems affecting his life and

labor, then it should be recognized that a multiparty system essentially leads to the exclusion of enormous masses from the political process. In fact, in a multiparty system the role of the masses in politics is limited basically to the fact that they make their vote once every 4 or 5 years for one of several parties competing among themselves or, to put it differently, they select one from among a number of party programs presented to them, the formation of which the ordinary voter can in no way influence. In my opinion, precisely self-management, the broad extra-party, grass-roots movements are a type of democracy, answering both the calls for NTR, as well as the nature of socialism and the people's craving for participation. Incidentally, certain informals understand this when they emphasize the existence in Western democracies of a “multiparty partocracy,” which actually reinforces bureaucracy.

In the debate surrounding the multiparty system, in my opinion, it is important to realize that the point is not that the party does not “want” to part with power. Elementary political realism suggests that the sharp weakening of the party and its scattering or, the more so, its alienation from the political scene will not give rise to some kind of “mythical” multiparty system, but will lead the country into chaos, since the CPSU acts as a stabilizing element for transformation. (After all, for the time being a structure capable of taking the power functions upon itself—the soviets—is not yet fully formed). However, it is just as obvious that delaying perestroika within the party itself will also bring the country to chaos, since it will then be unable to integrate rapidly differentiating interests.

Thus, a multiparty system is no panacea. Moreover, depending on the political regime, it may either stimulate or hold back the democratic process. As noted in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress, our society's development is creating the possibility of forming parties. The communists do not lay claim to a monopoly and are proceeding from the fact that democratization of society and the inclusion of citizens in politics has decisive significance.

What is the essence of this democratic alternative to a multiparty system of a particularly Western model? How do we fill the multiparty system that is being created with a precisely democratic content? For this, first, we need a rapid and profound democratization of the party, right up to recognizing different platforms within it, and a radical change of the mechanism for drafting party decisions. If this process is delayed, one can then agree with the opinion that the course of democratization will “flow around fossilized institutions and find a different path for itself, as happened in Poland and Hungary” (p 65). So, it is a question of the party's destiny.

Second, a democratic alternative requires a well-developed and powerful structure for mass, grass-roots extra-parliamentary and extra-party activeness by the people. The fate of the informal movement, which must

slip through between the Scylla of party superficiality and break-up and the Charybdis of depoliticization, directly relates to this.

These two alternatives can be combined through a union of communists and informals. The CPSU sees their progressive and constructive wing as a powerful motive force for perestroika and its own important ally. The party, as M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, offers dialogue and cooperation to all social organizations and movements, and invites them to joint action in restructuring and renovating society.

Of course, it is impossible in one book to exhaust a multifaceted theme, theoretically and politically still far from clear, such as the informal movement. The establishment in the country of a civil society and the enrichment of the political system with ever new structures, born in the process of perestroika, require competent, serious study of the trends and prospects for the development of informal movements in the future. It is good that Moskovskiy Rabochiy has started this interpretation with its book "*Neformaly: Sotsialnyye Initsiativy*."

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New International Theoretical Journal

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[Review by V. Rykin, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] On the initiative of the leadership of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (ISRP) and F. Gonzales, its general secretary, a new journal EL SOCIALISMO DEL FUTURO ("Socialism of the Future") has begun publication in Madrid. The first issue, in the Spanish language, came out in March 1990. The very fact that the leading committee of this journal, together with A. Guerra, deputy secretary general of the ISRP, includes O. Lafontaine, the deputy chairman of the German Social Democratic Party, the Polish social scientist A. Schaff, noted leaders of several European social democratic parties and of the Italian Communist Party, confirms that this is an authoritative international theoretical publication. For the time being the intention is to publish two issues per year in Spanish and in the English, French, German and other European languages.

Judging not only by the editorial membership but also the nature of the articles included in the first issue, this is an essentially new theoretical journal in which social democrats, communists and representatives of other left-wing social and political forces can freely debate. The main topic, the study of which will be subject of prime attention, is how is socialism perceived. The first issue takes as a base the debate which took place at the international meeting of scientists and political personalities, held in Madrid in September 1989. It is partially discussed in the articles by A. Guerra, O. Lafontaine and A. Schaff. One of the main sections in the publication is

"What Should Be Understood by Socialism of the Future?" In subsequent issues the following problems will be discussed in the journal: socialism and ideology; socialism in the age of the scientific and technical revolution; changes in labor relations and labor conditions; the situation in the socialist countries and its evolution; and socialism and the new social order. The list of submitted articles is interesting. They include "Communism and Social Democracy" (F. Claudin, Spain); "The Present and Future of Socialism" (E. Mandel, one of the leaders of the Fourth International); "Socialism of the Future" (D. Napolitano, Italy); "Socialism and Social Progress" (X.F. Tسانos, Spain); "What Type of Socialism?" (L. Pellikani, Italy); "The Future of Socialism. Prospects from Scandinavia to Africa" (U. Himmelstrand, Sweden); and "Stalinism: What Then?" (A. Werblyan, Poland).

The articles in the first issue require a close study and a considerate assessment. This will be something for the future. Today the articles "The World of the Future and Socialism" by M.S. Gorbachev and "The Future of Democratic Socialism" by W. Brandt can be read in issue No 2 for 1990 in the journal RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNY MIR, which intends to publish the most significant articles carried by SOCIALISM OF THE FUTURE.

The initiative to invite M.S. Gorbachev to write an article for the first issue of the new journal did not originate with the editors alone: the open dialogue on problems of socialism was suggested by W. Brandt, one of the acknowledged leaders of the contemporary social democratic movement. Strictly speaking, the dialogue between communists and social democrats has been going on for several years. It has covered a number of areas, such as disarmament, ecology, economic relations, and others.

In discussing problems of the established cooperation, M.S. Gorbachev pointed out that "I am pleased that in recent years serious and meaningful contacts have been developing between communist and social democratic parties. For the first time since 1914 a new process has started. I welcome it. Surmounting the historical division within the labor movement would be of tremendous importance in the context of the current changes in the world" (RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNY MIR, No 2, 1990, p 10). As though continuing this thought, W. Brandt writes: "One of the most important and encouraging features of our time is the opportunity for new dialogues made possible by the realization of the common interests of mankind. Ideological dogmatism has been replaced in a number of cases with views of understanding and cooperation. The impression is growing that despite remaining differences, the area of problems on which common positions are unquestionable is broadening. This means, for the different political formations, possibilities of reciprocal exchange which is fruitful for all" (ibid., p 19).

The two sides have set the problem of socialism as a phenomenon of a qualitatively new nature as the focal point of such exchanges. Several years ago it would have been difficult even to assume that an open and constructive dialogue was possible between communists and social democrats. Today it is a reality. Furthermore, representatives of other parties and views are being invited to discuss models of the socialism of the future, along with anyone who has a serious attitude toward the development of a socialist future for mankind. Are we not dealing here with the formulation of yet another, a new universal human task? Time and the dialogue will reveal this.

So far, only one issue of SOCIALISM OF THE FUTURE has come out. Its editors do not include a Soviet representative. However, the wish to correct this omission has already been expressed along with interest in constant cooperation with us. Now we must jointly think about socialism of the future, for the sake of the future itself.

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